Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1974

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Michel Oksenberg
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2

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EDITOR: Paul A. Smith, Jr.
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1 The Chinese Political Spectrum
by Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein

14 Sino-Indian Relations: Changing Perspectives
by S. P. Seth

27 Kim's Korean Communism
by Bruce G. Cumings

42 The Italian CP at the Grass Roots
by Alan J. Stern

BOOKS

55 The Life Struggle of Indian Communism
by Bhabani Sen Gupta

60 The Maoist Educational Revolution
by Theodore H. C. Chen

65 Stalinism: A Marxist Analysis
by William Zimmerman

68 Marx and the Soviet Path
by Jiri Valenta

71 Of Encyclopedias and Economists
by Vladimir G. Treml

74 The Political Economy of Comecon
by Andrzej Korbonski

NOTES & VIEWS

78 Correspondence

Cover: Chou En-lai, veteran party leader and Premier of the People's Republic of China, pictured at Peking Airport in 1970. Photo by Denes Baracs for Interfoto MTI (Hungary) via EUPRA.

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The Chinese Political Spectrum

By Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein

Recent developments in China point to two unmistakable conclusions. The first is that the spirit of the Cultural Revolution has not been extinguished; the second, that the leadership at the top remains unstable and tension-ridden.

With respect to the first, it is clear that while the massive campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius is not a second Cultural Revolution in the sense of rampaging Red Guards, uncontrolled and violent factional strife, paralyzed government and party hierarchies, and military rule, the campaign has nevertheless reinvigorated Cultural Revolution policies in the cultural, educational, and—to a lesser extent—economic realms. The controlled, disciplined movement now under way in China may, in fact, conform to what Mao originally intended in 1966, before the Cultural Revolution escaped his control and turned into a purge of bureaucrats by mobs that were partly out of hand and partly manipulated from above.

Regarding the second, the spectacular return of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the rise of Wang Hung-wen to the third spot in the party hierarchy, the transfers of military commanders, the continual shifting around of individual leaders in officially-released photographs—all are signs of persistent uncertainty. More important indications are the large number of unfilled positions at the center and in the provinces and the failure, as yet, to convene the long-postponed National People's Congress. One suspects a continuing struggle over the positions involved.

While this much seems relatively clear, the *reasons* for the staying power of the Cultural Revolution and the continued instability at the top are a great deal more difficult to pin down. Indeed, observers may differ even on how to go about explaining these phenomena. As will be seen below, there are a number of valid perspectives from which to analyze them. This paper will examine the current struggles from a somewhat broad and historical perspective. More specifically, it will probe the two following questions: What is the makeup of the political spectrum in China today—not necessarily as the Chinese might describe it, but as seen by Western observers? And how does this perspective shed light on the current situation?

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Needed: A New Analytical Framework

In a fundamental sense, Chinese Communists and most Western "China watchers" have employed similar language and the same simplifying assumption to describe the political spectrum of Chinese struggles over official position and policy. They both describe these struggles in terms of two opposing lines or camps: "left" and "right."

To be sure, Chinese and Westerners attach different meanings to these labels. To the Chinese, the "left" represents the interest of the proletariat and of peasants from poorer backgrounds. The "left" is the sane, progressive side, committed to Maoist principles and to sound, socialist development of

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China's culture and economy. The Chinese identify the "right" as the side of conservatism, "revisionism," or "capitalism"—the side whose policies would erode the vitality of the revolution.

Most Westerners, on the other hand, think of the "leftists" in China as the radicals, the extremists, the reds, the utopians, the campaigners, or the ideologues. (The "leftists" include the groups whom the Chinese call "extreme leftists.") Opposed to them, in the Western idiom, are the moderates, realists, experts, pragmatists, or bureaucrats, all seen as making up the "right." In this language, these are the sane people, committed to the rational, flexible development of the economy and of political institutions.

Hence, in the Chinese media "left" refers to the "good" forces on the China scene, while in the Western media the opposite is true. Further, since the term "left" in China and in the West does not refer to the same properties, the same individual could be classified as a true "leftist"—*i.e.*, committed to revolution—by the Chinese, and a "rightist"—*i.e.*, pragmatist—by Westerners.

It is important to focus on the labels because the language and simplifying assumptions that are employed to analyze politics have a decisive impact upon the analysis itself. Unfortunately, both the Chinese and the dominant Western terminologies obfuscate more than they illuminate. Chinese politics are more complicated than the "two-line struggle" model suggests, and to describe them in simplistic terms of "left" *vs.* "right" or "radical" *vs.* "moderate" not only precludes analysis of the process whereby coalitions are pieced together over a number of issues, but also obscures the shadings of opinion involved.

Furthermore, such labels as "radical" and "moderate" do not sensitize analysts to the Chinese cultural context and to the nature of the Chinese political spectrum. What, precisely, does it mean to be "moderate" in the Chinese milieu? It is all too easy to forget that moderation to the Chinese is not the same as moderation in the American context. As his lifelong commitment to the revolutionary cause demonstrates, Chou En-lai—perhaps "moderate" in the current Chinese spectrum—hardly has the same value commitments as such American moderates as Nelson Rockefeller or Edmund Muskie.

In order to free analysis from the misleading dichotomy just described, other categories and terms, hopefully value-neutral, are proposed here. In place of the "two-line" framework, the author proposes a 'four-line" interpretation of Chinese political struggle, particularly in the foreign policy realm. The four camps representing these lines are designated: 1) the militant fundamentalists; 2) the radical conservatives; 3) the eclectic modernizers; and 4) the Westernized Chinese.

Two Basic Assumptions

This classification scheme is rooted in two basic assumptions about Chinese politics. The first is that it is useful to focus on the issues involved in political struggles rather than just the contest for office. The second is that a few key, interrelated issues continuously have been at the core of Chinese politics. Let us elaborate upon these assumptions.

Political struggles in China have been more than contests over position; substantive issues have continually been at stake as well. At the very least, ambitious politicians have cloaked their grab for office and used issues for the purpose of attacking adversaries and securing allies. To be sure, bureaucratic politics and personality clashes have also been involved. Questions of the succession to Mao and of personal political survival have certainly been important concerns for Chinese political figures at

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, after having been in political eclipse since the Cultural Revolution, reemerged in early 1974 when he was reinstated as a member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and appointed Deputy Premier.

—Photo by Denes Baracs for Interfoto MTI (Hungary) via Photoreporters.

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least since the Kao Kang affair of 1953.[1] And assuredly, a full explanation of the Great Leap Forward of 1958–59—its timing, precise programs, leadership style—requires reference to the bureaucratic interplay of party and government and to the personal relations among Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen, Chou En-lai, and Ch'en Yun. Similarly, understanding the politics of the Cultural Revolution era certainly requires reference to the rise of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the interplay between the central and various regional bureaucracies of the CCP and PLA, and the clashes among Liu, Lin Piao, Chiang Ch'ing, and Chou En-lai.

Yet, efforts to explain Chinese politics in totally issue-less terms—that is, in terms of individuals or factions solely interested in power and reward, or of five field armies jostling for position and hegemony[2]—suffer from a major weakness. This weakness is that they do not illuminate either the problems with which the leaders seem conscientiously to be wrestling or China's distinctive path of development. And it is precisely this path of development and, more importantly, the issues and choices it poses that determine the parameters and the opportunities for the exercise of power.

To be more specific, considerable insight into the Cultural Revolution is obtained if one focuses initially on a major problem of the mid-1960's—how to preserve the vitality of the Communist revolution. Similarly, the Great Leap becomes more intelligible if one considers the growing disillusionment in China with the suitability of the Soviet development model, the unanticipated consequences of destalinization, and the search for a rapid, indigenous solution to China's developmental needs. Indeed, with the advantage of 75 years of hindsight, one can see that the Boxer Rebellion was not simply a matter of intense machinations at the Ch'ing court but centered upon the issue of China's proper response to the West. The task of the analyst of contemporary Chinese affairs, then, is to relate current struggles for position and exercise of power to the broader issues and context.

The second basic premise of this discussion is that a core theme has underlain Chinese politics

Younger members of the CCP Politburo: Yao Wen-yuan, left, and Wang Hung-wen.

—Photo by Denes Baracs for Interfoto MTI (Hungary) via Photoreporters.

since the 1840's. The key Chinese concern, as John Fairbank so insightfully noted over a generation ago, has been a search for the proper route to a Chinese modernity, in response to the Western challenge and to powerful indigenous forces also demanding change.[3] What aspects of the past—if any—are supportive of modernity? What features of Western civilization—be it West European, Russian or American—must China accept in order to be able to respond effectively to the West? How much of China's essence can be preserved so that she can retain her proud distinctiveness and heritage? What precisely is the essence to be preserved? What contribution can China make to mankind? What, in short, are the terms upon which a proper relationship should be built with Western countries? As one of Fairbank's students, Joseph Levenson, put it, the search is for modernization with pride.[4]

The issues related to this core concern have remained at the heart of Chinese politics after 1949. As in the late Ch'ing and Republican eras, four separate schools of thought can be identified by their responses to these questions. In this sense, the range of opinions in the People's Republic exhibits remarkable continuity with the spectrums of the past or the range of views visible in Taiwan today.

Admittedly, however, the Communist spectrum

[1] Kao Kang, the head of the State Planning Commission and of the party apparatus in the Northeast, was purged in 1953 over matters related to the succession. See Frederick Teiwes, "The Evolution of Leadership Purges in Communist China," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 41, January-March 1970, pp. 122-35.

[2] Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *ibid.*, No. 53, January-March 1973, pp. 34-56; William Whitson, *The Chinese High Command*, New York, Praeger, 1973, Chap. 12.

[3] The classic statement remains Teng Ssu-yu and John Fairbank, *China's Response to the West*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

[4] *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, Vol. 1, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1958.

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does differ markedly from its predecessors in one major respect: that is, with regard to the essence of China which most participants consciously seek to preserve. In the late Ch'ing period, the avowed aim of most of those concerned with retaining a Chinese essence was to maintain what they believed was the Great Tradition of China—Confucianism as it had evolved through the centuries. Mao's effort has been to define a new essence: one that selectively draws upon the diverse cultural strands from the Chinese past, particularly the "little traditions" of the peasantry, but combines these with the distinctive features of the Chinese route to socialism. From this perspective, Mao's constantly perceived need to battle Confucianist tendencies suggests that many of his countrymen, if less consciously now than in the past, still believe that the preservation of a Chinese essence requires retention of certain Confucian standards of behavior. In any case, the result has been that whereas in the past the essence that the leaders sought to preserve was Confucianism, today that essence at the conscious level has become for many the thought of Mao—although several interpreters of Mao's thought have infused it with more than a dash of Confucianism.

Recognizing this important qualification, then, let us turn to a definition of the four schools of thought based on their responses to the questions outlined above.

The Militant Fundamentalists

Those identified under this label believe that an adequate response to the West can be found within an ideologically aroused populace. This view is rooted in the conviction that the Chinese masses can overcome all challenges through proper motivation and organization. Its proponents are even prepared to accept temporary military defeats, believing that in the long run the Chinese are invincible. This posture, visible even today, is probably linked to the Confucian notion that a government which fosters a truly moral order will enjoy the support of its people and hence will be able to repel would-be conquerers. It also flows from Confucian notions that man is malleable —that it is possible to nurture a moral man, ideologically pure, through a proper educational system.[5]

To create such a moral order, however, nefarious influences must be kept at a distance. Hence, a Western presence in China not only need not be tolerated but *cannot* be tolerated, for only its exclusion will enable the Chinese to build the kind of order that would permit an effective response to the West. Moreover, to develop the moral order, the leaders of the country must develop a close working relationship with the masses. In the most fundamental sense, the leadership doctrine must be democratically determined: it must appeal to, and elicit a positive response from, the people, so that their loyalty will be retained. According to such a doctrine, urbanization and bureaucratization are particularly threatening, for leaders ensconced in cities, presiding at the apex of complex organizations, become easily separated from the masses. There is a parallel in Western criticism of the institutionalized church: unless the pastor works directly among the flock, he cannot create a Christian community.

The militant fundamentalists, then, have been strongly anti-bureaucratic, anti-urban, and anti-foreign. They cling undeviatingly and inflexibly to the ideology, for the ideology is the inspiration, the strength, and the essence of China. To this group, the slogan *tzu-li keng-sheng* (regeneration through one's own effort, or self-reliance) means strict isolation from alien influences; hence, "militant fundamentalism" easily—though not necessarily—leads to xenophobia. It facilitates the expression of nativistic impulses and the accumulated anti-foreign feelings in China that stem from the humiliations suffered at the hands of outsiders—an expression seen in the anti-Christian movement of the 1860's, in the Boxer Rebellion of the 1890's, in the anti-Christian movement of the 1920's, and in the Cultural Revolution of the 1960's. Now again, the campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius is providing an opportunity for the expression of "militant fundamentalist" notions, as in this passage criticizing music by Beethoven and Schubert:

In cultural aggression, untitled music has a particular role to play. On the one hand, by praising it as music of the highest standard, it is possible to promote in countries subjected to such aggression an ideological tendency toward blindly worshipping Western bourgeois musical culture. On the other hand, by propagating the view that "music is an international language," it can widely popularize the cultural view of one-worldism. From this it can be seen that when used in imperialist cultural aggres-

[5] See Donald Munro, "Man, State, and School," in Michel Oksenberg, Ed., *China's Developmental Experience*, New York, Praeger, 1973, pp. 121-43.

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This wall poster in Hsuchang, entitled "Grasp Class Struggle in the Ideological Field," is a sample of the anti-Lin Piao and anti-Confucius campaign in China in recent months. Various subtitles read: "Why Criticize Confucius?" "Confucius and Lin Are Two of a Kind," and "We Must Carry the Revolution to the End." Below there is a condensed translation of the first large block of text on the left side of the poster.

Why Criticize Confucius?

In his political report to the Tenth Party Congress, Comrade Chou En-lai called for tending to class struggle in the superstructure, including various cultural fields, and for reforming all superstructures that do not conform to the economic base. Now throughout the land there is developing a struggle to criticize Confucius. This is an important aspect in implementing the spirit of the Tenth Party Congress, deepening the movement of rectification through criticism of Lin Piao, and carrying on the revolution in the superstructure.

Confucius . . . took the position of the declining slave-owning aristocracy, stubbornly upheld the class grades and ruling order of the slave system, opposed changes in the social system, and attempted to turn back the wheel of history.

All reactionaries have arrogantly worshiped Confucius, and this was in order to use Confucius' reactionary thought as an ideological weapon to restore old systems which suppress the people and oppose the revolution. Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao also spared no efforts in worshiping and exalting Confucius and the schools of Confucianism, and it was Lin Piao, in particular, who, with many of his reactionary ideas derived from Confucius, surreptitiously advocated fedualism, capitalism and revisionism under Marxist camouflage.

Despite having gone through the Cultural Revolution and the movement for rectification through criticism of Lin Piao, we today are still contaminated with the reactionary ideas of Confucius and the schools of Confucianism, which poison us and serve as a major obstacle to the development of socialism. During the current movement for rectification through criticism of Lin Piao . . . certain comrades feel uncomfortable with, give no support to, or even oppose, the new phenomena and new emerging forces . . . still long for the old order of the past.

If we do not eliminate the reactionary ideological influences of Confucius and of Confucianism . . . , we can never correctly implement Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, we can never sustain the continuous revolution under the proletarian dictatorship, and we can never take any steps forward in our time.

—Photo by Wide World.

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sion, untitled music can play the role not only of poisoning the human mind in general, but also of strangling the development of musical culture and destroying national pride and confidence of states subjected to such aggression. This is a reactionary trick . . . even more crafty and vicious than armed aggression with armed forces.[6]

The current burgeoning Chinese relationship with the outside world and the increasing centralization of state power since the Cultural Revolution have obviously disturbed the "militant fundamentalists." Their model of political organization remains the Paris Commune. They attack what they perceive to be the erosion of the Cultural Revolution reforms in the educational realm and in income policies as steps away from creating a moral community.

Militant fundamentalism is at once profoundly utopian and profoundly reactionary. Its utopianism lies in its vision of a Chinese society regenerated through the development of a populace imbued with a new spirit and the cultivation of an ideologically pure leadership. But it is reactionary in its conviction that the inspiration for devising solutions to China's present problems can and must be found in aspects of China's past. In a strict sense, militant fundamentalists are Confucian in their search for a purely moral order.

According to this typology, many now disgraced younger leaders of the Cultural Revolution group—*e.g.*, Ch'i Pen-yü, Kuan Feng, Lin Chieh, Wang Li—certainly were 'militant fundamentalists." [7] The mainland press today claims that they appeared "ultra-leftist" but were in fact "ultra-rightist." We can now understand the logic of this Chinese claim, for what Westerners have commonly perceived as Chinese "leftism" or "utopianism" is actually a reassertion of traditional and in many ways Confucian values.

The Radical Conservatives

This second school of thought also seeks to preserve the essence of China, but with selective borrowing of Western technology. According to this view, China must undergo a major transformation if she is to be capable of an effective response to the West. Moreover, indigenous ideas alone are insufficient, and China must therefore supplement them by tapping the technical knowledge of the West. The formula is one that was advocated by Chang Chih-tung in the late 1800's: "Chinese learning for the essence; Western learning for its application." [8]

Thus, the radical conservatives are prepared to accept ideas and assistance from the West, but they hold that such an involvement must be entered upon cautiously and without sacrifice of Chinese autonomy or initiative. A situation of dependence, they recognize, would mean not only that China would remain subject to exploitation, but also that her transformation would then be such as would benefit the foreigner rather than meet China's own needs. The spirit of this cautious approach is reflected in current Chinese trading practices, as exemplified by the semi-annual trade fair in Canton and the temporary toleration of Hong Kong as a Western enclave serving its originally envisioned treaty-port purpose.

In this school's interpretation, the *tzu-li keng-sheng* or "self-reliance" slogan requires not "isolationism" but rather "independence." Embedded in the logic underlying this view is a sophisticated theory of how true independence can be attained: self-respect and dignity can only be earned, not received as a gift, whether by an individual, a community or a nation. Thus, for radical conservatives, *tzu-li keng-sheng* is a slogan that is appropriate to liberation from perceived oppression. It has much in common with the desire of some blacks in American ghettoes to control local schools and is similar to the lessons which Frantz Fanon learned during the Algerian War:

When people have taken violent part in the national liberation, they will allow no one to set themselves as "liberators." They show themselves to be jealous of the results of their action and take good care not to place their future, their destiny or the fate of their country in the hands of a living god. Yesterday they were completely irresponsible, today they mean to understand everything and make all decisions.[9]

[6] *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* (Peking), Jan. 24, 1974, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, Feb. 1, 1974, p. B-15.

[7] These were the leading figures in the "May 16th group," the extremist faction which sought to topple Chou En-lai. See Barry Burton, "The Cultural Revolution's Ultraleftist Conspiracy: The 'May 16th Group,' " *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), Vol. 11, No. 11, November 1971, pp. 1029-53.

[8] Others have made similar observations. See Stuart Schram, Ed., *Authority, Participation, and Social Change in China*, Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1973; A. Doak Barnett, *Uncertain Passage*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1974.

[9] *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York, Grove Press, 1966.

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In sum, radical conservatives envision an internally-generated transformation, but with selective borrowing from the West at China's initiative and choice. The key, in their view, is the unification of China, which requires not only economic development but also the creation of a sense of modern nationalism among the populace. Crucial also is the sense that the present is an era of rapid global transformation. Since the opportunities that China enjoys to manipulate affairs to her advantage are undergoing constant change, she must retain the necessary diplomatic flexibility to shift with the changes in the global situation. Only the avoidance of entangling alliances will permit China to pursue such a course.

According to this typology, both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung belong in the category of radical conservatives. To be sure, the Chinese essence that each seeks to preserve is quite different, and the contribution that each wishes China to make to the world contrasts sharply. Mao, more than Chiang, has realized that to unify China, the urban and rural areas have to be linked; and certainly Mao has been more committed than Chiang to a restructuring of Chinese society. Chiang's tragedy—which he regretted at the time and which may not have been totally his own choosing—was the degree to which he came to rely on the United States and hence sacrificed a measure of China's autonomy. But Mao and Chiang still have something in common—the idea of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of China through a rule more ideological and personal than bureaucratic. Both have sought to make use of the West while fortifying the confidence of the Chinese in their own talents and heritage; and both have believed that ultimately the Chinese response to the West had to be internally generated.

The radical conservatives of the 1970's support China's cultivation of contacts with the West but also hold that she should retain her relations with the world's "genuine" revolutionary forces and the governments of the Third World. Their desire is to enable China to play upon and exploit all the tensions which Peking discerns in the world today: the tensions among the imperialist powers, between capitalist and socialist governments, and between the exploiting imperialists and the exploited Third World governments. Domestically, the desire is to retain the gains of the Cultural Revolution, so that China can march on toward her own distinctive future and make her own contribution to the realization of man's potential, while at the same time developing realistic military and economic programs. In sum, the radical conservatives—radical in their view of China's need for a restructured society and value system, but conservative in their determination to preserve Chinese autonomy, flexibility, and distinctiveness—advocate a complex and subtle range of programs that frequently are not easily reconcilable.

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party.

—Photo by EUPRA.

The Eclectic Modernizers

This third position, while still seeking to preserve a Chinese essence, is somewhat more tolerant of a Western presence in China. Li Hung-chang in an earlier era and Chou En-lai today seem to be the archetypes of this school. Indeed the "eclectic modernizers" believe that the only way to retain a distinctive Chinese identity is to enter into permanent relations with Western countries at the cost of a slight degree of Chinese independence. Seemingly compromising and flexible, this school accepts an entanglement with the West in order to control, manipulate, and use it. The "eclectic modernizers" also uphold the banner of self-reliance, but to them the

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slogan means neither isolationism as it does to the militant fundamentalists, nor total autonomy as it does to the radical conservatives. Instead, it means self-sufficiency.

The eclectic modernizers differ from the radical conversatives on several points. First, they are less convinced that China's modernization can be generated basically from within. Second, they are more prepared to see an extensive Western presence in China—not just Canton trade fairs and occasional visiting delegations of foreign scientists and others, but an influx of substantial numbers of Western scientists, technicians, language teachers, and so on. A third closely related difference is that the modernizers attach greater importance to specialization and expertise. They believe that if China as a nation is to develop its own path, some individual Chinese will have to sacrifice a portion of their Chinese identity. A vivid example of the difference concerns the training of linguists: should would-be interpreters be sent abroad at a young age to become truly bilingual? The conservatives recognize the need for such people, but they insist that the translator or interpreter should develop his Chinese identity and political consciousness before leaving the country, and hence should not go abroad at a tender age. (Chinese diplomats, it may be noted, rarely take their children abroad.) The modernizers, however, are more prepared to send young people abroad and even to allow them to live in private homes. (A pilot project along these lines is planned with Canada.) They reason that linguistic experts must be trained to meet worldwide standards if they are eventually to be able to defend China's interests in international forums and organizations.

As a corollary, the eclectic modernizers accept the need for a complex, centralized bureaucracy to coordinate the increasing specialization in Chinese society. They are more legalist than Confucian. And while bridging the urban-rural gap is important to them, so, too, is the development of modern urban concentrations where Chinese and Western experts can interact. To members of this school, then, Cultural Revolutions are unpleasant and costly pauses in China's development which are necessary in order to inculcate in the minds of the public the vision of a modern, unified, distinctive nation. While they are proud of the achievements associated with the Tachai production brigade and the Red Flag canal—the symbolic examples of local industry and effective

Politburo members (left to right) Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng and Li Teh-sheng at the Tenth CCP Congress in August 1973.

—Photo from "The Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)," Special Supplement to *China Reconstructs* (Peking), November 1973, p. 4.

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use of indigenous methods in the countryside—they also publicize the Shanghai shipyards and the Peking petrochemical works. In many ways the recent criticism of Antonioni's film on China seemed to express the modernizers' point of view: the film did not dwell sufficiently upon China's modern industry and improved standard of living.

Given the primacy they attach to drawing upon the West, the modernizers at present emphasize a foreign policy that plays upon the tensions that exist among Japan, the USSR, the US, and Western Europe; and to do this China must have contact with these powers, while not becoming dependent upon any one of them. The emphasis is on state-to-state relations, expansion of trade, and participation in international organizations. Internally, the task is to move beyond the Cultural Revolution to develop new programs suited to China's changing problems and opportunities. In this sense, the eclectic modernizers are the real progressives in the Chinese political system.

The Westernized Chinese

This school advocates China's pursuit of national greatness as a Westernized country. It envisions participation in world affairs on Western terms, confident China will eventually emerge as a wealthy and powerful nation. To be sure, the Westernized Chinese differ among themselves as to which Western tradition the Chinese should follow: the American, German, French, British or Soviet. In the short run, the Westernized Chinese advocate alliance with, and dependency upon, the country to be emulated.

In earlier eras, the United States and West European countries were the examples which many Chinese sought to emulate, but the Communist revolution and the retreat of the Kuomintang to Taiwan destroyed the vitality of these cultures on the mainland. Within the Communist movement, the so-called "international wing" has long advocated the desirability of following the Soviet model of development and, more generally, of deferring to Moscow's lead. Prior to the late 1950's, the attraction of the Soviet model, deriving from the Marxist-Leninist tradition, stemmed from a mistaken belief in its lack of cultural specificity. This is to say, many Chinese Communists believed that China, by following the Soviet model, could partake in an internationally valid experience—that China would not have to become Russia in order to import the Soviet model successfully. Indeed, the Westernized Chinese in the CCP who advocated following the Soviet path were able to convince even some militant fundamentalists that China could have five-year plans, Stalinist legal codes, Soviet educational and medical systems, and so on, and still retain her essence and ideological fervor. The actual experience of importing Soviet governmental forms, however, soon made the Chinese aware that the Soviet model was culture-bound. That discovery and the Sino-Soviet dispute led to the conclusion that the pro-Soviet Chinese were peddling an example that was no more suited to China than the models advocated by the Americanized or Anglicized Chinese.

Today, Westernized Chinese on the mainland—no matter their stripe—are few and in hiding. Their only choice is to adopt the protective coloring of another school. The pro-Soviets can pose as militant fundamentalists, upholding Marxism-Leninism as the ideology with which to arm the Chinese people and hoping the ideology one day will again link Peking and Moscow. The Americanized Chinese can pose as eclectic modernizers, ritually espousing self-reliance and the national essence. In a sense, then, Mao's concern is correct. Now that the conspicuous Westernized Chinese—the obvious capitalists and revisionists—have been eliminated, the real problem is to discover the hidden "traitors" among the ranks of those committed to preserving a Chinese essence.

Some Qualifications

Several qualifications and observations concerning this typology are in order. For one thing, individuals change over time. The eclectic modernizer of yesterday can be the militant fundamentalist of today. For example, Joseph Levenson's biography of Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in a sense traces Liang's journey from modernizer to fundamentalist.[10] Moreover, for the Chinese, the choices involved are frequently so stark and painful that they are not made. Ambiguousness, vacillation, efforts to blur distinctions, searches for synthesis, attempts to adopt different postures in different circumstances—these are the ways in which some Chinese seek to avoid commitment to a particular school. The result is a lack of clear-

[10] *Liang Ch'i ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1953. Liang was a leading intellectual figure in China during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

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

Yeh Chien-ying, member of the CCP Politburo and Vice-Chairman of the Military Council.

—Photo from "The Tenth Congress . . . ," Special Supplement to *China Reconstructs* (Peking), November 1973, p. 5.

cut self-identity, but also a capacity to shift as the prevailing opinion changes.

There is also the problem of linking the particular schools to particular occupational or economic groupings. It would be nice if one could say, for example, "Intellectuals are, for the most part, Westernized Chinese," or "officers from the Third Field Army, for the most part, are eclectic modernizers." But the necessary data to support such linkages are lacking, and even if they were available, one suspects that psychological variables may be as important as sociological ones in determining particular preferences. This means that analysts cannot draw swift conclusions about the policy implications of such phenomena as the rise of the PLA or of the Shanghai bureaucrats. Within the ranks of any sociologically determined grouping are individuals with psychological proclivities toward each of the schools. So the types identified above should not be reified. They are not tangible categories in the external world. Rather, the four types are opinion clusters, with their ever-changing members coming from diverse sectors of society.

Nonetheless, the schools that have been described have, in a sense, independent force and appeal, with historical memories associated with each. Particularly, militant fundamentalism and radical conservatism acquire support because of their unambiguous nationalism and their identification with a widely-shared sense of national greatness. Militant fundamentalism, however, also has it weaknesses. It evokes the image of the Boxers, and while the nativistic label may be appealing to some, it recalls Chinese vulnerability to foreign military power and the occupation of Peking in 1900. It also recalls some aspects of the Great Leap and the subsequent economic depression, as well as the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.

On the other hand, the Westernized Chinese and, to a lesser degree, the eclectic modernizers suffer from their cosmopolitanism. The former especially—strangers in their native land—are vulnerable to charges of appeasement and capitulation to a West which humiliated China, but the "Uncle Tom" image can also be hung on the eclectic modernizers because of their emphasis on drawing freely from the West. Further, the modernizers' sophisticated notions of specialization and complex organization easily arouse hostility in the Chinese cultural context, where advocacy of modern bureaucracy taps latent hostility toward traditional bureaucratic forms.

The Politics of Coalition

For the past century, the center of gravity in the Chinese political spectrum has been radical conservatism. The leaders of China have continually been in this school, or at least they have sought to project the image of belonging to it. But neither this position nor any other has been so strong as to dominate the system. Consequently, the strength of the radical conservatives has been due, in large part, to their strategically advantagous position for mediating between and forming alliances with other positions. Hence, no ruling coalition has been formed in the late Ch'ing, Republican, or Communist eras without radical conservative participation, if not leadership. It can be said that they occupy a position similar to that of moderate liberals in the American political spectrum. In part also, their strength to date has stemmed from the relevance of their policies to China's needs.

Their weakness, on the other hand, has been the

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difficulty of accurately implementing their complex program, which involves accepting Western assistance and at the same time retaining a rural orientation. If they ally themselves with the fundamentalists, their program tends to tilt excessively toward a nativistic, mobilizational approach; when they join forces with the eclectic modernizers, their program tends to tilt toward bureaucratic solutions involving a loss of Chinese autonomy. The result has been that radical conservative leaders such as Mao and Chiang Kai-shek—when in command—continually had to readjust their coalitions in order to pursue their long-run objectives.

Thus, the Chinese hierarchy at any given moment is dominated by a coalition of two or more of the four opinion groups. Any such ruling coalition, moreover, is highly unstable, containing within itself tensions between elements holding different views on fundamental issues. This instability has become particularly acute in recent years, as members of the coalition have vied for political positions that would give them advantage and security in the post-Mao era. In the course of such struggles, the various sides habitually adopt protective colorations and try to portray their adversaries as camouflaged elements—*e.g.*, as fundamentalists in radical conservative disguise, or as Westernized Chinese in modernist or fundamentalist guise. Image management, in fact, becomes as important a dimension of Chinese politics as it is of American politics, with the participants seeking to project themselves (and their adversaries) as belonging to the schools that will best promote their own political interests at the moment.

In addition to image and symbols, however, substantive issues, principles and convictions about China's proper course, are also at stake. Indeed, without reference to these issues, the intensity of political struggles in China since 1966 cannot be understood. Reference to the competition for the succession to Mao, by itself, is not sufficient.

The Current Scene: An Interpretation

What remains is to utilize the foregoing analysis of the Chinese political spectrum in an effort to interpret the current developments in China. The authors' basic thesis is that the militant fundamentalists are

At the Tenth CCP Congress, from left, Tung Pi-wu, Acting Chairman of the People's Republic of China and member of the Politburo's Standing Committee, and Politburo members Li Hsien-nien and Hsu Shih-yu.

—Photo from "The Tenth Congress . . . ," Special Supplement to *China Reconstructs* (Peking), November 1973, p. 7.

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engaged in a fight for survival as part of the Chinese Communist movement.

This is a development of far-reaching significance because the Communist movement in China has, from its very inception, always had room for militant fundamentalists. Indeed, in earlier eras, the fundamentalists helped the movement acquire a rural appeal and were effective in inculcating a sense of defiance of foreign threats. Again, with the intensification of the perceived threat to China resulting from US escalation of the Vietnam conflict in the mid-1960's, and at the peak of Sino-Soviet tension in 1968-69, their participation in the ruling coalition facilitated the inculcation of such a sense of defiance in the Chinese populace.

It was the Cultural Revolution, however, that brought about the first coalition composed exclusively of the fundamentalists and the radical conservatives, with Chou En-lai playing down his eclectic-modernizer commitments in order to survive. The political consequences of this change were profound. Because of the 1969 border clashes with the USSR and the chaos produced by the Cultural Revolution, in conjunction with the economic pressure of a rapidly expanding population, the dangers inherent in militant fundamentalism became abundantly clear for the first time since the founding of the CCP. The fundamentalists had always claimed to be the firmest guardians of the ideology; now, however, it was apparent that in their hands the ideology—and indeed China—might not survive. They had brought the nation to the precipice of both civil and foreign war.

Chiang Ching (Mao's wife) and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Politburo members, pictured at the Tenth CCP Congress in August 1973.

—Photo from "The Tenth Congress . . .," Special Supplement to *China Reconstructs* (Peking), November 1973, p. 6.

The outcome was that the post-Cultural-Revolution reconstruction and the fall of Lin Piao brought forth a new alignment of political forces in which Ch'en Po-ta's "May 16th group" was eliminated, the position of Chiang Ch'ing and Yao Wen-yuan weakened, and the influence of the militant fundamentalists generally curtailed. This reduction of militant fundamentalist influence is attributable only in part to their decreased representation at the apex of power. Other, more fundamental forces were working against them by 1972. For one thing, China's newly-won position in world affairs made a posture of defiance obsolete, as new opportunities for participation in the established world community beckoned as never before.

In addition, economic necessities appeared to have overwhelmed the quest for a moral community. Demographic pressures have become particularly pressing. The population continues to grow, accompanied by the need for ever-increasing agricultural production. In the past, incremental rises in agricultural output could be achieved by intensive application of mobilized labor and from inputs of implements and other items produced by small-scale, local industries, and to the extent that mobilization of the working force was relied upon, the fundamentalists could play a positive role. By the late 1960's, however, it had become clear that further increments in agricultural output depended upon inputs from the modern, industrial sector: agricultural machinery, chemical fertilizers, insecticides—all of which require expanded metallurgical, petrochemical, and rubber industries. For such an expansion, Western technology and capital would obviously be useful.

Further, the increasing numbers of well-trained teenagers aspire to contribute their skills to China's economic development, and the demand for employment in the modern, urban, industrial sector outstrips the number of new jobs generated annually. Rising foreign trade, by accelerating the growth of the economy, could do much to alleviate this situation.

On top of these crucial considerations, the disruptions of the nation's higher-education system as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution have deprived the country of seven to eight years' worth of college graduating classes in the sciences and in engineering. Rather than enabling China to practice more self-reliance, this loss of over a million technicians, doctors, teachers, and so on, would seem to

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render the importation of technology from abroad still more necessary.

By early 1973, then, conditions appeared to be evolving firmly in a direction favorable to the eclectic nodernizers—perhaps even shifting the political center of gravity toward them and away from the radical conservatives. In fact, some analysts believe that Mao himself had migrated toward an eclectic-modernizer position.[11] Whether their assessment is correct or not, China and the Communist movement had definitely reached a historical moment, in that a distinct possibility had emerged that the fundamentalists might undergo an eclipse. Such a development would, of course, be as significant as the eclipse that the Western Chinese had experienced a decade earlier.

The past year has seen the fundamentalists wage a struggle for survival—not only in terms of the succession to Mao at the apex of power, but more importantly in terms of their continued vitality as a force throughout Chinese society. Their tactics are familiar: attacking eclectic modernizers as disguised Western Chinese who seek to restore the earlier capitalist order in China; seizing upon issues with wide popular emotional appeal; seeking allies among the radical conservatives, many of whom are military men; launching campaigns under their own control. The eclectic modernizers respond in characteristic fashion, accusing the fundamentalists of being the true reactionaries or pro-Soviets in disguise; seeking to deflect the campaigns aimed at them; and adopting the protective coloring of radical conservatives.

It is essential to bear in mind, moreover, that the militant fundamentalists, despite the international and domestic economic forces working against them, do have sources of strength. For one thing, the "three-way alliances" encompassing members of the PLA, representatives of "revolutionary rebel" organizations, and "reliable" former party officials, as well as the party recruitment campaigns of the Cultural Revolution, brought about the promotion of many younger people into positions of authority. Many of these individuals are suspicious of the West and have matured in an atmosphere of militant fundamentalism.

Furthermore, developments on the world scene during 1973-74—the monetary crisis, the growing scarcity of natural resources (especially oil), and the signs of moral decay in a number of non-Communist Western countries—have somewhat enhanced the position of the militant fundamentalists. At the same time, Chinese overtures to the outside world in recent years, particularly to the United States, can be represented by the militant fundamentalists as having yielded Peking relatively little from the Chinese point of view and as having proved, on balance, disadvantageous to China. The evidence indicates that some of the fundamentalists are attempting to argue the case in public print,[12] and there is at least a presumption that they may be voicing a similar line more forcefully in the private councils of the leadership. Contentions of this kind probably strike sympathetic chords among elements of the radical conseratives and thus tend to undermine the alliance between the radical conservatives and the modernizers.

At this writing, then, the outcome of the fundamentalists' fight for survival appears uncertain. Economic realities would seem to spell their doom, but man does not live by these realities alone. Indeed, a cautious conclusion is in order, for after all, Western analysts of the contemporary Chinese scene have vainly been writing the obituary of militant fundamentalism in its different guises for a hundred years. The fate of the current variant rests, as was the case in the past, in the hands of the radical conservatives, who are loathe to abandon staunch nationalist allies in favor of modernizers who might end up by abandoning China's essence. Whether the conservatives will choose to do so in this instance remains to be seen.

[11] Although no one has applied the specific label "eclectic modernizer" to Mao, several have argued that Mao's views have moderated during the last few years. See, for example, Schram, *op. cit.*, and Benjamin Schwartz, "China's Developmental Experience, 1949-72," in Oksenberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-26.

[12] For an explicit statement in the cultural realm, see the *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* article cited in fn. 6. While Chinese sources contain no such direct comments about trade, they do imply that the militant fundamentalists have raised complaints in this sphere as well. One can infer a debate on the subject from, for instance, Tien Chih-sung, "Adhere to the Policy of Independence and Self-Reliance," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), March 22, 1974.

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Sino-Indian Relations: Changing Perspectives

By S. P. Seth

Except for a brief interlude of Sino-Indian cordiality in the mid-1950's, relations between the two largest and most populous Asian nations over the past twenty-odd years have been marred by mutual distrust, tension, and occasional armed hostilities along disputed segments of their common frontier. In the last two years, however, there have been subtle indications of a change in atmosphere as a combination of factors has seemingly impelled both powers toward a more relaxed and constructive approach to the problems dividing them. The present article will endeavor to trace the beginnings of this change against the background of the earlier record of tension and conflict.

Observers have generally tended to view the border dispute as the basic cause of hostility and impasse in the relations between India and China. In fact, however, the border conflict only triggered tensions that developed from other causes. When one looks back over the checkered course of Sino-Indian relations, it becomes apparent that the primary source of strain between the two countries has lain in faulty assessments on both sides of each other's political and strategic objectives, not only in the context of bilateral relations but also in the broader context of global politics.

In order to see how these misjudgments developed, it is necessary to go back to 1950, when tension first began building up between India and the newly-established Communist regime in China. The starting point was the Chinese military occupation of Tibet, which removed what had long served as an effective buffer between China and India. Growing acrimony in India over the Tibetan issue was temporarily arrested in April 1954 with the conclusion of a Sino-Indian agreement whereby China, in return for Indian acceptance of Tibet as "part of China," promised to respect Tibetan autonomy and agreed to the continuance of certain Indian trading privileges in Tibet inherited from Britain and the provision of facilities for Indian religious pilgrims.[1] But while this agreement smoothed over the immediate differences between the two governments and ushered in an interval of euphoria in Sino-Indian relations, the atmosphere of cordiality proved short-lived.

Tibet and the Border Conflict

The main reason for the renewal of tensions was the fact that the Chinese occupation of Tibet activated the whole issue of the boundary between China and India, setting in train the long series of claims and counterclaims, and resultant armed border

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[1] A reading of the text of this agreement shows that India conceded more than it gained, but the Indian government skillfully "sold" the agreement to the public by playing up the relatively minor Chinese concessions regarding Indian trade and pilgrim traffic to Tibet and explaining its acceptance of Tibet as "part of China" as signifying recognition merely of China's "suzerainty" rather than "sovereignty." See in this connection P. C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy*, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1962, pp. 25-57. For the agreement text, see Lok Sabha Secretariat, *Foreign Policy of India—Texts of Documents (1947-59)*, 2nd ed., New Delhi, 1959, pp. 103-09.

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clashes, that developed during the late 1950's.[2] The boundary dispute mainly involved two widely separated sectors: the eastern sector, where Tibet adjoined India's Northeast Frontier Agency (now Arunchal Pradesh) and where the line of physical control generally followed the historic McMahon Line; and the western sector, between Tibet and the Ladakh region of Kashmir, where there were conflicting claims on both sides and no clear line of actual control. Chinese interest centered primarily in the western sector, more particularly in the Aksai Chin district of northeastern Ladakh, which lay athwart the only feasible overland route between China's Sinkiang Province and Tibet. When India discovered in 1958 that the Chinese had built a motor road through the Aksai Chin and established a line of advance positions guarding the road, the border dispute suddenly assumed serious proportions. So far as the eastern sector was concerned, the Chinese had indicated in 1956 that they were prepared to accept the McMahon Line as the boundary,[3] but after the dispute in the western sector became acute, they sought to use their acceptance of the McMahon Line as a bargaining counter to pressure India into accepting an overall settlement legitimizing their new "line of actual control" in the west.

Even though the border problem was largely a political issue that might have been resolved by compromise in easier circumstances, it became enmeshed in the overall climate of mutual distrust that was again beginning to permeate Sino-Indian relations. This atmosphere of suspicion deepened still further with the 1959 Tibetan revolt against Chinese rule. On the one hand, China's forcible suppression of the revolt evoked a sharp reaction in India, where there were open expressions of sympathy for the Tibetan cause; on the other, the action of the Indian government in granting political asylum to the Dalai

Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is welcomed by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in Peking in 1954.

—Eastfoto.

Lama in the face of Chinese protests markedly intensified Chinese suspicions of India's intentions with respect to Tibet, particularly in view of New Delhi's equivocal position on the issue of China's "sovereignty" over that sensitive region.[4]

Parallel with these developments, the buildup of distrust between Delhi and Peking was given added momentum by the emergence of a Chinese strategy aimed at exploiting differences between India and Pakistan. Evidence of this new strategy appeared as early as the 1955 Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states, at which China's representatives were seen befriending the Pakistanis despite the fact that Pakistan, through its membership in SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), belonged to the Western alliance system. According to Pakistani accounts, Chou En-lai, in private talks with Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra during the conference, unquestioningly accepted the latter's assurance that Pakistan's adherence to SEATO was not directed against China,[5] as well as Bogra's explanation that Pakistan's "virtual defenselessness vis-à-vis India at that time" necessitated "strengthening its relative military position even if this had to be done through American assistance." [6] Soon after the con-

[2] On the positions of each side in the border dispute, see: For India, Government of India, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China*, White Papers Nos. 1-12 (1954-1966), New Delhi; Government of India, *Reports of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China*, New Delhi, 1961; and Surya P. Sharma, "The India-China Border Dispute—An Indian Perspective," *American Journal of International Law* (Washington, DC), January 1965 (reprinted by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs). For China, *The Sino-Indian Border Question*, two separate studies with the same title, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1962 and 1965.

[3] According to then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, he received such assurances personally from Chinese Premier Chou En-lai when they met in 1956. See Government of India, *India's Foreign Policy (Selected Speeches of Jawaharal Nehru, September 1946-April 1961)*, New Delhi, 1961, p. 360.

[4] See fn. 1.

[5] See Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan and China: The Scope and Limits of Convergent Policies," in A. M. Halpern, Ed., *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965; Qutubuddin Aziz, "Relations Between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China," in *Foreign Policy of Pakistan—A Symposium*, Karachi, The Allies Book Corporation, 1964, p. 79.

[6] Anwar Syed, "Sino-Pakistan Relations," *Pakistan Horizon* (Karachi), 2nd quarter, 1969, p. 108.

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ference, according to Rushbrook Williams, who had close contacts with the Pakistani official establishment,

. . . Karachi received . . . a private message from Peking. The Chinese People's Government assured the Government of Pakistan that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries which could imperil their relations; but that this position did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations, in which a definite conflict of interest could be expected in the near future.[7]

In light of these exchanges, it is clear that Peking's discernment of the potential value of Pakistani friendship in the event of an anticipated conflict with India inspired Chinese readiness to overlook Pakistan's alliance with the West. It also seems probable that the same calculation motivated Peking's consistent refusal—even while India and China still appeared to be on the best of terms—to publicly endorse India's position in the dispute with Pakistan over ownership of Kashmir.

Peking's Misperceptions

In the latter half of the 1950's, the strains in Sino-Indian relations were augmented by still another factor—namely, Chinese misperceptions of India's role in the context of global politics. These misperceptions stemmed primarily from Indian moves toward closer relations with both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union, against the backdrop of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, offered India extensive economic assistance, later supplementing it with sales of military equipment, and there also were indications of a trend toward more cooperative relations between Washington and New Delhi. These developments were viewed in Peking as signifying a shift in India's international political "alignments" to the strategic disadvantage of China.[8]

Against this background of developing Indo-Soviet and Indo-US ties, the Chinese construed India's continuing sympathy for the Tibetan cause, so dramatically symbolized by the Dalai Lama's 1959 flight to political haven on Indian soil, as evidence that India was becoming a willing tool in an aggressive international conspiracy directed against China. This suspicion found expression in Chinese accusations that India was being used as a base of American operations to support rebellion in Tibet by training and arming Tibetan "counterrevolutionary" forces.[9]

Toward the end of the 1950-62 period, initial Soviet-American moves toward détente—though briefly interrupted by the U-2 incident and later by the Cuban missile crisis—tended to reinforce a Chinese "siege mentality" that pictured India as a "front man" for China's more powerful adversaries. This integration of the supposed threat from India into Peking's broader perception of a global anti-Chinese conspiracy created an extremely complex situation that defied solution through bilateral Sino-Indian negotiations.

The Chinese, indeed, were right in estimating that India counted upon developing closer links with the United States and the Soviet Union as a principal means of containing a possible Chinese threat to Indian security. However, their perception of the developing international situation, and more particularly of India's "involvement" in an aggressive conspiracy against China, was clearly overdrawn.

The Dalai Lama speaks to Tibetan refugees from his garlanded throne in Dalhousie, India, in July 1960, some 16 months after his flight from Tibet during the 1959 uprising.

—London Daily Express via Pictorial Parade.

[7] Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan*, London, Faber, 1962, p. 120.

[8] According to Edgar Snow, Peking felt that India was "maneuvering to get both American and Russian aid in order to oppose the unification of the People's Republic." See his *The Other Side of the River—Red China Today*, London, Gollancz, 1963, p. 591.

[9] See Indian Government White Paper No. 1, referred to in fn. 2 above, pp. 60-69.

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This becomes clearer if we look at the measures that India was actually taking to bolster its security vis-à-vis China. These measures combined diplomacy with discreet precautionary steps more directly related to military security. On the diplomatic side, India continued its vociferous professions of friendship for China and sought to promote China's involvement and acceptance in international forums in the hope that this would subject Peking to a measure of international discipline. At the same time, New Delhi took steps to cultivate closer political ties with the superpowers in order to achieve "security through policy," [10] and it had also sought earlier to strengthen India's security perimeter by entering into treaty relationships with the Himalayan states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.

On the military side, India undertook the construction of strategic roads linking the interior with the hitherto inaccessible, mountainous border regions and the establishment of an administrative network in those areas. Indian units also carried out occasional patrols in the border districts "to show the flag," and eventually a more active security posture was adopted with the establishment of so-called forward posts in the vicinity of Chinese-occupied positions in the disputed areas. These limited military measures, however, represented more a conscious demonstration of India's will to stand up to Chinese threats than a full-fledged security effort.

In sum, neither India's diplomatic initiatives nor its military precautions appeared to justify Peking's perception of India as part of an aggressive international conspiracy against China.

Indian Misperceptions

If the Chinese exaggerated, and overreacted to, the perceived Indian threat, India at this stage also misjudged the situation—but in an opposite sense. Despite the apparent strains in Sino-Indian relations, the Indian government persisted in its belief that a direct, large-scale military confrontation with China was politically unthinkable. Consequently, when the conflicts over Tibet and the border issue became too conspicuous and threatening to be glossed over any longer, the government tended to take refuge in expressions of righteous indignation at what it saw as a Chinese betrayal of India's good faith.

It was, indeed, genuinely felt that India had made vital concessions to China by accepting the latter's position on Tibet and by crusading on China's behalf in various international forums; and as an implicit *quid pro quo,* New Delhi expected Peking to respect India's general position in the boundary dispute between the two countries, which China did not officially challenge until 1959. It was also felt that the Chinese had not been forthright in putting forward their formal territorial claims only after establishing a forward "line of actual control" in the Aksai Chin (western sector), for which they then demanded Indian legitimation.[11] As Prime Minister Nehru subsequently remarked, Indian acceptance of this demand would have been tantamount to condoning aggression after it had been committed.[12] Finally, the inclusion in China's September 1959 territorial demands of claims in the eastern sector—notwithstanding Chou En-lai's 1956 assurances to Nehru that China would accept the McMahon Line in that area—added to the Indian sense of betrayal. The Indian general public, having been subjected to much trumpeting of the slogan *Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai* (Indians and Chinese are brothers), fully shared this sentiment, creating an internal political climate that made it all but impossible for the government to negotiate a political settlement of the border issue on any terms that would be acceptable to Peking.

Thus, the 1950-62 period saw the gradual development of a hostile relationship between India and China which first gathered momentum in the context of bilateral relations and then acquired global connotations as Peking came to view India as part of a hostile international environment. It was not surprising, therefore, that confrontation rather than conciliation became the keynote of policy on both sides, finally producing the border war of 1962.

Hostile Coexistence

Following the 1962 hostilities, which ended inconclusively without any agreement settling the border issue, armed conflict gave way to a state of hos-

[10] R. K. Nehru, "Relations with China and Pakistan," *The Times of India* (New Delhi), Independence Day Supplement, Aug. 15, 1972.

[11] Prime Minister Nehru expressed his disillusionment when he remarked that in the past, whenever India had called the Chinese Government's attention to errors in Chinese maps showing Indian territory as part of China, the Chinese had evaded the issue by saying that "these were old maps, and their revision would be taken up later when they had the leisure to do so." See *India's Foreign Policy, op. cit.,* p. 360.

[12] Government of India, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches,* Vol. 4 (September 1957-April 1963), New Delhi, 1964, p. 217.

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tile coexistence between India and China. The Chinese remained nervous and suspicious with respect to Indian policy on Tibet, especially in view of persisting political instability there and the presence of the Dalai Lama and his entourage in India, where Peking feared that he might be encouraged to set up a Tibetan government-in-exile backed by India and outside powers. At the same time, in the global context, Peking became even more fixed in its perception of India as a client state and cat's paw of China's major enemies—the United States and the USSR—with whom Chinese relations were steadily worsening. Peking's suspicions deepened as India proceeded to strengthen its defenses with American and especially Soviet military assistance.[13]

A key element in China's response was the translation of Peking's discreet approaches to Pakistan of the mid-1950's into an active policy of forging close ties with that country as a regional counterweight to India. The prospects for such a policy must have appeared particularly bright to Peking in light of evidences of Pakistan's growing disillusionment with its Western allies for having failed to take advantage of India's dependence on their support during the Sino-Indian border conflict to pressure Delhi into settling the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan on terms favorable to Karachi.[14] Accordingly, China in 1963 concluded a provisional agreement with Pakistan defining the boundary between China's Sinkiang Province and that part of Kashmir claimed by Pakistan,[15] and the next two years witnessed visits to Karachi by top Chinese government leaders, who publicly stressed China's solidarity with Pakistan.[16] Since the border agreement in effect ignored India's claim to sovereignty over all of Kashmir, it evoked a sharp protest from New Delhi and further aroused Indian suspicions of an emerging Peking-Rawalpindi "axis." There have also been strong indications that China, prior to the 1965 Indo-Pakistani clash, entered into an understanding with Karachi committing China to aid in the defense of East Pakistan if India should attack that region in a war with Pakistan.[17]

In the event, East Pakistan did not become involved in the 1965 hostilities, so that this understanding, if it existed, would not have applied. Even so, China's failure to give more direct and positive support to Pakistan during the 1965 conflict with India caused at least a temporary setback to Peking's strategy of playing off Pakistan against India. Instead of abandoning the policy, however, China redoubled its efforts in order to recover lost ground.[18]

While trying to groom Pakistan as an external force contributing to the political fragmentation, and hence the weakening, of India, China also sought to promote the same objective by encouraging and supporting subversive forces within the Indian polity. Peking, in fact, had good reason to be optimistic that India might soon fall asunder under the pressure of its internal political contradictions. Maoist-inspired "Naxalite" elements in India's West Bengal state and rebellious tribal groups in remote areas of northeastern India seemed to provide potential nuclei for a general Maoist revolutionary upsurge, and in 1966-67 internal political unrest gained momentum as India faced near-famine conditions because of widespread drought. The 1967 general elections, moreover, tended to fragment the Indian polity by bringing into power in a number of provinces a conglomeration of coalition governments composed of

[13] On US military aid between late 1962 and September 1965, when it was discontinued following the outbreak of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, see K. Subrahmanyam, *The Asian Balance of Power in the Seventies—An Indian View*, New Delhi, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, 1968, p. 21. On Soviet military credits to India prior to 1965, see Selig Harrison, "Troubled India and Her Neighbors," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1965, p. 326; after 1965, see an estimate of US Undersecretary of State Kenneth Rush, reported in *The Times of India*, April 21, 1973.

[14] Pakistan's President Ayub Khan made his disillusionment plain when he warned his Western allies in October 1963 that they should "not rule out the possibility of Pakistan firmly allying with China in order to safeguard her independence against Indian aggression." See B. L. Sharma, *Pakistan-China Axis*, Bombay, Allied Publishing House, 1968, p. 96.

[15] Text in Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Sino-Pak "Agreement"—Some Facts*, New Delhi, 1963, p. 24.

[16] During a highly successful visit to Pakistan in 1964, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai voiced general support of Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and criticized India, by implication, for adopting "a big-nation chauvinistic attitude of imposing one's will on others" (see *Pakistan Times* [Lahore], March 24, 1964). Visiting Pakistan the following year, then Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi called "the solidarity of the 750 million people of China and Pakistan . . . an important force for the defense of world peace" (*Dawn* [Karachi], March 28, 1965).

[17] Speaking in the Pakistan National Assembly on July 17, 1963, then Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto strongly hinted at the existence of a defense understanding with China when he declared that "an attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia. This new factor . . . is a very important one. I would not, at this stage, wish to elucidate it any further" (*Foreign Policy of Pakistan* [A Compendium of Mr. Bhutto's Speeches as Foreign Minister in the Pakistan National Assembly], Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1965, p. 75). See also *Patriot* (New Delhi), June 27, 1969, quoting an East Pakistani author, Kammaluddin Ahmed, in a book entitled *Our Freedom Struggle* (then banned in Pakistan), to the effect that there was a detailed understanding between China and Pakistan regarding the defense of East Pakistan in the event of Indian attack.

[18] See the author's "China as a Factor in Indo-Pakistani Politics," *World Today* (London), January 1969.

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An Indian officer peers at a Chinese outpost (complete with a poster of Mao Tse-tung) along the Sikkim-Tibet border during 1967 tension.

—London Daily Express via Pictorial Parade.

disparate elements which had nothing in common except their antipathy to the ruling Congress party. Although the Congress was returned to power at the center, its parliamentary majority was significantly reduced and dangerously faction-ridden.

Amidst these conditions of rampant political confusion, the Peking-backed Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)—or CPI(M-L)—resorted to tactics of mass terror, particularly in West Bengal, and China also undertook to equip and train selected cadres for an insurgent Naga regime that had set itself up in the remote hill-country of northeast India. At one time, it even appeared that the rebellious tribesmen (Nagas and Mizos) and the Maoist revolutionaries in West Bengal, with the prompting and encouragement of Peking, might engage in concerted action to disrupt India's polity.

Given these seemingly bright revolutionary prospects in India, it was not surprising that China was initially unresponsive when the New Delhi government, prompted by a feeling of increased self-confidence resulting from India's relative success in the 1965 clash with Pakistan, initiated a series of signals in late 1967 indicating its desire to reopen a dialogue with Peking looking toward a normalization of interstate relations.[19] An additional reason for the lack of response from Peking at this time may well have been the virtual paralysis of Chinese diplomacy as a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, which reached its high point of intensity in mid-1967. In any event, Sino-Indian relations remained in stalemate until after the Ninth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party declared an end to the Cultural Revolution in the spring of 1969.

Interval of Relaxation

The interval between the latter part of 1969 and the events leading up to the Bangladesh crisis of late 1971 brought a brief whiff of fresh air into Sino-Indian relations as Peking's tactics toward India showed some hopeful signs of change. The probable reasons for this shift in style (though not in substance) were several.

First, the change appeared to be in line with China's new diplomatic approach that began to unfold in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. So far as India was concerned, the new Chinese tack manifested itself in a resumption of diplomatic courtesies and even of some formal contacts between Chinese and Indian envoys stationed in third countries. The most significant indication, however, came in Mao Tse-tung's reported remarks to the Indian Chargé d'Affaires at a May Day 1970 reception in Peking, urging that China and India become friends once again.[20]

Second, it was no doubt evident to Peking that the prospects for an anticipated Maoist revolutionary upsurge in India were already on the wane, with the Indian left-Communist forces and the Naga rebels both hopelessly divided within their respective ranks.[21] Peking's disillusionment with the tactics and strategy of the CPI (M-L) was, in fact, explicitly conveyed to the Indian party in a secret letter from the Chinese Communist Party,[22] which had the contrary effect of further aggravating the fragmentation within the already divided left-Communist ranks.

Third, contrasting political changes in India and in Pakistan probably induced a Chinese reappraisal

[19] See statement by the then Indian Foreign Minister, M. C. Chagla, reported in *The Statesman* (New Delhi), Aug. 30, 1967. The series of signals culminated in a statement by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi seeking a dialogue with Peking, reported in *The Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Jan. 2, 1969.

[20] *The Statesman*, June 8, 1970.

[21] Chinese hopes of stirring up unrest in India's vulnerable northeastern border regions were dealt a heavy blow by the Indian authorities' arrest of Naga rebel "Commander-in-Chief" Mowu Angami when he and a number of followers attempted to get back into Nagaland after receiving weapons and training in China. See *ibid.*, March 17, 1969.

[22] For text of the letter, see *Mainstream* (Delhi), Oct. 21, 1972, p. 33. The letter had been originally sent in November 1970.

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of the subcontinental balance. On the one hand, the general political situation in India, though still not entirely stable following the split in the ruling Congress, did indicate a pro-Indira Gandhi upsurge which was confirmed in subsequent national elections. In Pakistan, on the other hand, severe political disturbances led in March 1969 to the resignation of President Ayub Khan and the establishment of a new military regime under General Yahya Khan, which reimposed martial law and suspended the constitution. These events exposed sharp divisions in the body politic and were bound to create apprehensions in Peking regarding Pakistan's political stability and its effectiveness as a counterweight to India.

Finally, China's softened attitude toward India no doubt resulted, in part, from a growing acrimony in Indo-Soviet relations caused mainly by a shift in Moscow's policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. This shift, evidenced by a Soviet decision in 1968 to supply sophisticated military equipment to Pakistan and by a series of subsequent visits to that country by high-level Soviet military dignitaries, was interpreted in India as signifying a Soviet move to follow the Western policy of creating a parity of power between India and Pakistan. There also were misunderstandings over a host of other matters, including the fact that Soviet official maps continued to reflect endorsement of Chinese claims in the boundary dispute with India.[23] At a time when Sino-Soviet hostility was about to erupt in the armed clashes of March 1969 on the Ussuri River boundary and later along the Central Asian border, China could hardly have failed to discern the potential advantage that might be derived from exploiting the simmering differences between Moscow and New Delhi. In this context, a Radio Peking commentary at about the same time as the outbreak of the Ussuri River clashes significantly omitted India from a list of Asian countries accused of ganging up with the Soviet Union and the United States in an anti-Chinese "Holy Alliance." [24]

The Bangladesh Crisis

The easier atmosphere that appeared to be emerging in Sino-Indian relations in 1969-70, however, evaporated almost as quickly as it had surfaced, as a combination of regional and global developments during 1971—the burgeoning separatist movement in East Pakistan, the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of August 1971, and the December war between India and Pakistan that clinched the independence of Bangladesh—again intensified tensions between New Delhi and Peking.

The independence movement in East Pakistan, which threatened to bring about Pakistan's dismemberment, and India's moral commitment to support it created an extremely difficult dilemma for Peking. On the one hand, China's vital interest in preserving a balance of forces on the subcontinent dictated that it act in support of its Pakistani ally. On the other hand, it wished to avoid provoking India into active involvement in Pakistan's dismemberment and also to keep alive New Delhi's interest in normalizing relations with Peking. Therefore, the Chinese response was muted and twofold.

First, Peking stepped up its verbal professions of "undying friendship" for Pakistan and of support against possible external "aggression" (obviously from India). Such pronouncements, it was hoped, would not only help to deter Indian involvement but also would offset Soviet criticisms of the repressive policies being pursued by the Yahya Khan regime toward the separatists in East Pakistan.[25]

Second, Peking balanced its vociferous expressions of support for Pakistan with a carefully restrained and low-key reaction to popular Indian fervor for the Bangladesh movement in the hope that such a response would be less likely to prod India into the very course of action that Peking wished to prevent. At the same time, China was reported to be discreetly advising the Pakistani government "to act with restraint and seek a political settlement of the East Bengal [*i.e.*, East Pakistan] problem." [26] Moreover, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (later to become President, and currently Prime Minister, of Pakistan) visited Peking in early November 1971 at the head of a high-level delegation including army, navy and air force chiefs, Pakistani hopes of obtaining direct Chinese military help in the event of a conflict with India over East Pakistan apparently received no encouragement.[27]

[23] For a detailed discussion of these misunderstandings, see the author's "Russia's Role in Indo-Pak Politics," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, Calif.), August 1969.

[24] *The Statesman*, March 8, 1969.

[25] On the Soviet and Chinese roles in the Bangladesh crisis, see Zubeida Mustafa, "The 1971 Crisis in Pakistan-India, the Soviet Union, and China," *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), April 1972.

[26] BBC radio report quoting the Rawalpindi correspondent of *The Times* (London), also in *The Hindustan Times*, Nov. 13, 1971.

[27] A dispatch published in *The Observer* (London), Nov. 13, 1971, reported that Mr. Bhutto, in an interview following his return from China, indicated that Pakistan could "probably hope for little real help there."

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Thus, China appeared to be trying to walk a political tightrope in coping with the threatening situation on the subcontinent—balancing between loud verbal support of Pakistan (coupled with quiet diplomatic pressure for a peaceful resolution of Pakistan's internal political contradictions) and careful restraint toward India so as not to destroy New Delhi's hopes for a normalization of Sino-Indian relations.

The same note of restraint was evident in the initial absence of hostile official reaction from Peking to the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, in spite of the fact that it obviously strengthened India's hand vis-à-vis both China and Pakistan. This restraint, of course, was cast aside with the outbreak of the December Indo-Pakistan war, China thereafter assailing the treaty as an "aggressive alliance" and claiming that India would never have taken up arms in support of Bangladesh had it not been for the deterrent effect of the treaty (*i.e.*, on China).[28]

In fact, while the Indo-Soviet treaty did provide India with a valuable political and security prop such as the country had not enjoyed at the time of the 1962 border war with China because of Nehru's reluctance to seek such a link with any superpower, China's options in the Bangladesh crisis would have been extremely limited even without it. Consequently, when the crisis actually erupted into war between India and Pakistan, the role that Peking chose to play was precisely the limited one that many informed Indians anticipated: China restricted its response to efforts to mobilize international diplomatic pressure as a means of thwarting the realization of India's objectives.

There were a variety of considerations that contributed to China's decision to eschew military intervention—some military, others political. The military considerations were essentially three: (1) The logistical and combat limitations that would be imposed on Chinese forces operating from the difficult Tibetan terrain amidst a hostile native population[29] ruled out anything beyond minor diversionary actions that would probably be ineffectual. (2) As the Chinese had learned from an armed border clash at Nathu La in 1967, when the Chinese had reportedly suffered high casualties and failed to dislodge the Indians from their positions, the Indian border forces were much better prepared than at the time of the 1962 war. (3) Once hostilities began between India and Pakistan in December, the speed with which the Indian forces attained their objectives in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) deprived the Chinese of the opportunity to gain a possible strategic advantage by a quick thrust from the Chumbi Valley through the northwestern part of Sikkim, which could have cut off India's northeastern provinces from the rest of the country.

The political deterrents were equally cogent: (1) The Indo-Soviet treaty heightened the probable risk involved in Chinese military intervention against India. (2) The activities and subsequent death of Lin Piao (allegedly in a plane crash in the Mongolian People's Republic in September 1971) had produced unsettled political conditions inside China that militated against any military adventurism abroad. (3) Peking probably recognized that the independence movement in Bangladesh was a genuinely popular, indigenous phenomenon that Pakistan would not be able to crush, especially in view of the more than 1,000-mile distance between West and East Pakistan. (4) China probably also realized that military intervention would permanently alienate the population of Bangladesh from China without creating favorable objective conditions for the reunification of Pakistan.

All these considerations evidently convinced Peking of the wisdom of heeding Mao's teaching never to engage in an unwinnable war. Consequently, the only option left open for China was to resort to diplomatic efforts to thwart India's intervention in support of independence for Bangladesh and to prolong the conflict there in the hope that eventual disenchantment with India on the part of the local population would promote leftist political tendencies and thus create favorable conditions for Chinese manipulation in furtherance of Peking's objectives.

India's speedy victory in the war defeated this Chinese strategy, however, and the immediate effect of the conflict was to return Sino-Indian relations—at least on the Chinese side—to the state of hostile vituperation that had characterized them throughout most of the 1960's. In the wake of the hostilities, Peking unleashed an unprecedentedly harsh propaganda assault against India in which it questioned the very basis of Indian nationhood, denigrating the state as a British creation,[30] and went so far as to voice im-

[28] See, *e.g.*, statement by the Chinese delegate to the UN Security Council during the debate on the admission of Bangladesh, reported in *The Times of India*, Aug. 27, 1972; also in *Peking Review*, Dec. 8, 1972.

[29] Michael Peissel, in his book *Cavaliers of Kham—The Secret War in Tibet*, London, Heinemann, 1972, claimed that China for the past 18 years had had "a Vietnam" on its hands in Tibet.

[30] Chou En-lai interview with Neville Maxwell, reported in *The Sunday Times* (London), Dec. 5 and 19, 1971.

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plied threats that others might do to India what that country had done to Pakistan.[31] The attacks also castigated India as a "sub-superpower" that posed an increasing threat to its smaller Asian neighbors, and Chinese leaders conjured up a vision of India as part of a Soviet-dominated encirclement ring designed to strangle China.[32]

These emotional outbursts were understandable in light of Peking's discomfiture at having been unable to prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan, and New Delhi chose to play down the Chinese attacks and keep open its earlier option for a dialogue between the two governments. This course proved wise, for the Chinese, having let off steam, subsequently returned to a correct, if not very friendly, posture toward India.

Meanwhile, the drastically altered situation on the subcontinent resulting from the defeat and breakup of Pakistan confronted both China and India with a whole new set of problems and concerns that continue to have an important bearing on their policies toward each other. These problems and concerns revolve around two major elements: first, the position of Pakistan on the subcontinent; and second, India's relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Status of Pakistan

In regard to the first, the greatly increased predominance of India and the weakened condition of Pakistan sharply reduced the effectiveness of the latter, from China's standpoint, as a regional counterweight to India. At the same time, China could not ignore the fact that Pakistan still faced potential internal troubles arising from minority autonomy movements in its Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, which presented the danger of a further threat to the country's integrity if it were to be encouraged on a collision course with India. Both these considerations tended to incline Peking toward a new concern for stability, rather than confrontation, on the subcontinent.

There were, in fact, numerous evidences during 1972-73 of such a concern on China's part. When Professor John K. Galbraith, formerly US ambassador to India, visited Peking in September 1972, he was assured by Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua that China desired peaceful relations with and between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Chiao, according to Galbraith's published account, also used the occasion to seek the American's good offices in counseling his Indian friends to show greater flexibility and moderation toward Pakistan's postwar Bhutto government.[33] Other signs of Peking's new attitude were provided by its favorable reception of both the Simla agreement of July 1972 and the Delhi agreement of August 1973,[34] which marked important steps toward the normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations and the amicable settlement of various issues left by the war.

China's interest in promoting stability on the subcontinent, as well as in avoiding any further erosion of Peking's credibility with Pakistan, likewise dictated a policy of continued political support for the Bhutto government in order to shore up its position in Pakistan's fragmented polity and provide it with at least some bargaining power in its negotiations with India. But if Peking was to avoid what Delhi might see as an outright anti-Indian posture, its support of Pakistan could not be open-ended. Thus, when the question of the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations came before the UN Security Council in August 1972, China acceded, apparently not without some reluctance,[35] to an appeal from the Bhutto government to exercise its veto power, but the Chinese delegate to the Council was careful to make it clear—to both India and Bangladesh—that China was "not fundamentally opposed" to the new state and was interested only in "a reasonable settlement of the issues" between Pakistan and Bangladesh.[36]

There were subsequent indications as well that China sought to encourage Pakistan's early recognition of Bangladesh. Thus, in July 1973, Chinese official comment warmly welcomed a resolution of the Pakistan National Assembly authorizing Prime

[31] New China News Agency (NCNA) report, Dec. 17, 1971.

[32] In a book published after a trip to China in 1971, former French Premier Pierre Mendes-France recounted an interview with Chou En-lai in December 1971, in which Chou took this line. See *The Times of India*, Aug. 26, 1972.

[33] J. K. Galbraith, *A China Passage*, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1973; from extracts published in *The Hindustan Times*, April 1, 1973.

[34] See Chiao Kuan-hua's comment on the Simla agreement, made in Islamabad during an official visit to Pakistan, reported in *The Times of India*, Aug. 30, 1972. On Chinese reception of the Delhi agreement, see *The Hindustan Times*, Oct. 4, 1973.

[35] Prime Minister Bhutto revealed in press interviews that it had required considerable effort on his part to persuade the Chinese to exercise their veto in the UN. See report by P. N. Lakshaman in *The Times of India*, Jan. 18, 1973; also Bhutto's interview with Lewis Simons of *The Washington Post*, quoted in *ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1972.

[36] For Huang Hua's statement in the UN Security Council, see *Peking Review*, Dec. 8, 1972, p. 11.

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Huang Hua, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, casts his country's first veto in the UN Security Council on August 25, 1972, blocking the admission of Bangladesh to the UN.

—Wide World Photos.

Minister Bhutto to recognize Bangladesh "at an appropriate time," [37] and several months later the Pakistani government-owned *Morning News* (Karachi) warned domestic opponents of recognition that Pakistan's friends, including China, could not wait indefinitely to recognize the "near-reality" (of the new state).[38]

On the Indian side, too, the new situation on the subcontinent in the wake of the December 1971 war was one in which India clearly had nothing to gain from any further dismemberment of Pakistan, entailing as it would the risk of converting that country into an area of global confrontation and thereby undermining India's own security. Furthermore, rising Soviet influence in Afghanistan, in conjunction with the existence of minority separatist movements in Pakistan's adjoining Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces, was a development which, notwithstanding the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty, would clearly be prejudicial to India's long-range national interest and would likewise tend to constrict Delhi's options in international politics.

These concerns, as well as India's genuine desire to place the new political structure of the subcontinent on a more stable footing, undoubtedly lay behind the more flexible and conciliatory posture adopted by the Indira Gandhi government toward Pakistan after the 1971 conflict. The posture itself was manifest in the series of bilateral negotiations concerning reciprocal withdrawals of forces from territories occupied during the hostilities, the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners-of-war, and other matters involved in the process of normalizing relations.

Peking and Indo-Soviet Ties

To turn to the second pivotal element affecting Sino-Indian relations—*i.e.*, India's tie with the Soviet Union symbolized by the 1971 Indo-Soviet friendship treaty—there is ample evidence that this relationship sharply intensified Chinese suspicions of a joint conspiracy on the part of Moscow and New Delhi against the PRC. Chinese Premier Chou En-lai personally voiced such suspicions in talks with the visiting French ex-Premier Pierre Mendes-France, in Peking in December 1971. Chou denounced Soviet policy in the Indo-Pakistan war, then going on, as aimed at catching China between two military jaws—Siberia and Mongolia in the north and "a Soviet-dominated India and Bangladesh in the south." [39] Even stronger language was used in a Chinese propaganda broadcast, which assailed India's "invasion" of Pakistan as "out-and-out aggressive war" directed by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism" to further its aims of "setting Asians against Asians" and gaining "control of the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean." [40]

China, like India, also feared a possible move by the Soviet Union to use Afghanistan as a base for supporting the separatist movements in Pakistan's vulnerable border provinces. But in this the Chinese tended to see India as a co-conspirator with the USSR and Afghanistan in a joint plot to effect a further dismemberment of Pakistan within the next few years. These Chinese suspicions were openly expressed in connection with the July 1973 coup in Afghanistan, which resulted in the establishment of a new government under Prince Mohammad Daud, reputedly a close friend of the Russians and a hard-line advocate of the unification of ethnic groups divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan's

[37] *Ibid.*, July 20, 1973, p. 19.
[38] Quoted in *The Times of India*, Nov. 12, 1972.
[39] See fn. 32.
[40] NCNA English-language broadcast from Peking, Dec. 23, 1971.

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Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan provinces.[41] Peking's apprehensions regarding Soviet expansionism in South Asia and possible Indian "involvement" in it may likewise have inspired a Chinese diplomatic move in June 1973 to encourage Iran to bolster its military strength by seeking foreign arms and to enter into closer political and military cooperation with Pakistan.[42]

On the other hand, at a time when the Chinese were drastically restructuring their foreign diplomacy in order to counter the growing Soviet threat from the north, they could not ignore the danger that a policy of intransigent hostility toward India and continued refusal to respond to Delhi's overtures for a dialogue might only push India further into the embrace of Moscow. One indication of Chinese awareness of this danger was a considerable toning down of anti-Indian propaganda emanating from Peking. Thus, the Indian subcontinent was conspicuously omitted from the customary analysis of the international situation contained in the *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) New Year's (1973) editorial,[43] thereby sparing India from the kind of violent anti-Indian invective that had highlighted Chinese propaganda immediately after the 1971 conflict. Even more significant was the fact that Chou En-lai's report to the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in August 1973 similarly avoided any direct criticism of India, although it did make passing reference to the dismemberment of Pakistan, which Chou blamed exclusively on the Soviet Union.[44]

There was further evidence that explicitly linked this apparent softening of the Chinese attitude toward India with Peking's desire to avoid strengthening—and, if possible, to weaken—India's ties with the Soviet Union. Following a visit to China in early 1973, Sultan Ahmed, editor of the authoritative Pakistani newspaper *Morning News,* reported that there was a feeling in Peking official circles that if Sino-Indian relations were to improve, India's "dependence on the Soviet Union" would be reduced.[45]

As for India, the international situation in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war tended to bring to the fore a different but converging set of concerns. The Indo-Soviet treaty had not only had a harmful impact on Sino-Indian relations but had also created the impression in some foreign countries that India was abandoning its long-standing policy of nonalignment in favor of "alliance" with the USSR. Inasmuch as India did not conceive of the friendship treaty as anything like a formal alliance, this situation tended to persuade New Delhi of the need to correct such misinterpretations and to broaden its international options by cultivating balancing relationships with China and the United States.

India and the Soviet Connection

India's concern in this regard was evidenced by a number of official statements explicitly aimed at reassuring the Chinese and others regarding the nature of the Indo-Soviet relationship. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, addressing the Indian Parliament in late 1972, characterized the view that this relationship was an obstacle to the normalization of Sino-Indian relations as "completely mistaken," adding:

The Indo-Soviet treaty is not aimed against any third country. We are prepared to consider similar arrangements with any other country that is willing to do so.[46]

Foreign Minister Singh coupled these reassurances with a new bid for direct talks with China on the issues "which have bedevilled our relations in the past."[47]

Shortly thereafter, the Indian Foreign Minister used the occasion of a press conference in Tokyo to clarify India's position on a much broader range of issues to which the Chinese were sensitive, including the Indo-Soviet relationship. Attempting to dissociate that relationship from Sino-Soviet hostility, Mr. Singh emphasized that the two were unrelated, and that, in fact, the strains in Sino-Indian relations antedated those between China and the Soviet Union. On another related and highly sensitive issue, the Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security scheme, he avoided any explicit reference to the Soviet proposal but expressed the view that Asian security could be achieved only by strengthening the individual Asian nations, and that this in turn could be accomplished only through economic development. Mr. Singh also

[41] See *The Australian* (Sydney), Aug. 4, 1973, quoting a Clare Hollingsworth dispatch from Peking to the London *Daily Telegraph.*

[42] See reports on visit to Teheran by Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, *The Times of India,* June 17 and 18, 1973.

[43] Reprinted in *Peking Review,* Jan. 5, 1973, pp. 9-11.

[44] *Ibid.,* Sept. 7, 1973, pp. 35-36.

[45] Quoted in *The Times of India,* March 7, 1973.

[46] *Indian and Foreign Review* (New Delhi), Dec. 15, 1972, p. 7.

[47] *The Times of India,* Dec. 1, 1972.

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reiterated New Delhi's position that Taiwan had always been part of China, adding that India would never support self-determination for the island. (This was possibly meant to reassure the Chinese that India would not be a party to any Soviet machinations for an independent Taiwan.) Finally, the Indian Foreign Minister cited the absence of tensions on the Sino-Indian border as a hopeful sign pointing toward improved relations between China and India.[48]

There also were more general statements by Indian government leaders designed to correct misunderstandings abroad of the Indo-Soviet relationship. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, for example, categorically denied in December 1972 that India was anybody's satellite,[49] and in June 1973, in connection with reports that the Soviet Union was seeking naval facilities on the Indian coast, she declared that India had not given and did not intend to give bases to any foreign power.[50] A *New York Times* report from New Delhi in March 1973 pictured Mrs. Gandhi as "seeking to blunt the view that India's nonalignment is slipping away" and even pointed to signs of "a delicate turn" in Indo-Soviet relations. In this context, the report also noted the Indian government's firm determination not to dovetail its economic planning with that of the Soviet Union.[51]

These indications of a disposition on India's part to move away from overly close ties with the USSR in order to mend relations with China were indirectly reinforced by signs of apprehension in Moscow. An early evidence of Soviet nervousness on this score was an article by G. V. Matveev in the Moscow scholarly journal *Problemy Dalnevo Vostoka* (Problems of the Far East), which for the first time voiced unreserved support of India on the Sino-Indian border issue and accused China of duplicity in taking over the Aksai Chin.[52] Soviet party chief Brezhnev's spectacular visit to India in November 1973 could also be seen as attributable, in large measure, to the same concern over the future orientation of Sino-Indian relations.



Soviet Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev addresses a giant public rally at the historic Red Fort in Old Delhi on November 27, 1973.

—UPI.

Thus, in two vital areas bearing on Sino-Indian relations—*i.e.*, the strategic position of Pakistan on the subcontinent and India's association with the Soviet Union—the period since the end of the Indo-Pakistan war has seen forces at work that have appeared to be nudging both India and China toward a reorientation of their bilateral relations along lines of conciliation rather than confrontation. It remains to sum up the evidences to date of a disposition on both sides to enter into direct negotiations with a view to composing their past differences.

Trends in Bilateral Relations

On the Indian side, we have already noted Foreign Minister Singh's renewed appeal for direct talks with China in his late 1972 statement in the Indian Parliament, as well as his explicit reassurances to the Chinese on the Indo-Soviet relationship and other sensitive issues in his Tokyo press conference of January 1973. It should also be noted that Chinese accusations of Indian meddling in Tibet, made in the UN administrative and budgetary committee in October 1972,[53] drew the reassuring response that India unequivocally accepted China's sovereignty over Tibet, did not harbor any émigré Tibetan government, and was not acting in any way in support of Tibetan rebellion.[54] Furthermore, while Indian

[48] *Ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1973.

[49] *Ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1972.

[50] Interview with Australian Broadcasting Commission, reported in *ibid.*, June 3, 1973. For a detailed discussion of India's relations with the major powers in the aftermath of Bangladesh, see the author's "India's New Role in the South Asian Context," *Pacific Community*, April 1973.

[51] Excerpts reported in *The Times of India*, March 28, 1973.

[52] G. V. Matveev, "Political Machinations of Peking on the Indian Subcontinent," *Problemy Dalnevo Vostoka* (Moscow), No. 4, 1972, pp. 39-45; gist reported in *The Hindustan Times*, Jan. 7, 1973.

[53] See *The Times of India*, Oct. 22, 1972.

[54] *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1972. See also Mrs. Gandhi's interview with Murray Gart, *Time* (New York), Dec. 11, 1972, p. 24.

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official statements, for obvious reasons, have remained noncommital on the boundary issue, New Delhi's expressed desire for talks without preconditions would seem to suggest that India is not unwilling to discuss and settle the problem on a compromise basis.

On the Chinese side, too, there have been slight but—in the aggregate—significant indications of a more positive attitude toward India. One was the appointment in March 1973 of a new Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in New Delhi after an 18-month period without diplomatic representation above secretary-level (the new Chargé, Ma Mu-ming, had been First Secretary of Embassy in New Delhi in 1956, during the period of Sino-Indian cordiality).[55] Another was the republication in China in April of a note which Chou En-lai had addressed to the heads of Asian and African states in 1962 with regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute.[56] Although the republication was probably meant to serve notice on India that China was not likely to retreat from its old position that the boundary should be fixed on the basis of "actual control," it could also be seen as reflecting an intention on Peking's part to take up New Delhi's offer of direct talks on outstanding issues at an appropriate time. Of possible significance, too, was China's reported abandonment of a cotton-farming project in a strategic area of Nepal close to the Indian border, which had aroused Indian apprehensions. While economic considerations could have influenced the Chinese decision, the move was viewed, in part, as a political gesture toward India.[57]

There have also been roundabout hints in the diplomatic sphere of a Chinese change of heart. Coincidentally with Foreign Minister Singh's conciliatory press interview in Tokyo, the Chinese were reportedly telling a visiting Italian delegation in Peking (headed by Italy's Foreign Minister) that China was not intransigent toward India and that, on the contrary, several attempts had been made on the Chinese side to promote a new phase of improved relations between the two countries.[58] Still more significant, perhaps, was a report that Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu told visiting Indian President V. V. Giri in Bucharest last October that he had the impression of a much more relaxed Chinese attitude toward India, and that he expected this to lead to a normalization of Sino-Indian relations.[59] In view of Romania's close political contacts with Peking and the part it reportedly played as an early honest broker between China and the United States, Ceausescu's remarks to the Indian President were probably more than a diplomatic nicety.

Meanwhile, the new mood on both sides has been reflected in the attendance of appropriate Chinese diplomatic representatives at official Indian functions both in and outside India and in exchanges of cordial messages between the two governments on important national occasions. (Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took note of this in a press interview in Colombo last year, when she remarked, "Earlier they [the Chinese] were not on talking terms with us, but now they are . . . and come for our receptions and the like. This continues to progress." [60]) Other straws in the wind have been the cessation of the "loudspeaker war" between the opposing Chinese and Indian lines of control in the vicinity of Nathu La and the inauguration of Ethiopian Airways flights to China via India, with Chinese through travellers permitted to move about freely in Bombay without Indian visas.[61]

All these scattered bits of evidence, when taken together, suggest that while no new explicit and clear-cut policy framework has emerged on either side, at least there has been significant movement toward preparing the climate for a dialogue between New Delhi and Peking. It should be borne in mind in this connection that substantive changes in Chinese foreign policy particularly have tended—as in the case of the Sino-US rapprochement—to follow after a protracted preparatory course evidenced by seemingly insignificant changes in emphasis and subtle nuances. Whether in terms of such minor clues or in terms of the strategic forces now at work in subcontinental and global politics, it seems reasonable to infer that China and India, after two decades of almost continuous tension and hostility, are at last moving toward a normalization of their relations.

[55] *The Times of India*, March 22, 1973.
[56] Reported in *The Statesman*, April 18, 1973.
[57] See *The Times of India*, April 6 and 27, 1973.
[58] See *ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1973.
[59] See report in *The Overseas Hindustan Times* (New Delhi), Oct. 18, 1973.
[60] *The Statesman*, April 30, 1973.
[61] *The Times of India*, April 6 and 7, 1973.

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Kim's Korean Communism

By Bruce G. Cumings

In assessing the nature of communism in North Korea, many scholars have tended to ask questions which are perhaps more revealing of their own assumptions and predilections than of an unbiased curiosity about North Korean realities. For example, they seek to discover by what mechanisms the Soviet Union imposed an "alien puppet regime" in northern Korea and how Moscow maintained controls over the Pyongyang polity after Soviet troops withdrew. Or they ask whether the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has emulated Soviet or Chinese behavior, whether its system and methods are Stalinist or Maoist. By thus concentrating on external factors and criteria of analysis, such studies have persistently ignored or overlooked what may, in fact, be the most important question of all: What is specifically "Korean" about the brand of communism developed in North Korea?

It is to this surprisingly neglected question that the present analysis is addressed.[1] An examination of the political development of North Korea since 1945 from this perspective suggests that Pyongyang has trod a separate path, one that has reflected a fundamental Korean essence since the beginning, even while it has involved prudent and eclectic borrowing from the practice of its two Communist neighbors. Such similarities as one discovers between North Korea's behavior and Soviet or Chinese practices have not necessarily corresponded to periods of presumed Soviet or Chinese influence, nor do they involve uncritical emulation. Rather, they appear to reflect a discriminating selection of similar methods to deal with similar conditions. Moreover, those who suggest that a uniquely Korean model of communism has surfaced only in the last decade or so—perhaps in the aftermath of the appearance of open polemics between China and the Soviet Union—miss the fundamental continuities which have existed in North Korean policies and political organization from 1945 to the present. Even Pyongyang's attempts to project its experience as a model for development in small, third-world nations emerging from colonialism can be seen as a peculiarly Korean response to problems of legitimacy and self-image that date back to the formation of the DPRK after World War II.

From the outset, North Korean communism has manifested two distinct characteristics: it has been decidedly nationalistic and self-reliant in tone and practice, and it has involved an exceptionally high degree of political organization of the society. Both features appear to represent reactions by a revolutionary regime to distinctive Korean political traditions of a negative character. As Bertram Wolfe has observed,

Every land moves toward its future in terms of its own past, its own institutions and traditions.[2]

In the case of pre-1945 Korean politics, one can discern two salient characteristics: organizational weakness in the domestic political structure and re-

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[1] Any study of the opaque society of North Korea is fraught with difficulties, but the paucity of information available to the outside observer should be viewed as a challenge, not as an insuperable obstacle.

[2] Quoted by Alfred G. Meyer in his contribution, "Theories of Convergence," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1970, p. 314.

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liance on foreign power. The first has been so endemic that it has shaped major interpretations of 20th-century as well as traditional Yi Dynasty political behavior. For example, one recent attempt to construct a model of traditional and modern Korean politics underscored that system's inability to form meaningful intermediate or secondary groupings.[3] The outcome, this study suggested, was a fragmented society given to factionalism and incapable of asserting its own identity. The second characteristic of traditional Korean politics was the habit of "serving the great" (*sadaejuui*).[4] Not only did this mean subservience to foreign power, but it also involved a penchant for adopting foreign models of sociopolitical and cultural development.

One cannot understand the North Korean Communist experience without reference to these two critical legacies. The Communists in Pyongyang have attempted to remedy the first through organization and the second through ideology.[5] The discussion that follows will assess in this light several important features of North Korean communism—its extraordinary degree of political organization; the use of the mass line; the stress on nationalism and the concept of "self-reliance" (*chuch'e*); and the penchant for advertising North Korea as a model to be followed by other nations. In addition, it will—where appropriate—juxtapose Pyongyang's practice and Soviet and Chinese Communist experience to highlight the elements of comparability and contrast in the responses of the respective systems to comparable political problems.

"Fostering the Core"

It is difficult to imagine a society more tightly organized than contemporary North Korea.[6] This striking attribute has given the DPRK an unusual degree of stability and continuity. The revolutionary leadership has stressed iron-like, disciplined unity as a conscious means of overcoming past weaknesses and of achieving fundamental revolutionary goals within the society. Nowhere is this commitment to tight political organization more evident than in General Secretary Kim Il Sung's emphasis on "fostering the core" (*haeksimul yuksonghanun kot*) of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP):

Constant training of the core members of the cells while building up a mass political party is our invariable line of organization. The core consists of those party members who are aware of the Communist truth and are capable of keeping to the road of revolution without vacillation.[7]

The core members are highly disciplined and loyal cadres who can be counted on to carry out the directives of higher authority without question or hesitation, and who also serve as models to be emulated by the rest of society. Through the efforts of these core members, the leadership penetrates the society at every level and creates a disciplined unity in the face of external enemies. Kim speaks of "the great power which is born when the party leadership penetrates deeply into the lower units."[8]

Such an emphasis on organization, of course, appears to Westerners as nothing more than totalitarianism. Thus, a recent study has pictured North Korean society as susceptible to organizational manipulation from above as in totalitarian systems.[9] Moreover, personal distaste for the political methods of the DPRK has led some to continue to brand North Korea as a "Stalinist" society.[10] Yet something more seems to be involved here than a mere commitment by the KWP leadership to power for power's sake or a blind adoption of totalitarian models to that end. In large part, the North Korean dedication to intensive political organization may also have reflected an effort to overcome the debilitating factionalism of prerevolutionary Korean politics and to create the

[3] See Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968. The present author provided a critique of this model in "Is Korea A Mass Society?" *Occasional Papers on Korea*, Seattle, University of Washington, 1972.

[4] See Frederick M. Nelson, *Korea and the Old Orders in East Asia*, Baton Rouge, University of Louisiana Press, 1946; and C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-kyo Kim, *Korea and the Politics of Imperialism: 1876-1910*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, pp. 12-13.

[5] These terms are used in the sense employed by Franz Schurmann in *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968, pp. 3-9.

[6] See Harrison Salisbury's account of his 1972 visit to North Korea in *To Peking and Beyond: A Report on the New Asia*, New York, Quadrangle Books, 1973, pp. 189-221.

[7] Kim Il Sung, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing *Juche* in Ideological Work," *Selected Works* (in English—hereafter referred to as *SW*), Pyongyang, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971, Vol. 1, p. 599. Korean words in the present article are taken from the corresponding Korean-language version of Kim's works.

[8] Quoted in Kim Byong Sik, *Modern Korea: The Socialist North, Revolutionary Perspectives in the South*, New York, International Publishers, 1970, p. 134.

[9] Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 324-33.

[10] See, for example, Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East: Communism in North Korea," in Robert Scalapino, Ed., *The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1969.

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necessary preconditions for a revolutionary transformation of Korean society. Let us examine these two points briefly.

Koreans see their history as one of nearly hopeless factionalism. The last two centuries of the Yi Dynasty (the dynasty ruled from 1392 to 1910) saw endless factional struggles, and the situation was hardly better in the nationalist and Communist movements of the current century prior to 1945.[11] The degree to which this trait influenced Korean political history may be open to question, but there is little doubt that Koreans perceive it as a crucial element of their past. Kim Il Sung's writings are peppered wtih attacks on the factiousness of his countrymen, particularly the factionalism that characterized the pre-1945 Communist movement. His solution has been unity. As he wrote in 1946: "United we stand, divided we fall." [12]

However, to interpret Korean politics in the early post-World War II period solely in terms of a reaction to factionalism is to misrepresent those politics as issueless. In fact, political discourse in both North and South Korea during the years 1945-48 was dominated by the important question of what to do about a strong, locally-based rural gentry and its property.[13] The strength of this social group in the traditional Korean political system has been underestimated in most accounts, which tend to stress the highly centralized and autocratic nature of Korea under the Yi Dynasty. But, as James B. Palais has noted in a recent seminal study,

. . . the ostensible centralized and autocratic government structure was merely a façade that obscured the reality of aristocratic power. In fact, the social elite controlled the bureaucratic structure, kept it relatively weak, and used it to check royal authority.[14]

Falling between the bureaucracy and the peasantry, the landowners sought access to the former, not so much for the sake of power *per se* as to preserve personal privileges and status.

Some 35 years of Japanese colonial rule failed to eliminate this political factor, and in 1945 the rural gentry still held considerable economic and political power, power which remained devoted to the defense of largely parochial interest. The Korean rural landowners represented a major obstacle to the Communists or any political group seeking to modernize Korea and assert the country's identity as a liberated nation. It was therefore not surprising that the first major act taken by Kim Il Sung after assuming power was a thoroughgoing land reform (begun March 6, 1946). In discussing similar reforms elsewhere, Theodore Lowi has commented:

Issues that involve redistribution cut closer than any others along class lines and activate interests in what are roughly class terms. . . . In redistribution, there will never be more than two sides, and the two sides are clear, stable, consistent.[15]

What was involved in Korea, too, was a revolution, "an action of destruction willed against a whole ruling class," to borrow Franz Schurmann's phrase.[16] North Korea's Communists turned to a highly centralized, coercive, ideological approach in its revolutionary assault on the power of landed privilege. Tight organization was the key to implementing the land reform, and success in this endeavor doubtless reinforced Kim Il Sung's emphasis on "fostering the core."

The Mass Line

In addition to the emphasis on "fostering the core," North Korea's scheme of political organization has included the concept of the "mass line." Simply stated, the mass-line approach in Communist theory posits the potential of the masses for making a

[11] See, for example, Kwan Bong Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System*, New York, Praeger, 1971, pp. 1-39. Otto Kuusinen, the well-known Comintern operative, reportedly once claimed that Korean Communists held "the record" for factionalism among the world's Communist parties (see Dae-sook Suh, *Documents of Korean Communism, 1918-1948*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 271).

[12] Kim Il Sung, "On the Establishment of the Workers' Party of North Korea and the Question of Founding the Workers' Party of South Korea," Sept. 26, 1946, in *SW*, Vol. 1, p. 119. For various attacks by Kim on factionalism, see *ibid.*, pp. 103, 265-67, and 398.

[13] The author has discussed this issue in "American Policy and Korean Liberation," in Frank Baldwin, Ed., *Without Parallel: Essays on American-Korean Relations Since 1945*, New York, Pantheon, 1974; see also Robert Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972, Vol. 1, p. 343.

[14] See his unpublished manuscript, "Policy and Politics in Traditional Korea, 1864-1976: Systemic Restraints on Monarchical Authority and Central Power." Palais is at the University of Washington (Seattle).

[15] Quoted in Michel Oksenberg, "Policy Making Under Mao, 1949-68: An Overview," in John M. H. Lindbeck, Ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society*, Seattle, Univ. of Washington Press, 1971, p. 113.

[16] Schurmann, *op. cit.*, p. xxxvi.

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Premier Kim Il Sung engages in on-the-spot guidance with workers at the Hichun Machine Plant in 1967.

—Czechoslovak News Agency via EUPRA.

positive contribution to the revolutionary reconstruction of society either spontaneously or under the patient guidance of those with a higher level of revolutionary consciousness.

The North Korean regime has placed great emphasis on the application of the mass line in agriculture and industry since 1960 through the widely-publicized "Ch'ongsan-ni method" and the "Taean system." However, it is not generally recognized that mass-line politics have actually been employed in North Korea since the late 1940's. For example, Kim Il Sung stated in 1948:

We must acquire the work method of explaining matters to the masses, not commanding them, of going deep into the midst of the masses and knowing their feelings, teaching them and learning from them.[17]

The result has been the widespread application of "intensive guidance," whereby thousands of central and local functionaries "go down" (*naeryogada*) to help with implementation of policies (particularly collectivization). At times, the entire membership of the KWP's Politburo has toured the provinces after plenary sessions. Kim himself has made an institution of "on-the-spot guidance" (*chaeji chido*)—he has displayed his ample figure from the 38th parallel to the Diamond Mountains and claims hundreds of personal visits to villages, factories and collective farms (including 62 visits to the model village of Ch'ongsan-ni alone). North Korean officials have been instructed to behave in a circumspect and modest manner in their "going down" to the masses. As Kim wrote,

. . . responsible personnel should not give "guidance" in such a way as making tours by car and hurling abuse, but must personally go down to the lower levels and stay there for a long period to assist the functionaries in their actual work.[18]

Examination of Kim's statements and actions with regard to the mass line reveals considerable similarities with, as well as significant differences from, mass-line doctrine and practice in the People's Republic of China. The classic exposition of the Maoist mass line appeared in a 1943 speech by the Chinese leader:

In all practical work of our Party, correct leadership can only be developed on the principle of "from the masses, to the masses." This means summing up (i.e., *coordinating and systematizing after careful study*) *the views of the masses* (i.e., *views scattered and unsystematic*), *then taking the resulting views back to the masses, explaining and popularizing them until the masses embrace the ideas as their own, stand up for them and translate them into action by way of testing their correctness. . . . the leadership can work out correct ideas only if it sums up the views of the masses and takes the resulting ideas back to the masses so that they can gain firm mass support.*[19]

Such views seem to find a clear echo in the words of Kim Il Sung quoted above, or in a more recent statement of the North Korean leader:

Our best instructors are the masses and reality. All cadres should always learn humbly from the masses, raise their own level through actual work, sum up the results of their own work, and popularize their experience.[20]

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[17] "Report to the Second Congress of the Workers' Party of North Korea on the Work of the Central Committee," March 28, 1948, *SW*, Vol. 1, p. 247; for similar statements by Kim in the years 1945-48, see *ibid.*, pp. 15, 88, and 150-51.

[18] "On Some Questions of Party and State Work in the Present Stage of the Socialist Revolution," April 4, 1955, *SW*, Vol. 1, p. 573.

[19] Mao Tse-tung, "On Methods of Leadership," *Selected Works*, New York, International Publishers, 1954, pp. 113-14.

[20] "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea," Sept. 11, 1961, in Kim Il Sung, *Our Nation Today and Tomorrow*, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1966, pp. 480-81.

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While such resemblances between Chinese and Korean mass-line methods have been attributed, in part, to Korean emulation of Maoism,[21] they may also be seen as flowing from the adoption of similar solutions to similar political problems in the two societies.

Common Legacies—Similar Solutions

Both China and Korea traditionally had Confucian bureaucratic systems characterized by weak and tenuous links between the center and the periphery. Orders from the center were rarely carried out with fidelity in local areas. Officials dispatched from the center to the provinces were often at the mercy of local clerks and petty officials who "mediated between the authority of the central government as represented by the district magistrate and the population in the villages." [22] The center had to compete with the society at large for resources and often lost out to entrenched local interests in this competition. In the Korean case, intermediary groups of landlords and petty officials often took "the lion's share of national wealth." [23] Within the bureaucracy, officials formed cliques and alliances to frustrate directives running counter to their interests, and they represented constituencies external to the bureaucracy with an interest in impeding the implementation of various orders. In short, constant vigilance was necessary to secure even minimum compliance with directives from the center. The extraction of surplus resources was constantly hindered by falsification of land registers, tax rosters and grain harvest reports.

The habits acquired under the traditional Confucian bureaucratic systems persisted and bedeviled the efforts of Communist regimes in both China and North Korea to modernize state administration and bring about effective revolutionary change. In both cases, the regimes turned to mass-line politics in an attempt to create new linkages and bridge the existing gaps between the center and the periphery, to secure compliance with central directives throughout the administrative hierarchy, and to "bring the higher levels down to the lower levels."

The difficulty North Korea encountered in attempting to eradicate the entrenched traditional bureaucratic patterns in North Korea is clearly reflected in a 1952 speech by Kim Il Sung on "The Task and Role of the Local Organs of Power at the Present Stage." [24] He accused local officials of saddling the people of the villages "with various financial burdens besides taxes" and of flattering higher officials and reporting to them "only what is good." Officials sent down to the lower levels were accused of listening to flatterers, taking consolation in false reports, subjecting subordinates to abusive language if they advanced an opinion, and failing to "give ear to the voices of the masses." Kim described a typical result of such practices:

The area not sown to crops is reported as sown, while higher authorities assess the tax in kind on the basis of such reports without investigating into the real state of affairs.

This litany of bureaucratic inefficiency and obfuscation is reminiscent of the administrative problems of Yi Dynasty politics.[25]

Kim's remedy for this situation was to require that officials at every level go down to the lower levels, familiarize themselves with local conditions, attend to the needs and problems of the masses, and, in general, never become "divorced from the people." Thus, the North Koreans, much like the Chinese, have used mass-line techniques to overcome a common bureaucratic legacy.

Leninism *vs.* Populism

However, despite the parallels in problems and solutions, the North Korean mass-line approach has placed greater emphasis on assuring compliance than on the stimulation of mass spontaneity and participation that seems to figure so strongly in Mao's mass line.

In attempting to draw any comparisons between the two, one is of course faced with the issue of widely conflicting interpretations of Mao's own mass line. Is Mao a "natural Leninist" [26] whose prime con-

[21] See, for example, Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Communist Strategies in Asia*, New York, Praeger, 1964.

[22] Palais, *op cit.*, "Introduction," p. 18.

[23] *Ibid.*, Ch. 4, p. 8.

[24] *SW*, Vol. 1, pp. 350-70.

[25] See, for example, Kim's speech of April 1, 1955 (*SW*, Vol. 1, pp. 540-54), "On Eliminating Bureaucracy," in which he criticized the "detective or police methods" employed by cadres sent to lower levels to do "check-up work" (*komyol*). Such behavior reminds one of the actions of the secret inspectors (*amhaeng osa*) of the Yi Dynasty.

[26] Stuart Schram spoke of Mao's "natural Leninism" in a volume he edited: *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, New York, Praeger, 1963.

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

A massive card display—a distinctive feature of mobilization à la *Pyongyang—at a 1971 rally depicts the world's revolutionary peoples allied against the US.*

—Photo by EUPRA.

tribution has been to organize a vast population? Or is he a voluntarist who believes in spontaneous action by the masses, and who even tends to negate the uniqueness of the role of the vanguard party in effecting the revolution? As Maurice Meisner has suggested, there is in Mao "a still unresolved tension" between Leninism and populism.[27] If one treats the Chinese mass-line concept as essentially a "top-down approach" to creating linkages with the masses, eliciting compliance by the masses and affording a controlled form of mass participation in the execution of policies,[28] Korean usage perhaps differs from the Chinese only in degree. However, if one emphasizes the non-Leninist, populist aspects of Maoism, the difference between Chinese and North Korean practices becomes one of substance.

The crucial distinction between the two approaches to stimulating revolutionary change lies in the assumptions about where revolutionary consciousness resides. From the populist perspective—to which Mao would seem to incline—the role of the vanguard, *i.e.*, the activists or cadres, is one of stimulating a revolutionary consciousness that is latent in the masses. Leninism, on the other hand, would locate revolutionary consciousness in the activist himself, who embodies that consciousness and brings it to the masses. From the Leninist standpoint, Mao's populism has led him to confuse the nature of the vanguard. Thus, as Stuart Schram has noted, for Mao, "the proletariat is defined above all by a state of mind, which anyone can acquire through study or simply in a flash of illumination." According to Schram, Mao sees the Leninist vanguard of the proletariat (*i.e.*, the Communist party) as "merely one instrument among others, and not as something unique and sacred which is in itself the embodiment of legitimacy." [29]

Mao betrayed his unconventional views on the vanguard role of the party in his well-known Hunan Report of 1927. To Mao, the peasantry, not the party, was "the vanguard in overthrowing the feudal forces," and peasant revolutionaries would stand in judgment of the revolutionary mettle of Communist activists.[30] Mao's belief in the creativity and spontaneity of the Chinese peasantry and his corresponding distrust of the pretensions of any elite (including the Communist party itself) figures in his widespread adoption of the practices of *hsia-fang* (downward

[27] See Meisner's "Leninism and Maoism: Some Populist Perspectives on Marxism-Leninism in China," *The China Quarterly* (London), January/March 1971, p. 16.

[28] Harry Harding presents this interpretation in "Maoist Theories of Policy-Making and Organization," in Thomas Robinson, Ed., *The Cultural Revolution in China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 113-64.

[29] Stuart Schram, "The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology," in John W. Lewis, Ed., *Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 195 and 182; see also Schram, Ed., *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, rev. ed., 1969, pp. 53-55.

[30] "Report on an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan," *Selected Works*, Vol. 1, pp. 22, 32.

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transfer) and *hsia-hsiang* (to the villages). First urged by Mao's mentor, Li Ta-chao, these practices were applied initially in Yenan and then in the People's Republic after 1949.[31] Moreover, many would ascribe the entire Cultural Revolution (1966-68) to Mao's determination to prevent the development of new elite values and to eradicate persistent old ones in Chinese society.[32]

One can trace elements of Maoist populism in Kim Il Sung's thought. Like Mao, Kim tends to distrust "the city" and to equate it with the evils of capitalism,[33] the latter viewed as an alien imposition by Japanese imperialism. Kim speaks often of the creative powers of the masses. Almost paraphrasing Mao's Hunan Report, Kim has said: "The masses are very wise, and there is nothing they cannot see through." [34]

However, for Kim Il Sung, it is the cadre who embodies revolutionary consciousness and who brings it to the masses. Nowhere in Kim's writings does one find a Maoist questioning of the vanguard role of the Communist cadre. That the masses would stand in judgment of cadres would be unthinkable. If Mao's mass line reads "from the masses, to the masses," Kim's might be "to the masses, from the masses, to the masses." In other words, consciousness is not latent in the masses but must be brought from without. The masses cannot, in the first instance, lead or guide the cadre. They can, at a secondary stage, inform the cadre of local conditions, farming techniques, and the like. If in China the first stage of mass-line policy-making (the stage of "problems selection," to use Harry Harding's terminology [35]) consists of gathering information, in Korea the problems to be addressed are formulated by the elite, the vanguard Communist party. And in addition, for Mao the reservoir of revolutionary consciousness is the countryside, to which one returns for sustenance, and paying one's dues there is the true test of the revolutionary. For Kim (despite his mistrust of the bourgeois city, noted above), the reservoir of revolutionary consciousness resides in the proletariat or the factory workers, with the vanguard party as its agent, and raising peasant consciousness is a matter of proletarianizing them.[36]

The emphasis in North Korea has consistently been on revolution from above, from the top down. As Kim Il Sung wrote in 1948,

Our Party has made the peasants masters of the land through democratic reform and is leading them along the road to a new blissful life and continues to awaken them ideologically and enlighten them culturally.[37]

Kim has never questioned the authority of the KWP or suggested that any other body can play the vanguard role. Indeed, North Koreans joined Soviet figures in condemning Maoist attacks on the Chinese Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution in China.[38]

"Tailing" Behind the Masses

In seeking a plausible explanation for the differences in mass-line techniques of Kim and Mao, one is drawn to the difference in the roads to power traversed by the two Communist leaders. Mao's persistent reliance on the peasantry in the face of widespread opposition wtihin his own party as well as in Moscow is well known, and one can speak of the Chinese revolution as one carried out from the bottom up. On the other hand, while Kim had spent a decade leading armed forces against the Japanese prior to 1945, he had no experience in controlling independent rural base areas with an extensive population. After 1945, his role was to impose—with a measure of Soviet help, the extent of which is still subject to debate—his own control upon a revolutionary movement that already controlled much of northern Korea.

With the end of Japanese rule on the peninsula in August 1945, there spontaneously sprang up a large number of people's committees displaying a highly mixed composition that varied from province to province. Although generally oriented to the political

[31] See Maurice Meisner, *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 75.

[32] See, for example, Neal Hunter, *Shanghai Journal*, New York, Praeger, 1969, p. 6. The important 16-point directive of Aug. 8, 1966, said that "the masses must liberate themselves," and directed cadres to submit to the mass movement. See Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, *Chinese Communism in Crisis*, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 121-22.

[33] See his speech, "For the Successful Fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan," *SW*, Vol. 2, p. 108.

[34] "On Creating Revolutionary Literature and Art," *ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 166.

[35] Harding, *op cit.*, pp. 120-21.

[36] This is evident in Kim's speech of Feb. 25, 1964, "Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country," *SW*, Vol. 4, pp. 33-83.

[37] "On the Tasks of Our Party Organizations," Jan. 24, 1948, *SW*, Vol. 1, p. 185.

[38] Baik Bong, *Kim Il Sung: Biography*, Tokyo, Miraisha, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 70.

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left, this movement owed little, if anything, to the initiatives either of the Soviet forces which occupied the north or of the forces of Kim Il Sung.[39] In effect, Kim and the Communists were caught in the painfully "un-Leninist" position of "tailing behind the masses." However, the presence of Soviet troops in the north did create conditions under which Kim could place his own men and those of allied Communist elements in leading positions in the people's committees there and thus gradually impose his control on this local political structure. This greatly facilitated the task of communizing North Korea, for by taking control of the local revolutionary movement Kim's Communists were able to create an image of legitimacy for the DPRK (formally established in 1948) in Korean eyes that this government might not otherwise have enjoyed.[40]

In calling for a Provisional People's Committee of North Korea in early 1946, Kim Il Sung did acknowledge the representative nature of the spontaneous people's committee movement, but he viewed as "the most urgent task" of the moment the creation of "a central organ of state power."[41] As a good Leninist, Kim was not interested in being swept along by the spontaneous will of the masses as manifested in the people's committee movement. Rather, he saw his primary political contribution to be the development of a strong central organization which would dominate the emerging political structure and use it to inspire the masses to seek the proper revolutionary goals. For him, the cadres of the party core, not the spontaneous activists of the committees, were the embodiment of true revolutionary consciousness, and the mass line was the means whereby this consciousness was to be imparted to the masses. As Kim's biographer summed up the process,

. . . to strengthen ties with the masses, it was necessary to bring the Programme, decisions, and all policies of the Party to the masses so that the masses could assimilate them, thus leading the masses to voluntarily carry out the will of the Party.[42]

The Ideology of *Chuch'e*

An integral feature of the ideology and practice of the party as it worked to transform the North Korean society and economy has been a nationalistic emphasis on self-reliance, or *chuch'e*. Kim Il Sung defined this concept as

. . . the principle of solving for oneself all problems of the revolution and construction in conformity with the actual conditions of one's country, and mainly by one's own efforts.[43]

His approach to the organization of the DPRK has been

. . . Juche [*sic*] *in ideology, independence in politics, self-sustenance in the economy, and self-defense in national defense.*[44]

Although the ideology of *chuch'e* has been broadcast far and wide by Pyongyang only in recent years, here again the underlying attitude is not a new phenomenon, having already been present in the North since the late 1940's. Nor is it a monopoly of the North Korean regime, for the same concept has been widely invoked in South Korea as well. There the term is usually translated into English as "subjectivity," but its meaning is much the same as in North Korean usage—*i.e.* "subjectivity where the nation is concerned." As South Korean philosopher Cho Kah Kyung has observed, *chuch'e* is a "mental posture" to preserve and maintain, in difficult circumstances, Korean autonomy and self-respect; its emotional undertone is "concern for the nation's interests and pride." As such, it is a response to Korea's long history of subservience to foreign models—first the

[39] See the author's "American Policy and Korean Liberation," *loc. cit.*, and his paper at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, 1974, "The People's Committees in the Provinces: An Ecological View of Politics Under the American Occupation of Korea."

[40] Dankwart Rustow has observed: "In the countries where Communist regimes were imposed by outside conquest, all other tensions are periodically overshadowed by a fourth, that between revolution from outside and the need for indigenous legitimation." ("Communism and Change," in Chalmers Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 354.)

[41] "On the Present Political Situation in Korea and the Organization of the Provisional People's Committee of North Korea," Feb. 8, 1946, *SW*, Vol. 1, pp. 26-27; see also *ibid.*, pp. 50-53. Baik Bong ignores the people's committees in his hagiographic work (*op. cit.*) because Kim Il Sung played no role in initiating them. Those who comment on the adulatory nature of Baik Bong's work forget that hagiography is a tradition in Korea. See references to Syngman Rhee as "the leader," "the prophet," or even "the Messiah" in Yang Uchong, *Yi Taet'ongyong t'ujaeng-sa* (History of President Rhee's Struggle), Seoul, Yonhap Sinmun-sa, 1949, pp. 38, *passim*.

[42] Baik Bong, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 158.

[43] "On Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the South Korean Revolution," speech given in Indonesia on April 14, 1965, *SW*, Vol. 4, p. 228.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

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Chinese, then the Japanese, Russian, and American. It answers the question "what to model after?" in a distinctly Korean way.[45]

Chuch'e is, then, a nationalistic concept—Korea for the Koreans. A people with a long and proud history, once ranked among the advanced nations of the world, Koreans—in both the North and South—are highly sensitive about a "backwardness" which they see as being not inherent but the result of foreign control and colonialism. To make matters more intolerable, foreign control has often been "legitimized" by citing alleged Korean failings. Thus, the Japanese claimed that their colonial rule was needed to save Koreans from themselves, and in the well-known Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, the Allies pledged themselves to give Korea independence "in due course," *i.e.,* only after a period of tutelage in self-government.

Kim Il Sung spoke trenchantly of this legacy of subservience on numerous occasions in the late 1940's. In 1946, on the eve of elections to the people's committees, he attacked those who tended to view power as real ". . . only when it is framed up by someone from above or forcibly introduced from without by a foreign country," and who say, "Our ancestors, too, lived that way." He continued, "our people know better than anyone else through their own bitter experience how barbarous and predatory the power framed up forcibly by another country is." Kim looked to the elections to

. . . demonstrate to the whole world that our awakened and united people are capable of self-government and are fully able to build their country into an advanced, independent, democratic state.[46]

In an important speech in 1948, he linked these themes of nationalist pride and self-respect with his emphasis on strong organization:

The path our Party has traveled and the realities in North Korea have completely belied the imperialists' slander: "Being an inferior nation, the Korean people are incapable of governing the state, and they cannot have a powerful political party." We are now legitimately proud that the Korean nation, ranking among the advanced nations of the world, *is credibly administering its country and has a political party capable of shaping the destinies of the country and the people.*[47]

The power of such an appeal to a Korean audience is obvious. Not only does it provide an explanation (*i.e.,* imperialism) for the nation's former backwardness, but it suggests a means (*i.e.,* socialism) for overcoming that backwardness and moving into the ranks of the advanced nations. Moreover, an ideology of self-reliance strikes a responsive chord in a society whose past leaders—as anthropologist Vincent Brandt has noted—have traditionally shown "an inability to find appropriate symbols or methods that would stimulate a sense of identity and common purpose capable of unifying the loyalties of diverse groups of people." [48]

As Communists, of course, the rulers of North Korea face the question of reconciling their heavy emphasis on nationalism with the principles of Marxist internationalism. In 1946 Paek Namun, now President of the DPRK Academy of Sciences, began his study, *The Path of the Korean Nation,* with a discourse on Korean uniqueness. To him, Korea's history, people, and current world-historical stage were unique, and this required a unique solution for the application of Marxism-Leninism to Korea. Soviet and Chinese models were not applicable; the Koreans would have to develop a unique synthesis of nationalism and socialism.[49] This impulse toward synthesis has characterized Korean communism since its beginnings.

Chuch'e was Kim Il Sung's solution. He first publicized the term in a well-known speech in 1955, using it much as the South Koreans do. "The Korean revolution is the subjective point (*chuch'e*) of our Party's ideological work," [50] he said; in other words,

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[45] Cho Kah Kyung, "Philosophical Aspect of Modernization of the Modern Consciousness and the Problems of Subjectivity," in *Report: International Conference on the Problems of Modernization in Asia,* Seoul, Asiatic Research Center, 1965, p. 62. The immense appeal to Koreans of national self-reliance in economic and political terms is clearly revealed in Yi Konhyok, *Kon'guk kwa kungmin kyongje* (National Construction and the National Economy), Seoul, Hansong Sanghoe, 1946, especially pp. 15, 27-29, 39.

[46] "On the Eve of the Historic Democratic Election," Nov. 1, 1946, *SW,* Vol. 1, pp. 125-26, 131, and 156-58.

[47] "Report to the Second Congress . . . ," *loc. cit.,* p. 256. Emphasis added.

[48] *A Korean Village Between Farm and Sea,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 239.

[49] *Choson minjogui chillo* (The Path of the Korean Nation), Seoul, Sin'gon-sa, 1946, pp. 11-12, 29-32, 34-40. For a similar attempt at synthesis, see Yi Chaehun, *Minjok uisik kwa kyegup uisik* (National Consciousness and Class Consciousness), Seoul, Tongyang Kongsa Ch-ulp'an-sa, 1946.

[50] Kim Il Sung, *Chojak sonjip* (Selected Works), Pyongyang, Choson Nodon-dang Ch'ulp'an-sa, 1969, Vol. 4, p. 326. The English version, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing *Juche* in Ideological Work," *loc. cit.,* lacks the nuance of the Korean text.

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chuch'e meant "subjectivity where the revolution is concerned." This article appeared well before Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of Stalinism and the ensuing development of Sino-Soviet differences. In light of this chronology and Kim's persistent talk about self-reliance in earlier years, one finds it difficult to accept the interpretation that *chuch'e* represents a North Korean effort to tread a careful path between its neighboring rival Communist giants.[51] What is evident in Kim's article is a disgust with slavish aping of Soviet and Chinese practices. He wrote:

Some advocate the Soviet way and others the Chinese, but is it not high time to work out our own? [52]

Although the Chinese by this time were also becoming disenchanted with the blind application of Soviet models to the solution of Chinese problems, no statement of comparable candor appeared in China before 1956.

Regardless, however, of which Communist society was first to express its distaste with Soviet dominance, there are striking parallels between Korean and Chinese insistence on "self-reliance." In China, a different set of characters—*tzu-li keng-sheng*—are used, with the nuance of "regeneration through one's own efforts," as Michel Oksenberg has noted. This reliance on the efforts of the Chinese people to effect China's transformation is seen by Oksenberg as a new response to "the central problem which China has faced in the past hundred years: how China and the rest of the world are to be joined." [53] Whether the characters used are *chuch'e* or *tzu-li keng-sheng*, the terms signify the determination of the respective countries to "go it alone" and to resist externally originated or imposed remedies to problems facing the respective societies.

Self-Reliance in the Economy

Although Kim Il Sung did not discuss the subject in his 1955 speech, he may have been reacting to efforts by the USSR to force North Korean economic development into what he saw as an undesirable mold. In subsequent statements, Kim explicitly accused the Russians of "great power chauvinism" in having tried to "enforce their unilateral will under the name of aid" and having attempted to obstruct "the line of self-reliance and of building an independent country." [54] Elsewhere, Kim pictured North Korea as having been a victim in the early 1950's of a Soviet-imposed "international division of labor" in which Pyongyang would export raw materials and import finished products.[55]

Kim had apparently foreseen these potential pitfalls. For example, in 1948 he stated:

. . . it is quite possible for us to develop the national industry independently . . . we need to receive necessary foreign aid in the future, too, but we must have a firm determination to rehabilitate and develop the national economy and build a rich and powerful country by our own efforts (chach'eui himuro)*, without seeking to rely entirely on others.*

We should not send out to foreign countries the raw materials which we extract from abundant domestic sources, as in the bygone days of Japanese imperialist rule, but should proceed in the direction of processing all of them at home to produce finished goods.[56]

In 1957, the DPRK launched a five-year plan—its first—which was explicitly aimed at moving toward economic self-reliance. The importance of this effort was highlighted by Kim in a 1958 statement:

Constructing an independent, self-reliant economy means building a self-supporting state in which we can earn our own livelihood and fully meet our own needs.[57]

Not only did Kim seek to end North Korea's role as a supplier of raw materials to more advanced economies; he also sought to lessen Pyongyang's reliance on foreign raw materials. As he noted in his 1958 statement, "Industries which depend upon foreign countries for raw materials cannot be stable."

Such an autarkic view of development may have

[51] See Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East." *loc. cit.*, p. 134.

[52] "On Eliminating Dogmatism . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p. 591.

[53] Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "Mao's Policy of Self-Reliance," Columbia University Seminar on Modern East Asia, March 1970, pp. 4-5.

[54] "Let Us Defend the Socialist Camp," Oct. 28, 1963, quoted in Scalapino and Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 630-31.

[55] See Baik Bong, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 443; also Kim Il Sung, "On Socialist Construction in the DPRK . . . ," *loc. cit.*, pp. 220-21.

[56] "How to Develop State Industry and How to Manage the Enterprises," Jan. 25, 1948, *SW*, Vol. 1, pp. 188-89.

[57] "For the Successful Fulfillment of the First Five-Year Plan," *loc. cit.*, p. 218.

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North Korea's quest for economic self-sufficiency proceeds on three fronts: agriculture, light industry and heavy industry. Shown above, from left to right, are mechanized rice transplanting in Maengjung Village of North Pyongan Province, production of textiles at a local workshop, and the inside of the Songjim Steel Works.

—Photos from *Tungdae* (Pyongyang), No. 8, 1969, p. 20; from *ibid.*, No. 163, 1971, p. 23; and from the CTK and KCNA news services via EUPRA.

hindered the economic growth of North Korea, yet the reported rate of growth there has been among the highest in the developing world since the mid-1950's.[58] North Korea is still to some extent reliant on external raw materials. It must, for example, import petroleum to fuel its military machine, but domestic consumption of petroleum is severely restricted, automobile use is negligible, and the railroad system has been converted to electric power, which the North has in plentiful supply.[59] Moreover, the Koreans have apparently been able to play China off against the USSR, thereby avoiding dependence upon a single source of raw materials. No foreign military forces are stationed in North Korea, and the foreign loans and aid that it receives seem to be at miniscule levels. Its military forces are largely self-reliant, except for jet aircraft.

With regard to food supply, North Korea—though traditionally dependent on rice imports from the South—nevertheless managed to achieve self-sufficiency by 1968 or, probably even earlier.[60] The country's lack of cotton was remedied by developing a synthetic fabric called "Vinalon" for clothing.

A particularly interesting application of the concept of self-reliance is seen in consumer-goods industry. In 1945 much of Korea's light industry was in the South, and the DPRK has been at pains to make good the deficiency. Pyongyang now claims that no consumer goods are imported, and that the greater part of such items are now produced within each province for the consumption of the people of that province. According to Kim Il Sung, there are about ten local industries in each county, on the average. They produce consumer goods, such as textiles, bean paste, soy sauce, and furniture. While this serves as a means of bringing industry closer to agriculture (proletarianizing the peasant, as discussed above), its basic purpose is "to produce consumer goods mainly by processing local raw materials."[61] To some, these methods may not seem economically rational; the benefits from economies of scale are lost, and the costs of individual, fragmented production may be high when spread through the whole economy. But that begs the question. North Korea stands today relatively more independent and less reliant on its larger surrounding neighbors than any Korean government in the modern era, a state of affairs that doubtless contributes significantly to the legitimacy of Kim's regime in the eyes of its population.

[58] Scalapino and Lee place North Korea's industrial growth rate at about 35 percent from 1956 to 1959 and 12 percent from 1961 to 1967 (both per annum averages), *op. cit.*, pp. 542-43, 617.

[59] Rinn-sup Shinn, *et al.*, *Area Handbook for North Korea*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 26.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[61] "Theses on the Socialist Rural Question," *loc. cit.*, p. 69.

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

Promoting North Korea as a model for other countries, Pyongyang sponsored a seminar on Kim's chuch'e (juche) *theories in Freetown, Sierra Leone, December 18-20, 1972.*

—Photo from *Choson* (Pyongyang), no. 4, 1973, p. 28.

The achievements of this self-reliant policy have afforded grounds for North Korea's claims to provide a model for other underdeveloped countries emerging from a colonial past.

North Korea as a Model?

For almost a decade—the nine years from 1945 until the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—North Korea's was the only ruling Communist regime in a postcolonial third-world nation. Each successive innovation by the fledgling government in Pyongyang—the land reform, the nationalization of colonial industry, the development of a "mass party," or promulgation of labor regulations—was trumpeted by Kim and his regime as a "first" in Asia or even in the history of the world's colonial and semicolonial nations.[62]

The uniqueness of the North Korean model has been questioned from several quarters. Some have suggested that, in the early years, the Soviet Union sought to make its Korean protégé a revolutionary model along Soviet lines; they explain the similarity of North Korea's land reform and its development of a mass party to Chinese practice as reflecting the "adaptability" of Soviet policy.[63] On the other hand, those who argue that Pyongyang has blindly emulated Peking in these and other policies may also miss the mark. As already suggested above, it seems more accurate to view North Korean policies as spontaneous, indigenous responses to Korean realities that closely approximate Chinese realities. Moreover, North Korea's solutions for local problems, while similar to those of the Chinese Communists, have their distinctive Korean characteristics and also predate the corresponding Chinese practices in some cases. Whether or not it has "blazed the path for the oppressed peoples of the East," as Kim claimed in 1948,[64] North Korea can claim to have dealt innovatively with the problems it faced.

This can be demonstrated by a brief examination of the implementation of land reforms and the use of united-front and mass-party political tactics in North Korea and China.

In attempting to eradicate the severe abuses that characterized rural property relationships in both countries, the North Korean and Chinese Communists adopted quite similar reform patterns. In both cases, local land committees composed of poor peasants and hired laborers—those with nothing to lose—were relied on to carry out the reform. Cadres and industrial workers supervised the committees and relied on them to provide information on local developments. The peasantry was carefully divided into strata—rich, middle, and poor—according to the amount of land held and the use made of the land (*i.e.*, whether it had been used exploitively or not). The so-called middle peasants were neutralized or made allies of the poorer peasants, which had the effect of isolating the rich peasants and landlords. In both countries, the land-reform policies differed markedly from earlier Soviet methods, particularly with regard to the rich peasants. Korean and Chinese revolutionaries emphasized reeducation and remolding instead of the massive eradication of kulaks witnessed in the USSR.

A Chinese influence in Kim Il Sung's choice of policies to cope with the land problem certainly cannot be ruled out. As Dae-sook Suh has noted, Kim "was educated and trained by the Chinese Communists as one of their own." [65] However, it should be noted that North Korea's land reforms were initiated in 1946, four years before nationwide land reform was launched in the People's Republic of China. Moreover, the Korean Communists were able to avoid

[62] See, for example, "On the Draft Labor Law," June 20, 1946, *SW*, Vol. 1, p. 64.

[63] Paige, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

[64] "Rep .rt to the Second Congress . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p. 230.

[65] Dae-sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 293.

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widespread bloodshed during the course of the land reforms by the practice of transferring landlords and rich peasants out of their native districts to small plots of land in other districts.[66]

A somewhat similar analysis can be made of North Korea's use of united front tactics. As in China, the united front approach was designed to include all but professed enemies of the revolution. Kim viewed Korea's "anti-imperialist, antifeudal, democratic revolution" as based on a united front including "the broad masses of peasants, patriotic intellectuals, and even national capitalists who had national consciousness." [67] In the Chinese case, the only enemies—those excluded from the ranks of "the people"—appear as what Maurice Meisner calls "internal foreigners," the defining factor being a foreign tie.[68] Korea's "internal foreigners" were the landlords and "comprador capitalists," who had benefited from Japanese rule and quickly allied with the incoming American occupation forces in the South. As in China, so in Korea the Communist united front organization also maintained a putative alliance with "democratic" or bourgeois political parties—in Pyongyang's case, with the Korean Democratic Party and the Chongu Party (comprising followers of the native Ch'ondoggyo faith).

There was unquestionably some ideological linkage between united front practices in North Korea and

[66] On the North Korean land reforms, see Kim Il Sung, "The Results of the Agrarian Reform and Our Future Tasks," April 10, 1946, *SW*, Vol. 1, pp. 38-41, and Minjujui minjok chonson, *Choson haebang illyon-sa* (History of the First Year of Korean Liberation), Seoul, Munu Insogwan, 1946, pp. 256, 332, 431; US Department of State, *North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover*, Washington, DC, 1961, p. 57, and Scalapino and Lee *op. cit.*, p. 350. On Chinese land reform policies, see Ilpyong J. Kim, "Mass Mobilization Policies and Techniques Developed in the Period of the Chinese Soviet Republic," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1969, pp. 78-98; C. K. Yang, *Chinese Communist Society: The Family and the Village*, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1959, pp. 131-52; and Mark Selden, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 76-77.

[67] Baik Bong, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 30-31. For a comparable statement by Mao, see Mao Tse-tung, "On the New Democracy," in *Selected Works*, pp. 106-56. Kim quoted Mao on united front policies in 1952 (see Scalapino and Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 423).

[68] "Leninism and Maoism," *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

This photo, distributed by the Chinese News Service in the early 1950's, shows (from the left) Kim Tubong, Chairman of the Korean People's Congress and former head of the New Democratic Party; Kim Il Sung, Prime Minister of the Korean People's Republic; Kuo Mo-jo, head of the Chinese People's Delegation to Korea; and General T. Shtykov, Soviet Ambassador to the North Korean government.

—From Eastfoto.

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China. Copies of Mao Tse-tung's 1940 theoretical work, *On New Democracy,* circulated widely in North and South Korea after the liberation.[69] Moreover, the New Democratic Party of Kim Tubong, which was merged with the Korean Communist Party of Kim Il Sung in 1946 to form the Korean Workers' Party, apparently drew its name from Mao's treatise and most of its membership from Koreans who had spent time with Mao in Yenan.

Despite these links with Chinese theory and practice, however, the united front tactics of North Korea have differed considerably from those in China or, for that matter, from those in any other Communist society. As Kim Il Sung indicated in 1946, membership in the KWP was to be based on very generous criteria:

We think that anyone can be a member of the Workers' Party, if he gives play to his patriotic zeal and initiative in the construction of the democratic fatherland and plays a leading role, even if he is not familiar with Marxism-Leninism.[70]

The resulting "mass party" has proven to be unique, having—from 1946 on—the highest percentage of the domestic population on its rolls of any avowed Communist party in the world. As one pair of Western observers described this organization, it is "a milestone for the Communist world . . . no modern party, Communist or otherwise, has ever placed so much emphasis upon the politics of mass mobilization." [71] Ever intent on being in the vanguard of world revolution, the North Koreans have been ready to project their mass party as a model. (Indeed, the Korean experience presaged the formation of a similar party in North Vietnam, the Workers' Party, or Lao Dong, although no causal relationship is implied here. Rather we have another example of similar conditions prompting similar methods; in both cases a broad united front was designed to draw support away from and to isolate an opposing alter-regime in the South.)

Since the Korean War, Pyongyang has also set itself up as a model for other emerging societies in the sphere of economic development. Thus, the policy of developing heavy industry simultaneously

A 1973 military parade in Pyongyang marks the 25th anniversary of the February 8, 1948, founding of the North Korean People's Armed Forces.

—Czechoslovak News Agency via EUPRA.

with light industry and agriculture—a sort of "walking on two legs" that predated similar Chinese efforts by four years—was heralded as a completely untrodden path,[72] however unsuccessful it might have been in actual practice. And, of course, since 1960 the policy of *chuch'e* has been widely recommended to remedy the ills of the world. Such a penchant for projecting Korean experience as a guide is not sheer bravado. Numerous aspects of North Korean development may well have application in other nations of comparable size and level of development. More important for the Koreans, this "modeling behavior" is a means of self assertion, of transcending backwardness and erasing a history of foreign domination.

Perspectives and Prospects

In sum, the foregoing study suggests, above all, the utility of examining North Korea from Korean rather than from foreign perspectives. When viewed this way, North Korean communism emerges as an understandable organizational and ideological response to traditional problems of political organization and to the nation's historical interaction with the larger powers that surround it. On the other hand, looking at North Korea through the lenses of Soviet and Chinese communism fails to explain the com-

[69] Mao Tse-tung, *Sin munjujui-ron* (On the New Democracy), tr. Kim Ilch'ul, Seoul, Sin Munhwa Yon'guso Ch'ulp'an-pu, 1946.

[70] Quoted in Baik Bong, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 154. Baik Bong refers to this as "creatively defining the qualifications of a party member" (!)

[71] Scalapino and Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 375.

[72] Kim Byong Sik, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

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plexities of Communist development in the DPRK. The self-assertiveness and fierce independence of Kim Il Sung's regime either contradicts the nostrum that externally-imposed Communist regimes are less vital than ones with indigenous roots or, more likely, indicates the need to take a closer look at common assumptions about the extent of Soviet influence in the DPRK as it emerged in the late 1940's. Moreover, the similarities in Chinese and North Korean practices seem to reflect common solutions to common problems rather than Korean emulation. A focus on emulation cannot explain the significant difference in the practices of the two regimes, nor can it explain the use of Chinese-like practices in the late 1940's when Soviet influence was apparently the greatest.

What does the foregoing analysis of North Korean communism suggest for the future of the political system? One can anticipate a continued spirit of self-reliance and independence based on a high degree of political organization of the society. The ideology of *chuch'e* is extremely appealing to Koreans, and under Kim Il Sung the DPRK has given it real substance. For those who like to ponder such questions as "After Mao, what?" or "After Kim, what?" the likelihood in the case of North Korea is that there will be a continuity of policy after Kim Il Sung passes from power by reason of age or death. One cannot foresee any repudiation of Kim similar to the campaign of destalinization launched in the Soviet Union in 1956. From the beginning, Kim has had excellent nationalist credentials in North Korean eyes because of his anti-Japanese record, and his avid personal participation in mass-line politics has doubtless further entrenched his reputation in the DPRK.

North Korea's self-reliant posture also has some possible implications for Pyongyang's future foreign policies. The studied attempts of the North to use domestic resources has given Pyongyang a fairly strong position in the current energy crisis. It is conceivable that the DPRK might offer some form of energy-sharing to the Republic of Korea, which is experiencing severe energy dislocations at this juncture. Such a gesture might serve to prevent Seoul from turning to Japan for assistance, a move which would only increase the Republic of Korea's economic dependence and probably postpone further any progress toward stability on the peninsula, let alone toward a reconciliation between North and South.

Pending any progress toward the emotionally-charged goal of Korean reunification, the DPRK has maintained a garrison-state atmosphere, complete with underground factories, extensive fortifications, and a mood of war preparedness. While these measures were doubtless inspired by a perceived threat from the South, there may have been other considerations as well. As Kim Il Sung eyes the ebb and flow of Sino-Soviet tensions, he must contemplate the ramifications for the DPRK of any hostilities between the two Communist giants. In the case of a Sino-Soviet conflict in the Far East, North Korea would be a region of great strategic significance. Hence, Pyongyang's quest for economic and political self-sufficiency and its maintenance of a state of constant defense readiness doubtless serve notice on its putative Communist allies that the DPRK will not be a pliant pawn if open struggle should erupt between them.

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The Italian CP at the Grass Roots

By Alan J. Stern

Over the last 20 years, Italy has undergone dramatic socioeconomic development which has transformed her into a leading industrial nation. This economic transformation, however, has not produced any significant political change at the electoral level—despite manifest evidence of bureaucratic inefficiency and the failure of successive governments to cope with mounting problems. Indeed, the whole period has been characterized by political continuity.

Even some seasoned observers were surprised by the results of the 1972 elections for the Italian Chamber of Deputies. This balloting took place in an atmosphere of governmental paralysis and widespread strikes and social unrest, but it witnessed virtually no important shifts in voter preferences. Contrary to dire predictions of massive defections to the political extremes—especially to the far Right—two parties wound up with the predominant share of the votes and dwarfed all other parties just as they had ever since 1946. The Christian Democrats (DC) again emerged on top, polling 38.8 percent of the vote (as compared with 39.1 percent in 1968). They thus ensured that politicians from their ranks would head national coalition governments until the next round of parliamentary elections. The only party of comparable strength remained the Italian Communist Party (PCI), with 27.3 percent of the votes (a slight gain over the 26.9 percent it had received in the 1968 balloting.)

In absolute terms, to be sure, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), a neo-Fascist group, and its monarchist allies did register substantial increases in support, but the Right still remains quite weak, having garnered a combined total of only 8.7 percent of the vote (as compared with 5.8 percent in 1968). Moreover, the gains of the Right, such as they were, came at the expense of parties other than the Christian Democrats and the Communists.[1] These two parties, then, constitute the core elements of the present political configuration in the country, and they control the key units of the political system not only at the national level but also at the new regional as well as the provincial and local levels.

The meaning of political continuity for the DC, however, is clearly quite different from its meaning for the PCI. For the former, which enjoys sway over the national government and its giant state corporations and draws strong support from the institutions of traditional order clustered around the Catholic Church, the maintenance of support in a context of rapid economic and social change amounts to a fairly satisfactory performance. After all, the Christian Democrats continue to exercise government authority, and as former Premier Giulio Andreotti reportedly once said, "power exhausts only those who don't wield it." In the case of the PCI, the situation obvi-

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[1] Of the groups that suffered the greatest setbacks, the Liberals (PLI)—who lost 10 parliamentary seats—fall to the political right of the DC, and the Proletarian Socialists (PSIUP)—who lost all 23 of their seats—fall to the political left of the PCI. The neo-Fascists failed to make substantial inroads into the conservative denominational support of the DC; similarly, the Proletarian Socialists and other avowedly extremist groups did not succeed in weakening the Communists significantly on the left.

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ously has disturbing elements. PCI leaders, in command of the largest Communist party in the West, have been intent upon developing a road to power and societal transformation within a parliamentary framework, yet they have to date been unable to win either an electoral majority or Communist participation in a ruling national coalition.

At the same time, the implications of political continuity for the PCI are harder to evaluate from an objective standpoint. Some observers might argue that the party's record indicates that it has approached the limits of its popular backing—that its confinement to only marginal increases in the electoral polls reflects stagnation. From such a perspective, local Communist strongholds in various parts of Italy serve as testimony to tradition and the fruits of political patronage. Other observers, however, might contend that the party's slow but more or less steady accretion of strength attests to considerable organizational resources and strategic ingenuity—particularly in its regional strongholds—and that it therefore exhibits great potential as a vital political entity.

The present article will attempt to explore this subject in some depth. In doing so, it will focus on the circumstances of the PCI in the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, and Umbria—the so-called central "Red Belt" of the country. Here, not only does the party constitute the largest vote-getter in national elections, but many of the local governments have for years had Communist-run administrations.[2] Soon after the liberation of the country at the end of World War II, groups of party activists, a large contingent of whom had originally been associated with the wartime resistance movement, organized local Communist Party cells and sections and succeeded in displacing the old Socialist Party (PSI) as the main political force in most towns with traditional left-wing loyalties. Moreover, social life for many inhabitants of these provinces has long centered around the party and its various affiliated bodies; hence, political norms penetrate numerous aspects of community life.

Organizational Resources

The available evidence regarding the current vitality of the PCI in the "Red Belt" areas is somewhat sketchy and ambiguous, but even where new socio-economic conditions have affected many dimensions of local life, the branches of the party seem by and large to retain considerable dynamism. In a study conducted in 1968, for example, the author found that the basic party structures in a typical small city which had undergone recent industrialization displayed a high degree of vigor.[3]



Italy and its "Red Belt"—the administrative regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany and Umbria, politically dominated by the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano—*Italian Communist Party).*

—Map prepared by the Department of Geography, University of Texas at Austin.

[2] Robert Fried discusses the records of PCI administrations in "Communism, Urban Budgets and the Two Italies," *Journal of Politics* (Gainesville, Fla.), Vol. 33, December 1971, pp. 1008-51.

[3] See his *Local Political Elites and Economic Change: A Comparative Study of Four Italian Communities*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1971. In this study, it should be underscored, two criteria were employed in selecting the precise towns for investigation—political dominance by a single party (PCI or DC) and economic setting (agricultural or industrial). A single party's clear majority in each election since 1946—national and local—was used as an indicator of political dominance, and the percent of the active labor force in industry was used as an indicator of economic setting.

Generally speaking, there has been little field research on the PCI at the local level. Urban and provincial studies that complement the work reported here will be brought together in a forthcoming Princeton University Press volume edited by Donald Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow. The findings of these studies are similar to those that emerged from the author's own investigations.

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Table 1: Member/Voter Ratios of the Christian Democratic and Communist Parties in Italy, 1946-63 [a]

	DC Members per 100 DC Voters		PCI Members per 100 PCI Voters	
Year	Northeast [b]	All-Italy	Center [c]	All-Italy
1946	8.9	7.5	37.6	38.3
1953	8.9	10.5	47.7	34.8
1958	9.3	11.3	40.1	26.6
1963	10.2	13.8	32.0	20.8

[a] Data of a comparable and equally reliable nature to those compiled by the Il Mulino group for 1946-63 are not available for the post-1963 period.
[b] In this breakdown, the Northeast encompasses the regions of Veneto, Trento-Alto Adige, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia.
[c] Here, the Center includes the regions of Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche.

SOURCE: Franca Cervellati Cantelli *et al., L'Organizzazione partitica del PCI e della DC* (The Party Organization of the PCI and of the DC), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1968.

This city, which for present purposes we will call Rossindustria, had during the 1950's developed from a farm town with an economy founded mainly on sharecrop agriculture and a few artisan workshops into a city crowded with furniture factories.[4] In the process, the most prominent architects of the party's extensive postwar organizational network had experienced rapid social mobility. Formerly unemployed resistance veterans, marginal peasants, and apprentice artisans had emerged as citizens of some financial stature; a few had even become quite successful owners of small- or medium-sized factories.

Despite these changes, the local party section remained quite strong in organizational terms.[5] There were, to be sure, indications of an erosion of two classic features of the mass party—namely, a high member/voter ratio and a dense network of affiliated associations.[6] For instance, the Rossindustria party secretary reported a decline in party membership which had reduced the local member/voter ratio slightly to 48.4 members per 100 PCI votes in 1968. He and other party militants also spoke about decreasing interest in the party's parapolitical flanking bodies that catered to special sectors of the population.

Yet this erosion did not appear to be indicative of a hardening of the party section's institutional arteries or of a growing lack of relevance. First of all, the section still constituted a formidable entity. Although its membership had fallen somewhat in recent years, it boasted 5,200 paid-up members (*iscritti*) in a total population of 24,000.[7] It maintained a large party headquarters and recreational bar, which was always open, and two full-time employees: the party secretary and an assistant; moreover, it provided a salary supplement for the local Communist mayor. Though it sometimes had trouble finding militants to lead and attend its frequent meetings, the party also supported branches of a variety of parapolitical associations: *L'Unione Donne* (for women), *Il Movimento Italiano Partigiani della Pace* (for resistance veterans), *L'Alleanza Nazionale Contadini* (for small farmers), *L'Unione Italiana Sport Populare* (for athletes), and *Federazione Giovanile Comunista Italiano* (for youth).

Perhaps the formidable character of the section

[4] During this period, the percent of the labor force in industry had increased by more than 300 percent. Toscana, Unione Regionale della Camere di Commercio Industria e Agricoltura della Toscana, *Lineamenti Economici e Prospettive Toscane* (Tuscan Economic Outlines and Prospects), Florence, 1965.

[5] The administrative unit at the community level in Italy is the *comune*. Typically, the *comune* consists of a land area with a *capoluogo*, a large "capital" town, and *frazioni*, several small hamlets, each often no more than a few stores and a post office at a crossroads. The basic political party unit at the community level is now the section. Very small towns may have no autonomous section; large communities often have more than one. The four communities covered in Stern, *op. cit.*, each formally supported several sections of the dominant party; however, since the hamlet sections were largely inactive, it is appropriate to speak here in terms of a single party section for each community. A section is run by a committee, led by an elected secretary. Representatives from the *capoluogo* invariably control the committee. For a detailed treatment of the formal rules for party organization at the local level for both the PCI and DC, see Franca Cervellati Cantelli *et al., L'Organizzazione partitica del PCI e della DC* (The Party Organization of the PCI and of the DC), Bologna, Il Mulino, 1968, Parts 2 and 5.

[6] For broad discussions of the features of mass parties and of the apparent erosion of these characteristics in West European political systems, see Otto Kirschheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 177-200; and S. M. Lipset, "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, Mass.), Winter 1964, pp. 271-304.

[7] Membership figures include everyone under the jurisdiction of the community party committee—that is, members in the *frazioni* as well as the *capuluogo*.

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emerges more clearly from a comparison with the Christian Democratic organization in a similar city controlled by the DC in the Northeast, the zone of greatest DC electoral domination in the country. This city, which the author investigated at the same time that he studied Rossindustria, we shall term Bianchindustria.

Like the PCI secretary in Rossindustria, the head of the DC in Bianchindustria complained about a decline in membership over the past few years, but he was talking about a profoundly different reality. His organization's membership/voter ratio had fallen to 18.1 per 100 DC votes in 1968; furthermore, the organization counted only 1,300 *iscritti* in a population of 20,000. As Table 1 shows, a comparable gap probably existed between the membership/voter ratios of the PCI in the "Red Belt" of Central Italy as a whole and those of the DC in the Northeast as a whole, although the gap in all likelihood diminished elsewhere because PCI sections were probably weaker and DC sections stronger in these other areas.

Similar contrasts were evident in the realm of political activities and facilities. The DC party section in Bianchindustria did have a small party headquarters and put out a quarterly magazine, but unlike the PCI section in Rossindustria, it operated no recreational facilities, had no full-time party employees, and contributed nothing to the local DC mayor's salary. While it did enjoy the support of a small number of parapolitical associations such as the *Coltivatori Diretti* (a farmers' group) and various Church-sponsored bodies, especially *Azione Cattolica* (Catholic Action), these groups functioned with autonomous, nonparty staffs.

Secondly, the relative erosion of the membership/voter ratio and of the density of the network of affiliated groups of the PCI section in industrialized Rossindustria fits into a more generalized pattern. A similar erosion had taken place not only in PCI sec-

PCI headquarters in a "Red Belt" town, complete with a recreation bar (under the awnings), offices, meeting rooms, and a mimeograph.

—Photo by Alan J. Stern.

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tions in communities which had remained essentially agricultural in character but also in DC sections operating in both environments. In 1968, for instance, the author explored the PCI situation in a Communist-controlled agricultural town in the "Red Belt" (which we shall designate as Collerosso) and found the same increasing political apathy there that he had discovered in Rossindustria. Indeed, this mounting apathy had induced the local party section to replace the cell with the section as the basic party building block just as the PCI section in Rossindustria had done. (Both had acted, of course, with the official sanction of higher party organs.) We have already noted the decreasing DC member/voter ratio in Bianchindustria and the Northeast generally. That this phenomenon extended specifically to Northeast agricultural communities under DC hegemony was manifest from the author's examination of DC circumstances in a typical agricultural town in 1968.[8]

This evidence suggests that with better transportation, enticing mass media, more recreational outlets, and more money to spend on them, people throughout Italy were inclined to devote less of their limited free time to politically-related activities than they had previously. In conversations, the mayors of both Bianchindustria and Rossindustria alluded to such a mood even among their party faithful. The former called attention to "a new nonassociative mentality" among the DC rank-and-file, while his Communist counterpart said: "The effect of a new prosperity on politics is great. As large as our party is, we feel . . . a lack of active participation in all the parties."

In sum, then, the Italian Communists in their strongholds seem to continue to mobilize supporters notwithstanding the economic milieu, though through somewhat weakened mass-party structures. Perhaps what deserves to be regarded as unusual is not the present level of party-linked activity but the intensity of party-centered life in the immediate postwar period.

Strategic Ingenuity

Besides retaining considerable organizational resources in the areas where it exercises hegemony, the PCI has evinced a capacity there to adapt party strategy fairly imaginatively to meet changing socioeconomic conditions. The party sections in Collerosso and Rossindustria, for example, had demonstrated a lot of ingenuity in charting their local programs, which constitute concrete embodiments of strategy.

In looking at these programs, one must bear in mind the broader strategy that the Communists have attempted to employ in their strongholds since World War II. The PCI has sought to distinguish itself from competing political groups, especially of the Left, by projecting itself as a legitimate, serious, working-class body struggling for major social change. That is, it has endeavored to appeal to people on the basis of *political activism.* In this regard, its approach has contrasted sharply with that of the DC in areas of DC domination, for the latter has relied on an appeal *only marginally political in nature.* It has striven to portray itself as a party allied closely to the Church, and it has stressed that public concerns are of secondary importance for most citizens and properly left to governing officials.

Communist projection of a militant working-class image has been complicated in the "Red Belt" areas, however, by changes in local social structure brought about by industrialization. The old landowning aristocracy has tended to disappear; simultaneously, a group of prosperous small entrepreneurs has emerged in the industrial areas.

As long as some members of the traditional landowning upper classes remained conspicuous residents of the Central Italian cities, the dominant PCI continued to agitate for the elimination of the visible historic "enemies" of the ordinary people. This was especially true in towns like Collerosso, where, for instance, as late as 1955, 14 families controlled half the arable land and 32 others owned another quarter of the arable acreage.[9]

But a variety of factors eventually forced the convenient aristocratic targets of PCI "class-struggle" slogans either to move away or to retreat to quiet private lives. Some had to sell underutilized holdings in accord with provisions of agrarian reform laws; others could not convince peasants to enter into adjusted sharecrop contracts. The growing unprofitability of traditional agriculture in Central Italy also caused many of them to sell or abandon their holdings.

What has posed dilemmas for the PCI in these circumstances is the fact that many of the newly prosperous individuals who have replaced the agricultural landowners at the apex of the Central Italian elite have emerged, as we have already observed, from the

[8] See Stern, *op. cit.*, The Northeast here includes the regions of Veneto, Trento-Alto Adige, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

[9] Information gleaned from the local archives for 1955.

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ranks of Communist activists. By 1965, for example, the party section in bustling Rossindustria included 41 industrialists. Such a development is hardly surprising, for the PCI constitutes the most important institution in many Central Italian communities and therefore is a magnet for ambitious young men. Nevertheless, the conspicuous party participation of some of the entrepreneurs and the widely-discussed suspicion that large numbers of them have exploited PCI ties to bolster their fledgling businesses in matters of credit, transport, and labor relations have embarrassed the local party organizations appreciably.

Despite the drawbacks involved, however, the local leadership in Rossindustria steadfastly refused to disown the rich activists. Indeed, one of the most conspicuously successful factory owners sat on the cabinet of the town council and served as a principal adviser to the mayor. Behind the stand taken by the local hierarchy lay a variety of calculations: it did not want to disrupt the section's veteran core of militants, to rupture old friendships often formed during the Resistance, to lose community officials with expertise, and above all, to further weaken the section's network of associations, which the entrepreneurs helped to lead and finance.

In defending their refusal to expel or even chastise the entrepreneurs, the section leadership argued that these men were in truth appropriate allies of working people, and it constructed elaborate, sometimes farfetched rationalizations to support its contentions. Like those of other ruling PCI elites in industrialized settings in Central Italy,[10] these rationalizations leaned heavily on the position of the national PCI favoring alliances with "productive middle classes" against the common monopolistic enemy.[11]

Such rationalizations had thus far proved successful for several reasons. The new factory owners operated relatively small establishments, and the entrepreneurs themselves worked long hours and were accessible to their employees. They were also widely-liked-men—unpolished, nonarrogant individuals who were accorded much credit for transforming the city from a pathetic, bombed-out locale into a busy industrial center. While it may have been stretching the notion of an alliance with the middle class to include owners of factories with 100 employees, the decision to do so had met with amazingly little resistance.[12]

Maintenance by the Communists of a militant reputation has been rendered difficult, too, by the fact that for some time conflict in the community and the rhetoric of violent revolution in Italy have seemed neither credible nor popular. During the initial years of their post-World War II hegemony in Central Italy, it is true, many Communist activists in the area believed not only that the PCI would come to power and change the structure of Italian society, but also that it would quite possibly do so through revolutionary means. Their readiness to resort to violence to contest government authority was manifest after an abortive attempt on the life of the national PCI Secretary, Palmiro Togliatti, in 1948. In both Rossindustria and Collerosso, some churches were defiled, many large properties were seized, and designated "class enemies" were locked in their houses.

But the national party subsequently embarked on an effort to teach the PCI faithful that the path to power in Italy lay along the electoral, not the revolutionary, road,[13] and a simplified version of Togliatti's famous *la via Italiana al socialismo* (the Italian road to socialism) became the program advocated by the majority of local activists, especially the core leaders. According to the secretary of Rossindustria's party section, among those entrusted with major responsibilities in that community, "sectarian positions" (his shorthand for all revolutionary policies of confrontation) were no longer championed.

For some years after 1948, however, an air of

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[10] The new entrepreneur is prominent in local affairs, for example, in Tuscan cities like Sinalunga, Colle Val d'Elsa, and Empoli, and in Emilian cities like Carpi.

[11] For illustrations of the national PCI position, see Palmiro Togliatti, *La Via Italiana al Socialismo* (The Italian Road to Socialism), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1964, and some of the writings of Giorgio Amendola. Two of Amendola's relevant, theoretically-oriented pieces are "The Working Class in the Twenty Years of the Republic," in *Critica Marxista* (Marxist Criticism), Rome, Sett.-Dic., 1966, pp. 79-127, and *Lotta di classe e sviluppo economica* (Class Struggle and Economic Development), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1962. Amendola has been labeled alternatively, yet *simultaneously, a reformer, a Stalinist, and a* backward capitalist for his defense of alliances with small and medium industrialists, often referred to as the *via emiliana* (the Emilian road).

[12] For a highly critical, sometimes polemical analysis of the PCI approach, see Ercole Camurani, "Communists and Small Industry in Emilia," *Corrispondenza Socialista* (Rome), Vol. 5, January 1964, pp. 18-24.

[13] For sensitive discussion of the implications of the various ties that the PCI has forged with post-World War II Italian society, see Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967, and Donald Blackmer, *Unity in Diversity: Italian Communism and the Communist World*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1968. Jon Holliday focuses on the effect of the PCI's courtship of small industrialists upon any rational economic system in his "Structural Reform in Italy—Theory and Practice," *New Left Review* (London), No. 50, July-August, 1968, p. 87.

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crisis, of embattlement, of continuing *lotta di classe* (class struggle) still pervaded the operations of the local PCI sections. Two things contributed to this atmosphere. First, Communist activists retained vivid memories of Fascism and of PCI heroes in the underground war against it. Second, the Communists employed fairly rough political practices. Minority politicians in both Rossindustria and Collerosso, for example, recalled that the local Communists had constantly interrupted opposition rallies, had condoned the destruction of minority political literature, and had even sometimes manhandled opposing public speakers.

A combination of time and economic changes ultimately altered the situation. In large part because of economic considerations, key Communist leaders became increasingly disposed to consult the minority DC politicians. The party section in decaying Collerosso, for example, was eager to take advantage of DC contacts with those national ministries which might channel economic assistance to a depressed area.[14] In booming Rossindustria, the local Communist section was seriously short of activists who could cope with the technical details of a spiraling budget and sprawling urbanization. Moreover, rough-and-tumble politics imposed administrative costs that the leadership did not choose to pay, for it wanted local DC businessmen to endorse loan petitions submitted to central government ministries. Thus, disturbances at opposition rallies and the defacing of opposition propaganda by Communist adherents had grown rare in both towns.

A more relaxed community atmosphere, of course, has confronted the local PCI organizations with a problem of how to convey a militant image to the public. Their solution has been to place special stress on issues of international politics, where militant rhetoric can be given free rein. At the national level, to be sure, a concentration on international affairs is certainly not a recent feature of PCI strategy; indeed, during most of the postwar years the central party offices have highlighted Communist objections to many aspects of global life—*e.g.*, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and US involvement in Korea. But a significant shift of emphasis has occurred at the community level. In an earlier period, the PCI leadership at the grass-roots level associated itself

Events in Chile evoke a public demonstration by Communists and members of the FGCI (Federazione Giovanile Comunista Italiano—*Italian Communist Youth Federation) in Bologna's Piazza Maggiore in September 1973. The FGCI banner reads: "The CIA and DC [Christian Democracy] are the culprits in the coup d'état and death of Comrade Allende."*

—Photo from *L'Unità* (Rome), Sept. 15, 1973, p. 2.

with widespread feelings of bitterness and dissatisfaction with the sharecrop system among the populace; in the 1960's, it sought to portray itself as the head of a party dedicated to peaceful coexistence.

The Christian Democratic and Socialist politicians in Central Italian communities have generally fallen in with the Communists' position that the great problems of international affairs are appropriate issues of community politics. For example, virtually every politician to whom the author spoke in the Communist strongholds—unlike the politicians with whom he talked in the towns of the Christian Democratic Northeast[15]—believed that international affairs were highly significant in the conduct of local politics. This attitude permitted the PCI sections to use town council sessions at frequent intervals as an arena for the polemics of class militancy. In addition, they employed more traditional political techniques like rallies—say, for Cuba—or community drives—like collection of blood plasma for North Vietnam—to underscore PCI activism in the sphere of international affairs.

[14] It happened that the private secretary of a key DC minister in the central government was a former Collerosso resident. Through this contact, the PCI mayor managed to obtain some patronage assistance—*e.g.*, the location in the community of a new national institution for firemen's orphans.

[15] For more precise data, see his "Local Political Party Organization and Economic Change: Evidence from a Study of Four Italian Communities," prepared for delivery at 1971 American Political Science Association meeting, copyright 1971, APSA, pp. 12 and 17; Tables 4 and 5.

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By and large, the population has appeared to respond to such efforts more enthusiastically than they have to PCI electoral rallies. A priest in Rossindustria stressed:

The people of our community do not center their attention upon the elements of local administration. If you go to a meeting of the town council, you will see, unfortunately, that they speak of Vietnam, they talk about the great problems and not local administrative problems. . . . We are maximally politicized to think about the great themes, not the little matters.

Of course, the local PCI organizations have clearly not created the interest in international topics among the populations in which they function. They have merely intensified certain sentiments already prevalent in public opinion and channeled these sentiments in ways that conformed to party needs. Specifically, they have articulated the sense of waste and stupidity that most Italians of Central Italy associate with war, and they have reflected the anger of a rather cynical populace which suffered the consequences of living in an area that became a battle zone in World War II.

The Future

The foregoing evidence concerning organizational resources and strategic ingenuity suggests that the PCI at present exhibits a substantial degree of dynamism and leadership potential in Communist strongholds in Central Italy, but it does not shed much light on the critical question of what the party's prospects are for the future. Will the erosion of the mass characteristics of the party sections in the "Red Belt" proceed further and turn the party there into a weak, ossified relic? Will local militants attempt to forestall additional erosion by resurrecting the former policy of violent confrontation? Will party organizations in the area seek and find new foundations upon which to build fresh popular support through electoral means? Or what? In assessing these prospects, we must weigh not only the attitudes of local Communist party activists but also the nature of mass opinion insofar as we can gauge it from the indications available.

At the moment, there seem to be three conceivable general scenarios with respect to the future: (1) a revival of revolutionism; (2) a clear-cut lapse into social conservatism; and (3) a revitalization through the advocacy of programs of structural reform. Let us discuss each of these in turn.

Revival of Revolutionism. In this scenario, the party faithful would return to endeavors to overthrow the government by violent means, either with or without external support. Of the three alternatives, this one is by far the most farfetched and appears the least likely to occur. According to data gathered not only by the author but by other investigators as well,[16] there is only a small minority of what can be described as cold-war Stalinists remaining among the local PCI militants in Central Italy; furthermore, this sort of individual tends not to be nourished in these modernizing socioeconomic settings. The Stalinist types are older men, often at least 65, who became committed to the party in the clandestine period of the 1930's. The great bulk of the locally powerful activists, in contrast, are men now in their late 30's or their 40's who were drawn to the party of Togliatti, have no taste for a violence that might jeopardize the relative prosperity they have recently attained, and believe that violent methods are not attractive to potential supporters. These leaders tolerate the few rigid, hard-line types who remain, but they express feelings that often mix respect for the aging militants' demonstrated courage with bemusement at the inability of these men to perceive the inappropriateness of violent methods in the present.

Lapse into Social Conservatism. According to this scenario, local PCI activists and their supporters in the hegemonic areas will come to value the fruits of relative affluence to the point that they will eschew any program of major social and political change. To be more specific, party leaders will grow increasingly conservative as they themselves enjoy, and make available to party loyalists, the rewards of local administrative power—the lure of offices, patronage, social prestige, and business advantages will prove overwhelming. Maintaining electoral strength and reflecting an image of responsibility will then become paramount goals, even though only a minority of residents may enjoy party largesse and the militants may face widespread apathy among the citizenry. Under such circumstances, centers of PCI strength will in all likelihood not serve as spawning grounds for bold new programs to meet evolving social conditions.

[16] See the recent empirical work of Stephen Hellman and Peter Lange as well as the introductory and concluding chapters of the forthcoming volume edited by Blackmer and Tarrow, *op. cit.*

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This scenario is a good deal more probable than the first. No one who has conducted investigations in the "Red Belt" area would ever deny that activists enjoy the exercise of local power; moreover, the local leaderships clearly derive status and jobs from their political positions.

At the same time, such a scenario by no means constitutes an inevitable course of events. Perhaps its greatest weakness lies in its assumption that party leaders in the area will cease to be committed to radical political programs and will stop promoting them once they attain some measure of personal material comfort. The author's research convinces him that the local PCI elites have not yet become conservative but remain wedded to profound social transformations—especially if they perceive signs of interest in such changes on the part of their mass constituency. For example, local leaders expounded at length what they considered essential societal transformations. Most of their catalogues included free health care, broader access to free higher education, public housing, longer-term unemployment insurance, child-care centers, aid to impoverished regions, assistance for small farmers, efficient bureaucracy, further nationalization of key industries, and politically neutral mass media—all modifications urged by the PCI for many years. The activists, however, reported frustration because they had been unable to mobilize public opinion to work toward the realization of such goals. In fact, some of the more thoughtful among them discerned a connection between industrialization and a growing popular disinclination to press for reform through collective action.

Whether this scenario will prevail, then, depends on the ability of the PCI organizations in the area to enlist public backing for a program of social reform. That question, in turn, brings us to the third alternative.

Revitalization by Championing Social Reform. In this scenario, the party sections in the "Red Belt" would breathe new life into their operations by espousing a program of structural reforms in Italian society desired by the local populace. By linking themselves with a program of popular wants, they would, the argument goes, inevitably enhance both their electoral and organizational strength.

As we have already noted, though, the local Communist elites in Central Italy have long endorsed and continue to endorse a wide range of reform measures in the political and social realms, but they claim that their appeals for political action to achieve the implementation of such reforms have struck no responsive chord among the masses. Data from a poll of 502 Central Italian workers in 1966[17] and the author's interviews with 20 new factory workers in Rossindustria in 1968 tend to uphold the judgments of PCI activists that their constitutents are not passionately concerned with political action. Both the veteran industrial employees and the new workers had experienced dramatic improvements in their living standards during their lifetimes; consequently, they focused on concrete economic problems and did not spontaneously voice desires to improve working conditions, reduce working hours, or reorder hierarchical relationships with superiors. Moreover, they were not really sure what, if anything, they wanted government to do for them. To the extent that they did voice requests, they asked that government put pressure on factory owners to pay higher wages and to adhere to labor regulations.

Should we conclude, then, that virtually no possibility exists for PCI revitalization based on rather radical initiatives even if the necessary leadership is at hand? A combination of factors seems to indicate that this would be unwise.

To begin with, the data on working-class opinion reported above stem from contexts in which a poll-taker confronted respondents face to face and asked for immediate presentation of their policy preferences. Italians are notoriously suspicious of surveyists; therefore, it seems safe to assume that comments critical of governmental authorities were abnormally minimal.[18]

Second, neither a low volume of spontaneously expressed political demands nor satisfaction with relative prosperity precludes support of a radical party program. For example, we have evidence from accumulating studies—especially from important research carried out in England—that a demonstrated taste for material comforts associated with a middle-class life style is not usually accompanied

[17] This is an unpublished poll by the leading public-opinion research organization in Italy, Instituto per le Ricerche Statistiche e l'Analisi dell'Opinione Pubblica, "Indagine sugli Addeti all'Industria delle Provincie di Arezzo, Grossete e Siena" (Research on Factory Workers in the Provinces of Arezzo, Grosseto and Siena), S. 6620, July 1966. For more detailed discussion of the poll, see Stern, "Local Political Party Organization and Economic Change: Evidence from a Study of Four Italian Communities," *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.

[18] See J. LaPalombara, "Italy: Fragmentation, Isolation and Alienation," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Eds., *Political Culture and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965, p. 290, n. 13.

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A banner in a town of the "Red Belt" exhorts the public to vote for candidates of the United Left, comprising the PCI and the PSIUP (Partito Socialista Italiano di Unitá Proletaria—*Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity), in Italy's 1968 senatorial elections.*

—Photo by Alan J. Stern.

by a change in basic political identifications and voting behavior.[19]

Third, the workers in the Italian "Red Belt" generally exhibit strong party identifications, and a large proportion of them are loyal to the Communist Party. For example, 42 percent of the workers polled in 1968 said that they supported the Communist Party. It is probable, too, that a large share of the 28 percent who responded "don't know" were also PCI adherents. Similarly, 18 of the 28 new workers of Rossindustria whom the author interviewed in 1968 identified themselves as PCI backers.[20]

Fourth, the working-class population of Central Italy appears to be relatively politicized. In an absolute sense, to be sure, the factory workers are not engrossed in politics. Only 46 percent of the respondents to the 1966 poll, which took place in a nonelection year, reported talking about politics with others in the last month.[21] If, however, we compare this figure with that for all Italians, and especially for all Italians with similarly modest educations, in a nationwide study conducted during the early 1960's, we find it far above the norm. In the national study, only 32 percent of the respondents ever talked about politics, and this proportion fell to 22 percent in the case of individuals who had not gone past elementary school.[22]

Taken together, these factors suggest that at least those who have felt the greatest impact of rapid economic development in Central Italy may potentially be open to appeals for political action in pursuit of a radical program of reforms. This interpretation is bolstered by a consideration of a more general

[19] John H. Goldthorpe *et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure,* Cambridge, Eng., Cambridge University Press, 1969.

[20] See Stern, "Local Political Party Organization and Economic Change: Evidence from a Study of Four Italian Communities," *op. cit.,* p. 21.

[21] See poll cited in fn. 17: p. 35, Table 27.1.

[22] See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 116-21. Similarly, 51 percent of the Central Italian workers indicated that they had stopped frequently or occasionally to read wall posters about political or union affairs in the last month, while only 24 percent of the respondents in the Almond and Verba study said they followed politics regularly or from time to time.

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character. In advanced industrial societies, a reevaluation is now taking place of the view that ordinary people are single-mindedly concerned with the fulfillment of primary material needs.

While the appraisal of subjective human needs is a difficult task, it appears reasonable to argue that, under conditions of economic hardship, people will strive most of all for material security, but that once they have attained relative economic comfort, they will then turn to second-order wants. In a recent fascinating study, Ronald Inglehart presents convincing cross-national evidence to show that such a shift in values has commenced in Western Europe. Younger, better-educated, middle-class individuals among those investigated emphasized political participation and freedom of speech as the most important values to them when forced to choose from a list of values which included not only these but also order in the nation and protection from rising prices.[23] Although Inglehart observes that working-class people are not as likely to make such choices, it is surely correct to stress two things. On the one hand, those who have just recently acquired economic security would logically be expected to value it most, and the data already set forth in this article substantiate that they do. On the other hand, while workers may not take economic security for granted —as young people educated during the postwar years do—they will in all likelihood come increasingly to want more than a decent salary. Such a development seems particularly probable in Italy because of the generally shallow roots that capitalist values have in most segments of a society which has long been influenced by Catholic and Marxist ideologies.[24]

Under certain conditions, then, ordinary people in Italy—like the workers of the "Red Belt," who are accustomed to a reassuringly close, homogeneous, politicized environment—may conceivably develop desires of a kind which they cannot pursue alone or as a family unit and which they may look to government to satisfy. There is fragmentary evidence of two types that at least the initial stage of the formation of such desires may be under way. First, in a 1972 pre-election survey conducted in the regions of Emilia and Tuscany, the magazine

Metalworkers meet at the Acciaierie plant of Terni to discuss means of increasing industrial employment in the region of Umbria.

—Photo from *L'Unità* (Rome), Oct. 23, 1973, p. 4.

L'Espresso discovered that the greatest problems perceived by the respondents were school reform (32 percent), housing (37 percent), guaranteed employment (36 percent), and improved sanitary conditions (31 percent). Only 7 percent of the sample cited salary increase as a pressing problem. The author of the report on the survey noted with surprise that there had been a change in values since a similar poll only two years before, and he summed up his findings by remarking that "an image is delineated of an Italy that does not search in the pay envelope for the remedy to all its problems, but seeks political solutions for these problems." [25] Such a judgment may be somewhat premature; nevertheless, the data do seem to reveal some disillusionment with private solutions.

Second, union leaders in Northern Italy have successfully mobilized mass support for programs modeled on some of the "advanced second-order wants" outlined by Andre Gorz.[26] Specifically, the

[23] "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review* (Menasha, Wis.), Vol. 55, December 1971, pp. 991-1017.

[24] For a comprehensive discussion of the two dominant intellectual heritages and their political articulation, see Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970.

[25] *L'Espresso* (Rome), April 16, 1972. Respondents were allowed to give multiple answers to the question concerning which problems they felt were most pressing.

[26] See Andre Gorz, *Strategy for Labor*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1967, especially Chap. 3. For other commentary on the development of "second-order wants," consult Gorz's chapter, "Work and Consumption," in Perry Anderson and Robin Blackburn, Eds., *Towards Socialism*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966. Gorz himself relies heavily on the writings of the Italian trade union leader, Bruno Trentin—especially Trentin's "Neocapitalist Doctrine and the Ideology of Dominant Forces in the Italian Political Economy," in

(continued on page 53)

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unions ask, among other things, for a degree of control over apprentice training, the right to demand variety in factory assignments, and—even more fundamental—the right to link premium earnings to production rather than to profitability.

Desires like the ones mentioned in these two illustrations lend themselves quite readily to conversion into political demands; thus, *some* political party would seem to have an excellent opportunity to capitalize on the mounting sense of need for action in the spheres touched upon. In the case of factory rights, the Communists, especially where they are strong and enjoy traditional ties with the local union movement, would appear to be in a particularly good position to take advantage of the dynamic social situation.

Even if there were rising popular desires in Central Italy for social reforms, of course, the local PCI sections might still fail to nurse them into political demands and turn these to Communist benefit. It is essential to bear in mind here that local Communist leaders do evince attributes which could prevent them from capitalizing on their opportunities. One is that they have grown accustomed to thinking about what people deserve from government, not what they demand from public authorities.[27] These leaders have not, it should be underscored, sought to avoid contact with the population, but they have—perhaps ironically—tended to misconstrue the satisfaction that ordinary people have derived from achieving basic improvements in their standard of living to which they have long aspired. Believing that there were no pressures from below for basic reforms, PCI elites have endeavored to stimulate such pressures by initiating discussion within the framework of the mass party about what people deserve from the national government and by using similar tactics to mobilize citizens who have only recently gained the chance to earn industrial wages. Though neither effort has proved successful in arousing the enthusiasm of ordinary people, the experience has left a strong imprint on the mentalities of local leaders.

Another negative attribute of PCI militants is their continuing preoccupation with the party's local structures notwithstanding the fact that these have tended to lose their vitality to a certain extent. Two factors may help to account for the intensity of this traditional emphasis. In the first place, the leaders of party sections manifest a community rather than a national perspective. That is, they pursue intracommunity priorities rather than intercommunity goals—not because they are predominantly conservative but because they basically accept and feel comfortable with the community boundaries that limit their operative political worlds. The PCI in the "Red Belt" areas, in short, suffers from a serious case of parochialism; the longtime activists continue to seek to make the solidarities of class and party synonymous with the cohesiveness of community.

Second, party elites are exceedingly proud of the string of continuous local electoral majorities that they have registered and are deeply reluctant to endanger these. The party's lopsided majorities result, in part, from successful courting of middle-class voters, and the section leaders hesitate to promote policies, especially alterations in control of

The PCI holds a rally in Rome's Sports Palace on March 8, 1974, to mobilize popular support for a "new party initiative." The aim, as the backdrop proclaims, is "a turn in the direction of the country" stressing the defense of liberty and guaranteeing "to the family the support of a new politics."

—Photo from *L'Unità* (Rome), March 10, 1974, p. 10.

Tendenze del capitalismo italiano (Trends in Italian Capitalism), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1962, Vol. I, pp. 97-144.

For a recent analysis of the important changes in the relationship between the PCI and Italian unions, see Donald L. M. Blackmer, "Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970's," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), Vol. 21, May-June 1972, pp. 50-52.

[27] In the author's dissertation research, he asked community political leaders in several different ways to comment on the political issues that concerned the citizens of the towns. For example, a series of eight standard questions—which often took more than 30 minutes to go through—repeatedly probed whether leaders had noticed changes in the kind and quantity of services that the public requested from government. This interest in what people wanted surprised the local elites in all cases. They seemed quite unaccustomed to thinking about politics in terms of a model in which pressure flows from ordinary citizens to various leadership strata.

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factory conditions, that might estrange some of this backing. This reluctance is especially strong at the present time since no viable group threatens to attract working-class votes on the left.

Whatever the explanation of the preoccupation with local party structures, however, it constitutes a major obstacle to PCI exploitation at the grass-roots level of any incipient popular desires for reform. Thus, it could impede or even forestall the development of the scenario.

* * *

On balance, the author believes that the third scenario charts the path along which the party in the Italian "Red Belt" is most likely to evolve, despite the numerous obstacles that lie along the way. The local elites have hitherto demonstrated substantial capacities for innovation and adaptation, and in Italy generally, as in England and France, the political leaders of left-wing parties still enjoy great flexibility.[28] Ultimately, of course, the real test will unquestionably be the willingness and ability of local elites to teach their fellow townspeople, at the appropriate time, to press public authorities with demands.

Clearly, the foregoing analysis and conclusions regarding the situation at the grass-roots level in areas of PCI political hegemony are not automatically applicable to all parts of Italy—especially to those areas where several political groups regularly compete for power. However, in settings such as large cities, where the state of affairs citywide is competitive, PCI strength is often concentrated in specific residential quarters or neighborhoods that themselves are organized politically and socially in patterns similar to the PCI-dominated communities of Central Italy. Hence, many apparently diverse settings may have much in common with these locales.

[28] See Goldthorpe *et al., op. cit.*, and Richard F. Hamilton, *Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.

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Books

The Life Struggle of Indian Communism

By Bhabani Sen Gupta

G. ADHIKARI, Ed.: *Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India,* Vol. 1, 1917-1922. New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1971.
MUZAFFAR AHMAD: *Myself and the Communist Party of India, 1920-1929.* Translated from Bengali by Prabhas Kumar Sinha. Calcutta, National Book Agency, 1970.
GAUTAM CHATTOPADHYAYA: *Communism and Bengal's Freedom Movement*, Vol. 1, 1917-1929. New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1970.
SANKAR GHOSH: *Socialism and Communism in India.* New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1971.
SUPRAKASH ROY: *Bharater Krishak Bidroha o Ganatantrik* (Peasant Uprisings and Democratic Struggle in India). Calcutta, DNDA Brothers, 2nd ed., 1971.

IF INDIAN communism has lagged far behind Chinese communism as a political force, the reasons are to be found in the history of the Communist Party of India (CPI)—in its origins outside the country as a party of émigré intellectuals and in its long, uphill struggle to become a viable indigenous element in national politics in the face of the handicaps imposed by India's linguistic and cultural diversity and a political culture strongly influenced by British parliamentarism. One indication of the growing maturity of the Communist movement in India is the emergence since 1967 of a body of empirical literature about the movement written by native scholars and political actors. The five books reviewed here are cases in point, all authored by Indians, the first three dealing with the genesis of the Indian Communist Party and the last two with aspects of Indian political history relevant to the party's struggle for mass support. Two of the first three books are the work of veteran Communists belonging to rival groups, the CPI and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M), and the third by a scholar associated with the former.

In India the Communists were from the beginning confronted by two interacting forces: British imperialism and the rising Indian national bourgeoisie. The interaction between the two, which can best be described as a love-hate relationship, posed a problem which the CPI failed to resolve throughout the colonial period and even into the first years of independence. The Indian nationalists rejected imperial rule, but they were also wedded to the political ideology and representative institutions of parliamentary democracy. In the Indian National Congress, led by Mohandas K. Gandhi, the bourgeoisie found a credible and effective platform from which it could fight British imperialism and at the same time weave a network of theoretical and institutional symbiosis between empire and metropolis. The inherent conservatism of the Indian middle class was simultaneously weakened and strengthened by the evolutionary dynamics of the British political system. And when, under Nehru's leadership, Indian nationalism began to acquire liberal-socialistic trappings, the doctrinal foundation upon which it drew was not the Marxism of the Bolshevik Revolution, of which Nehru was a distant admirer, but the socialism of the British labor movement and the mildly fermented egalitarianism of the Fabian intellectuals.

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The Congress, which led India's transformation from empire into nation (or, more precisely, into the twin nations of India and Pakistan), provided a canopy under which diverse social elements could join together and strive for a common objective. While the party's base of support was fashioned mainly around the urban middle class and the landed gentry, it also had links with such "peasant" fronts as came into being in the 1920's, and when a trade union movement sprouted in the newly-flourishing industrial areas of Bombay, Calcutta or Madras, it too came under Congress leadership. Thus, the Congress became a dynamic and effective vehicle for the assertion of national rights. At the same time, there was a conspicuous absence of working-class and/or peasant militancy aimed at a radical transformation of the social system, notwithstanding the fact that individual Congress leaders, moved by an enlightened social awareness, came to embellish the Congress ideology with the rhetoric of liberal-democratic socialism.

WHAT IS OF interest to students of the sociology of communism is that, in such a milieu, no Communist movement could germinate within India even though the "objective conditions" were eminently suitable for one. Adhikari's first volume of the official, documented history of the CPI, Ahmad's autobiography, and Chattopadhyaya's brief account of the birth of the Communist party in Bengal confirm the hypothesis that a viable, dynamic nationalist movement is the strongest obstacle to the successful growth of communism in a colonial or semicolonial society.

Perhaps the situation would have been different if an indigenous Communist party had grown up in India alongside the nationalist movement, but this did not happen. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin and other Soviet leaders became interested in the development of proletarian groups in the colonies and semicolonies of the European powers. At the same time, Indian "revolutionaries" living in exile in Europe sought Moscow's support in forming a Communist party. M. N. Roy, whose contribution to the 1920 Comintern "Theses on the Colonial Question" is known to students of international communism, was undoubtedly the man most instrumental in the creation of the CPI, although Adhikari and Ahmad, despite their reliance on the same party documents, disagree in their evaluations of his exact role. Whereas Adhikari is almost respectful, Ahmad presents a tarnished image of Roy (Ahmad's autobiography professes to steer clear of "political controversies" but nevertheless is rich in sallies against individual pioneers of the Communist movement). Both, however, concede that the CPI was an "emigrant" party—founded, as Ahmad recalls, ". . . on October 17, 1920, in the city of Tashkent, capital of the present Republic of Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union." Many of the problems later encountered by the party can be traced to its origin outside India and its early fugitive character. Indeed, it can be said that the genesis of the CPI demonstrates how a Communist party should *not* be formed—but then there was no

Reviewers in This Issue

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other way that the Indian party could have been formed in the 1920's.

Before it could reach the masses, the newborn CPI had to penetrate the dual barriers presented by British imperialism and the party of bourgeois nationalism (*i.e.*, the Congress). The Comintern gave all the help it could—it trained Indian recruits to serve as party cadres, provided strategic and tactical guidance, and supplied money. But these were far from enough to establish communism as part of the Indian political process. Though some of the Soviet-trained "revolutionaries" went to India in the early 1920's, they went—according to Ahmad—not to build a party of workers and peasants but primarily to contact leaders of terrorist organizations. The petty personal rivalries and mutual antagonisms that characterized relationships between these groups and the imported "revolutionaries" also infected relations among the first-generation Indian converts to communism.

THE LARGENESS and diversity of India also played a part in retarding the creation of a truly national Communist party. "At various times, both earlier and later," writes Ahmad,

attempts to build the Communist Party began at four places in India. These attempts were not the outcome of any decision taken after discussions at a joint meeting of those who first ventured upon this task; they started independently of each other and at different places; one did not even know the other. . . . For all of us, the epicenter was the Communist International; its headquarters lay thousands of miles away, in Moscow. However, the Communist International established independent connections with each of these four places (Calcutta, Bombay, Lahore and Madras). In some cases, the Communist International introduced us to one another (as, for instance, it did Dange to me).

Still another impediment to the development of the CPI was the fact that from the outset Lenin, as the guiding spirit of the Comintern, clashed with Roy over the posture to be taken toward the national bourgeoisie. At the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, Lenin held that the Communists should enter into "temporary alliances" with "bourgeois democracy in colonial and semicolonial countries," although he conceded that they "must not merge with it" and must under all circumstances "uphold the independence of the proletarian movement even in its most embryonic form."[1] Roy, on the other hand, argued—for the most part unavailingly—in favor of more revolutionary tactics on the ground that the national bourgeoisie could not be counted upon as a reliable ally.[2] At one stage, he even conceived of forming a "liberation army" in Afghanistan with Soviet help.

The difficulties faced by the early leaders of the CPI within India were compounded by the fact that the Comintern did not remain consistent in its evaluation of the national bourgeoisie and the freedom struggle under the latter's leadership. In a message to a projected conference of Indian Communists in 1923 (which actually never took place), the Comintern adhered to the line of the 1920 Theses, characterizing the Indian bourgeosie as a "revolutionary factor" and urging the Indian Communists to give it "fullest support" in its fight against imperialism.[3] This Leninist concept led to adoption of the united front tactic, which the CPI tried without much success in the 1920's. Then, in 1928, the Comintern radically changed its stance on collaboration with the bourgeoisie, denouncing all bourgeois parties as "reformist" and anti-proletarian. CPI members were called upon to reject the formation of any bloc and "to demarcate themselves in the most clear-cut fashion from all the petty-bourgeois groups and parties."[4] Thus, it was small wonder that the CPI throughout the period of the freedom struggle vacillated between working with and against the national bourgeoisie and, in this agonizing process, found itself cut off from the mainstream of Indian politics at almost every crucial stage of the freedom movement.

IN CONTRAST TO those who stress such historical factors, some scholars view the passivity of the rural masses as a major source of the difficulties encountered by the In-

[1] See Lenin's draft thesis on the national and colonial questions, Roy's alternative draft, and Adhikari's explanatory notes, in Adhikari's book under review, pp. 141-205.

[2] Roy seemed to consider himself a more orthodox Communist than Lenin. In his *Memoirs* (Bombay, 1964, p. 355), Roy wrote: "I disagreed with his [Lenin's] view that the nationalist bourgeoisie played a historically revolutionary role and therefore should be supported by the Communists. The Polish Communists of the Luxemburg school used to remark in joke that I was a true Communist, while Lenin was a nationalist."

[3] Message from the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) dated June 14, 1923 (produced as Exhibit No. 15 in the Cawnpore Conspiracy Case), in Chattopadhyaya's book under review, p. 78.

[4] "Thesis on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-colonies," *Imprecor*, Dec. 12, 1928; see also O. V. Kuusinen, "The Revolutinary Movement in the Colonies," *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1928.

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dian Communist movement. Barrington Moore and others see in the traditional docility of the Indian peasant a sociological explanation of the relatively nonradical attitude of the society. This alleged meekness is, however, a myth which Suprakash Roy's volume on the numerous and often widespread peasant uprisings in the India of the 18th and 19th centuries goes a long way to explode. Roy's description of these uprisings, which were especially serious in Bengal and Bihar, shows that they were waged by armed peasants demanding redress of genuine grievances. Most of the struggles were protracted and involved thousands, and many were extremely costly in terms of casualties. In the Santhal uprising of 1855-57, for instance, of the 50,000 peasants who took up arms, 25,000 perished. A peculiar characteristic of these rebellions was that the peasants and their leaders refused to compromise. They preferred defeat and death to surrender.

Unfortunately, no comprehensive study of these struggles has so far been published in English. Nor is there as yet even any reliable history of the organized peasant movement under Communist leadership in the present century. The only available account, written by Abdullah Rasul in Bengali, is sketchy and laments the loss of many valuable documents. In recent years, however, Roy's work has been supplemented by similar accounts, also written in the vernacular, of peasant rebellions in Kerala and Andhra Pradesh.

It was not simply the application of British power that was responsible for blunting the thrust of Indian peasant militancy. A more important factor was the Indian nationalist "renaissance," which had the effect of removing the deprived peasantry from the center of national attention. Ram Mohun Roy, a leading architect of the renaissance, had the farsightedness to realize that bourgeois democracy would be the strongest instrument to forestall an agrarian revolution. Thus, he argued for a free Indian press on the ground that it would help to contain peasant rebelliousness. Meanwhile, Bankim Chandra Chatterji, known as the father of Indian nationalism as well as of Indian fiction, distorted several peasant uprisings in his novels and constructed the ideological framework of a middle-class nationalism which turned its back on any radical transformation of agrarian relations. Under his influence, peasant sufferings and struggles ceased to be the theme of novels and plays.

But, as Sankar Ghosh shows in his study of the Indian Left, the renaissance also had a "socialist" content. Middle-class "socialism" imparted to bourgeois democracy a social purpose which has apparently succeeded so far in making it more credible to the masses than the socialism of Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Mao. Ghosh's study of socialism and communism in India is lacking in depth, but it does reflect what may be called the plagiaristic element in Indian middle-class nonradical thought. When Gandhi once remarked, "I am of the opinion that even a king can be a socialist by becoming a servant of the people," he was echoing the ethos of India's bourgeois democracy. Nehru's "socialist structure of society" and Indira Gandhi's "Garibi Hato" (Banish Poverty) may be characterized as spurious imitations of socialist slogans, but they have helped the bourgeoisie not only to remain in power but to confuse and contain the Communists. Thus, a CPI evaluation of Mohandas Gandhi in 1969 paid the following tribute to his "socialism":

It was he who brought Daridranarayan, *the* harijan *(the deprived poor who is also in most cases the untouchable), to the center of the national conscience.*[5]

Gandhi, of course, did nothing of the sort, though he certainly acted as a catalyst in bringing the masses into the freedom movement and immensely strengthened nationalism by giving it a credible social purpose. Even today, the poor in India (42 percent of the population earn less than $4.00 a month) still remain far removed from the center of political power. And if their plight is at last beginning to disturb the national conscience, it is mainly because middle-class nonradical socialism shows signs of exhausting its potentialities as an instrument of relevant social change, and because there are incipient indications of a dangerous polarization of Indian society between the privileged few and the deprived multitude.

THE FUNDAMENTAL reason why Indian communism, with the exception of its Maoist fringe, still remains generally nonmilitant today lies in the predominantly middle-class composition of the leadership of both the major Indian Communist parties, the CPI and CPI(M). The 19th-century renaissance imbued middle-class leaders of the Communist movement, no less than those of bourgeois national democracy, with a

[5] Mohit Sen, "Gandhism After Freedom," in *Mahatma: A Marxist Symposium*, New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1969, p. 56.

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reformist radicalism which still constitutes the core of the elite social ethos. This reformist tendency manifested itself during the very first decade of the CPI's existence in two manifestos which the party presented to the Indian National Congress, the first in 1922 and the second in 1928. Despite the extreme "revolutionism" of individual Communists (notably, M.N. Roy), these two documents reveal the party to have been an ardent supporter of representative institutions and democratic freedoms and a champion of agrarian reform rather than agrarian revolution. The 1922 manifesto proposed virtually nothing that could be called radical in terms of emancipating the poorer sections of the peasantry, and even though the 1928 document included an anti-landlord statement proclaiming that "the land belongs to the tiller," the program of agrarian reform it suggested was by no means revolutionary. Today the two major Communist parties are still led by people who were involved in the creation of the original CPI; a new generation has yet to gain control of the central organs of either. Influenced by the leaders of the renaissance, who realized that the stability of their society depended on the prevention of an agrarian revolution, as well as by the social ethos of a middle class that derived its ideological sustenance from the renaissance and sought development without radical social change, the Communist leaders, after several halfhearted and unsuccessful "revolutionary" experiments during 1948-51, embraced the parliamentary process and opted for change without revolution.[6] In so doing, however, they failed to provide any clear-cut alternative to the leadership of the ruling Congress party.

IN SPITE OF its failings, the Communist movement in India has gathered momentum in recent years. Keen competition between two almost equal parties, the CPI and the CPI(M), with several Maoist groups forming an extreme flank, has expanded the Communist support base and resulted in the introduction of more varied forms of struggle ranging from parliamentary pressure on the ruling party to brief experiments in armed peasant struggle. The most significant thing to have happened to Indian communism since the mid-1960's is that it has adapted itself to a greater degree to the demands and conditions of the Indian social and political environment. Only lately have the CPI(M) and the Maoists turned seriously to the rural poor with programs and tactics of militant political mobilization. Neither of these groups is in a position to pose a serious threat to the bourgeois political system, and the task facing them is rendered all the more difficult by the fact that the existing system and the present bourgeois leadership enjoy the support of the USSR. Nevertheless, the increasing polarization of social forces and the poor performance of the present system in terms of economic growth and structural social change have brought to the surface a certain clarity of thinking in India's Left.

The role played by the Communists in stabilizing India's parliamentary system has not been insignificant. A majority of the leaders of both major Communist groups still regard themselves as symbiotically linked with it. The landscape began to change only when the ruling Congress party quite unexpectedly lost control of a majority of the local governments in the fourth general elections of 1967. The two Communist parties came forward, in coalition with other opposition factions, and promised to run the country "better" than the Congress, but they failed. It was during this first crisis of the political system that some Communist elements began to turn away from the established representative institutions and the pseudo-socialist ethos of bourgeois democracy. India, then, provides an interesting case study of a Communist movement which is as old as China's but which has been substantially influenced by bourgeois-democratic concepts. However, an effort to break away from the movement's nonradical past has now begun.

[6] In his recently published autobiography, *In the Cause of the People* (New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1973, p. 181), CPI(M) leader A. K. Gopalan gives this description of how the Communists' participation in parliamentary politics affected their thinking and life-style: "A new life, a new environment, a new alliance. I found myself in an environment calculated to ruin a man. First-class travel, comfortable chambers in Parliament, a surfeit of money, magnificent quarters, and a new life free of heavy responsibility. All circumstances favorable for a life of pleasure. Is anything more necessary to turn a man's head? Daily garden parties and tea parties given either by the Prime Minister, the President or the Vice-President. In addition there were hosts of invitations from the foreign embassies. This was the setting in which ties of friendship could be established with fashionable men and women who constitute the upper crust of society. . . . On the other hand, people from all strata of society were arriving daily to meet Parliament members to present petitions and memoranda. We were thus faced with a combination of circumstances that brought us face to face with temptations of authoritarianism and luxurious living, as well as self-conceit. Communists like me who had suffered from want of a change of clothes to wear, for want of shelter for a night's sleep, for want of money to pay for our tea and bus fare, and who were scoffed at by the elite of society, were particularly liable to be spoilt by this sudden onset of luxury."

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The Maoist Educational Revolution

By Theodore H. C. Chen

PETER J. SEYBOLT: *Revolutionary Education in China—Documents and Commentary*. White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973.
CHARLES PRICE RIDLEY, PAUL H. B. GODWIN, and DENNIS DOOLIN: *The Makeup of a Model Citizen in Communist China.* Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1971.
JOHN N. HAWKINS, Ed.: *Educational Theory in the People's Republic of China—The Report of Ch'ien Chun-Jui,* Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1971,

AFTER DECIDING at the turn of the last century to replace the traditional Chinese system of classical education, China looked in various directions in search of a new educational model to follow while adapting it to Chinese conditions and Chinese needs. The first modern school system, instituted at the beginning of this century, was patterned after that of Japan, which in turn had borrowed from the Prussian system. With the establishment of the Republic in 1912, however, the educational system of monarchical Japan was deemed inappropriate for the young Republic, and a new system following the American model was adopted. The influence of this model was subsequently reinforced by the large number of Chinese students who studied in American universities and returned home to take up key positions in the educational field, by the establishment of numerous American - operated missionary schools and colleges in China, and by the growth of various forms of cultural relations between the two countries. In the 1930's, there was also an escalation of European educational influence.

In the eyes of the Chinese Communists, who set up a "Soviet Republic" in the southeastern Chinese province of Kiangsi as early as 1931, there was of course no essential difference between the American and European educational models, both of which they regarded as reflecting the ideology of bourgeois society and as serving the interests of the capitalist class. To them, each of these models was inspired by an elitist philosophy that ignored the proletariat, and its urban-centered programs were moreover totally unsuited to the agricultural society of China. Accordingly, Mao Tse-tung from the early years of his career began groping for an educational system that would reflect his own ideology and help to bring about the kind of revolutionary society he envisioned, but his thinking on the subject developed only by degrees. While he has always recognized education as an essential tool of the revolution, he thought in this early period largely in terms of propaganda and indoctrination through a variety of media in and outside the schools. The problems of an organized school system with planned curricula and graded levels of instruction did not occupy his attention to any great extent. True, such ideas as the practical application of knowledge and the need to combine education with labor and production and to make education serve primarily the welfare of the masses, especially the workers-peasants-soldiers, were expressed in Mao's early speeches and writings, but the translation of these ideas into actual educational practice came only in later periods.

The schools initially established by the Communists in the Kiangsi Soviet Republic before 1934 were the product of largely uncoordinated efforts. Later, after Mao and his followers established their new base area in northwest China, their program of education was designed primarily to meet the urgent needs of cadre training and the "remolding" of intellectuals who had come from other areas. Relieved of the pressure of military campaigns, Mao Tse-tung now commenced devoting more time to ideological and educational problems. In 1942–44, he launched an ideological rectification campaign, and the pronouncements he made at that time were reflected in policies for the "reform" of

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intellectuals and for a type of education different from the academic program of the "regular" schools. In the "Anti-Japanese Military and Political College", where he was Chairman of the Education Committee, Mao began to implement his ideas on integrating theory and practice, simplifying school curricula, shortening the period of schooling, and giving central emphasis to political indoctrination. Nevertheless, there was no attempt to abolish "regular" schools of the academic type or to replace them with a system of revolutionary schools.

An opportunity for educational reform on a nationwide scale came with the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, but the time was still not yet ripe for a radical educational revolution. The first concern of the new regime was to achieve order and stability, and its initial policy was one of moderation in order to allay popular fears of sudden and radical change. According to charges made during the Cultural Revolution, which brought on the high tide of revolution in education, educational reform in the first decade went no further than piecemeal modifications of the old school system because (1) education was still dominated by bourgeois intellectuals bent on preserving the elitist, academic, and knowledge-centered type of schooling, and (2) the impact of "revisionist" Soviet educational influence further tended to reinforce the conventional system of education serving the interests of the bourgeoisie and elite classes. True, a new system was promulgated in 1950 which provided for such innovations as worker-peasant schools and spare-time schools. But, the Maoists charged during the Cultural Revolution, these halfhearted measures did not disturb the predominance of the "regular schools," and education remained oriented toward the production of an intellectual elite that tended to be alienated from politics, from productive labor, and from the masses.

It was the Cultural Revolution that finally brought about a clean break with the past in education. Guided by the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung," those wielding power instituted a sweeping new educational program designed specifically to meet the needs of rural China and to produce worthy "successors" fully dedicated to carrying on the proletarian revolution as envisioned by Mao. The "regular" academic schools no longer exist and have been replaced by schools that are action-oriented and not knowledge-centered. The practical needs of production and the requirements of an ongoing revolutionary movement determine both the objectives and the content of education. Entrance examinations based on academic knowledge have been abolished, and the schools and universities give priority to the admission of workers, peasants, and soldiers. Graded levels of instruction and learning are now of less importance. The designations of "elementary," "secondary," and "higher" levels of education are no longer indicative of curriculum content, and the primary criteria of achievement are now to be the degree of one's dedication to the revolution and the caliber of one's performance in labor and production.

Academic degrees have no place in this new educational program. Scholarship standards are rejected as earmarks of bourgeois elitist education, and knowledge for its own sake is ruled out as unthinkable and useless apart from practice. The "bourgeois intellectuals" are no longer in control. Authority in education has been taken out of the hands of intellectuals and educators and vested in "revolutionary committees" of noneducators and worker-peasant - soldier representatives who exercise "proletarian leadership" under the guidance of the Communist Party. In sum, the party is in full control of day-to-day school management as well as of the goals of education.

THIS SKETCHY historical summary is provided as a background for commenting on the three volumes under review. Mr. Seybolt's study deals more specifically with the current scene than the other two, although the authors of all three books are well aware of the revolutionary changes that have taken place in Chinese education since the Cultural Revolution. After a 51-page introduction in which he explains Maoist principles of education and discusses earlier developments from the Maoist point of view, Mr. Seybolt presents 32 selected documents from Chinese sources, grouping them under 11 headings such as control of schools, higher education, etc. Except for six documents dealing with education in the Yenan area before 1949, these materials all concern recent changes resulting from the educational revolution. "What one thinks of the current revolution in education," the author writes, "depends, in the last analysis, on the degree to which one is sympathetic with the objectives of Maoist communism." Seybolt's own approach is basically sympathetic, although he also alludes to some problems and difficulties that have arisen in carrying out the Maoist program.

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The volume by Messrs. Ridley, Godwin, and Doolin uses the method of content analysis in examining ten readers used as elementary school textbooks for Chinese language classes. The readers were published in Shanghai in 1957–58 and were in use before the Cultural Revolution. Thus, they belong to the period of limited educational reform when, according to the proponents of the educational revolution, Maoist principles were diluted by the bourgeois ideology of the intellectuals who then were still in control of education. The authors of the study, by analyzing the content of the readers to show the major themes and topics presented in them, attempt to draw a profile of the "model citizen" that the educational system is designed to produce. The themes of the stories, according to the authors, reflect "the kind of values" to be inculcated in the young, and the topics are the "kind of stories used to project the themes" (p. 162). Finally, the analysis portrays the "ideal child-citizen," "who is the perfect example of the knowledge, attitudes, and values set forth by the readers" (p. 184). This analysis occupies a little more than half of the book; the other half contains a directive of the Ministry of Education and selected stories from the ten readers.

Mr. Hawkins' smaller book (122 pages as compared with more than 400 for each of the other two studies) is a translation, with commentary, of a document that appeared in the initial period of the Chinese Communist regime. Dated May 1950, the document was written by the then Vice-Minister of Education in an effort to formulate a Marxist-Maoist theory of education emphasizing "serving the workers and peasants" and "serving productive construction." It probably would not be accepted today as an adequate exposition of Maoist educational thinking, but Mr. Hawkins' commentary goes beyond the translated document to bring out some general concepts which, in his view, still remain applicable even in the context of the revolutionary changes brought about by the Cultural Revolution. The author thus sees continuity rather than disparity between Chinese educational thought in the 1950's and Maoist principles of education today. "The Cultural Revolution," he writes (p. 52), "has left China for the present with an educational policy which in theory is little different from that expressed in" the 1950 document. This despite the fact that the Vice-Minister of Education who produced the document was one of the "bourgeois intellectuals" denounced during the Cultural Revolution for paying lip service to Chairman Mao's instructions while actually conspiring to continue the propagation of bourgeois ideology (see Seybolt, p. 10).

THE IMPORTANCE of ideology and politics in present-day Chinese education is a theme that runs through all three volumes. In this reviewer's opinion, ideology and politics are practically synonymous in the Chinese Communist lexicon, and the supremacy of ideology-politics in education is being asserted in China more positively and more persistently than ever before. If the thematic analysis used by Ridley *et al.* were to be applied to the teaching materials currently in use, the percentage of "political" themes would probably be noticeably higher than the 36.44 percent they discovered (as against 13.67 percent for "informational" and 49.89 percent for "behavioral" themes). Moreover, the informational and behavioral themes would be found more heavily laden with ideological-political overtones.

Specifically, the "glorification of Mao" is a theme that appears with far greater frequency today, and stories that are not in harmony with the current interpretation of Maoism have been weeded out of school textbooks. A concrete example is the story of Szu-ma Kuang, a young boy who, upon seeing one of his friends fall into a water cistern and realizing that there was no time to summon adult help, quickly picked up a rock, broke open the cistern, and rescued his playmate. This story, familiar to many generations of Chinese schoolchildren before the Communist movement, had been retained in one of the 1957 school readers (see Ridley, pp. 245–46), but it has now been attacked and rejected as a reflection of feudal social values exalting personal success and fame. There is today an active campaign against old teaching materials and "bad books" that contain "unproletarian" ideas.

That education in China is consciously used as a tool of politics is recognized by all observers of the China scene. Such a general statement, however, does not convey the full significance of the Maoist insistence that politics (and ideology) must be "in command" in all phases of educational effort. While educational theorists have recognized that education in every country is tailored to serve national goals, the supremacy of politics and ideology in Maoist education means more than the requirement that education reflect and advance national ideals and aspirations. It is not enough for the model citizen to love his coun-

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try and to be proud of its past heritage; he must love Chairman Mao and the Communist Party and must be thoroughly and unreservedly dedicated to the political-ideological line prescribed by the current leaders of the proletarian revolution.

Not all of China's heritage is deemed worthy of the citizen's pride; there are past traditions that must be resolutely rejected. Since the Tenth Party Congress of August 1973, for example, there has been an intensified campaign against Confucius and the "feudal ideology" he taught and perpetuated. Even in the realm of Marxist-Leninist ideology, interpretations once accepted as correct and binding are today denounced as "bourgeois", "counterrevolutionary," or "revisionist." Along with Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, the Communist intellectuals (*e.g.*, Lu Ting-yi) who once laid down the line to be followed in all schools and universities are today repudiated as renegades and saboteurs of the educational revolution. In sum, the rule of politics and ideology in education means specifically the inculcation of the beliefs, attitudes, loyalties, and habits of thought and behavior decreed by those in power in the party-state at any given moment.

But, as Ridley and his co-authors have pointed out, the Maoists have projected conflicting goals for education. On the one hand, it must provide personnel with the professional, managerial, and technical skills required for the building of a modern, industrialized China, and on the other hand it must produce the Maoist "new man" dedicated to the revolution under Communist leadership. This basic conflict between the goals of "redness" and "expertness" and shifts in the relative degree of emphasis on one or the other of these objectives have given rise to inconsistencies in school textbooks, as pointed out in the Ridley-Godwin-Dooley study (pp. 26, 29, 194). Seybolt tends to minimize the harmful effects of such conflicts and discounts the apprehensions of "forecasters of doom" who expected the educational revolution to impede China's reconstruction program (Introduction, p. I). At the same time, however, he acknowledges that Chinese educational policy continues to be affected by various contradictions—between nationalism and "the supernational aim of communism" (p. xix), "between the desire for mass artistic creativity and the restrictive guidelines placed on it" (p. xlviii), and "between local self-reliance and central aid and control" of education (p. li). The course of educational development in China in fact tends to be marked by vacillation between diametrically opposing tendencies, as the balance of power between the pragmatic and the doctrinaire elements in the Communist Party shifts from time to time. This situation makes for little stability, and it is difficult to identify steady trends or to foresee future developments.

Although Mao Tse-tung has at times used strong language in decrying book knowledge, theory not directly applicable to practice, and professional competence apart from politics, he has on other occasions asserted that there is a rightful place for the study of theory and the acquisition of academic knowledge. It is possible, in fact, to quote Chairman Mao either in support of academic study or in opposition to it, and both moderates and radicals have done exactly that. In general, however, Mao stresses the integration of learning and politics, of "expertness" and "redness," but Chinese educational policy has tended to zigzag first in one direction and then the other. Thus, in the 1950's educational policy stressed "redness" over "expertness." Then, in the interim between the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, that policy gave way to one that acknowledged the usefulness of experts even if they were not thoroughly "red"; indeed, some Chinese leaders were even bold enough to say that the country could benefit from the services of "white experts," and that "the color of a cat is of little importance as long as it catches mice." During the Cultural Revolution such views were vehemently denounced as "revisionist," and the pendulum swung back toward a more doctrinaire position.

THE LAST TWO or three years have seen still another shift in the direction of official policy. The pragmatic elements currently in authority seem to have tried to counterbalance the extreme measures adopted in the name of the educational revolution, and recent policy has placed greater stress on construction and rehabilitation, and consequently on the training of personnel to carry on the tasks of nation-building. Accordingly, there appears to be a renewed emphasis on regular school subjects, "basic knowledge," and the study of theory and technique—always, of course, with the proviso that such studies must be carried on within the framework of the approved ideological-political orientation. It has also been proposed that young people from families of bourgeois background again be permitted to apply for admission to universities provided they have satisfactory

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labor experience and good political records, and there has been a tentative restoration of university entrance examinations to supplement the method of "recommendation and selection" which replaced them a few years ago.

Such moves away from the radical program of the educational revolution have evidently angered the doctrinaire elements in the party. The whole question of the direction of current educational policy was brought to the fore last summer by a controversy over methods of admission to higher institutions of learning. A young man who had been in the countryside since 1968 engaging in required labor and production had won "recommendation and selection" to pursue higher education, but in the written examination, recently reintroduced as the final step in the admission process, he was unable to answer any of the questions because they required a knowledge of chemistry, physics, and other academic subjects which he had had no time to study during his long stint at intensive labor in the countryside working 18 hours a day. Full of both disappointment and resentment against those who had shunned labor to bury themselves in book study, he wrote a letter to the *Liaoning Daily News* to express his feelings. The letter evoked prompt support from those who viewed the new trends in education with alarm, and they quickly seized the opportunity to attack the "insidious" forces that were threatening to undo the educational revolution.

The importance of the controversy intensified when the prestigious party theoretical organ, *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), joined in the attack in an article entitled "The Deep and Far-reaching Significance of Reforming the System of Admitting Students to the Universities." Recalling Mao's instructions that education be placed under the command of proletarian politics and that students be selected from among the workers and peasants, the article asserted that the most important criteria of selection must be the political qualification and practical work experience of the candidates and that any attempt to restore the old elitist entrance examinations would mean a reversion to "revisionist" and "bourgeois" education. The cultural level of a candidate, declared the article, cannot be judged on the basis of an examination paper or on tests of how much of the content of middle-school textbooks he has mechanically memorized.

The outcome of this controversy is still uncertain, but it underlines the continued existence of conflicting views held by powerful proponents and the probability that more vacillations and swings in Chinese Communist educational policy can be expected. No matter what the future course of developments may be, one can readily agree with Mr. Hawkins that China is experimenting with an educational program that "has never been tried anywhere" on such a large scale (p. 52), as well as with Mr. Seybolt's observation (p. li) that Chinese theory and practice are bound to be "provocative and stimulating for everyone seriously interested in education or in social reform" because they represent "the most radical approach to problems endemic to the world today."



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Of Encyclopedias and Economists

By Vladimir G. Treml

A. M. RUMIANTSEV *et al.*, Eds.: *Ekonomicheskaia entsiklopediia: politicheskaia ekonomiia* (Economic Encyclopedia: Political Economy), Vol. 1. Moscow, Izdatelstvo "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia," 1972.

UNTIL WELL INTO the 1960's, the status of economists in the Soviet Union was clouded by ambiguity. On the one hand, theirs was clearly a recognized and respected profession with all the attributes and rewards accorded to scientists—membership in the Academy of Sciences, academic ranks, scientific degrees, prestigious institutes, and comfortable incomes. On the other hand, the regime's dogmatic acceptance of the economic tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism placed both the science of economics and the economists in an equivocal position, without any clearly defined functions in the society. Any revision, reinterpretation, or extension of the economic ideas of the "founding fathers" was ideologically unacceptable; for that matter, any claim to originality in economic theory was tantamount to moving beyond the pale of Marxism. Thus, from the early 1930's on, Soviet economists were confined to endless restatement and refinement of the basic postulates of Marxism, mainly as interpreted by Lenin, or to very narrow technical studies of productive processes related more to engineering and accounting than to economic analysis.

The role and status of the economic profession began to change gradually in the late 1950's. In the freer atmosphere following the 20th CPSU Congress, economists began—rather timidly at first—to evaluate the performance of the Soviet economy, to identify inefficiency, to ask probing theoretical questions, and to advocate improvements in the mechanisms of planning and control. After a gap of some 20 years, the Central Statistical Administration resumed publication of economic statistics, making the analytical work of the economists more meaningful.

The most important factor contributing to this renaissance of Soviet economic science was a marked decrease in ideological censorship. It did not, of course, suddenly become possible to criticize Marx or Lenin. But under the more pragmatic leadership of Khrushchev, the ideological watchdogs of the profession largely abandoned their practice of interpreting every new idea, method or concept in narrowly-defined Marxian terms. Thus, techniques such as linear programming, interindustry analysis and general mathematical economics, which earlier had been declared anti-Marxian, gained acceptability.

In the late 1950's and early 1960's, Soviet economic development showed signs of increasing sluggishness, and it grew apparent that the traditional methods of planning and economic administration were incapable of coping with the complexities of a maturing economy. Economists were called upon more and more frequently to give counsel, and their advice was heeded—as demonstrated, for example, in the so-called Kosygin reforms of 1965, which bore a much clearer imprint of economic expertise than previous reform efforts of the party leadership.

But while the demand for meaningful empirical economic analysis was increasing and the role played by economists was changing, their professional status was not keeping pace. The inherent conflict between dogmatic acceptance of Marxism-Leninism as the ultimate in economic theory on the one hand, and the emergence of new ideas and methods of the other, was slow in being resolved and had the effect of keeping the economists themselves in limbo.

A definitive article published in 1967 on the state of affairs in Soviet economic theory best illustrates this point. In that year, numerous special commemorative issues of books and papers were published summarizing 50 years of the development of various Soviet sciences. Academician A.

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Pashkov was selected to write such a paper on economics. His long "Development of the Political Economy of Socialism in the USSR" [1] underscored the strange phenomenon of a science without scientists. The author referred frequently to the Pantheon leaders: Lenin was cited 34 times, Marx and Engels were invoked eight times, and even Stalin—then taboo—got honorable "non-mention" (his reference to "leftist chatter about the disappearance of money" from his famous speech at the 17th CPSU Congress was quoted with approval but without attribution). At the same time, the essay listed numerous enemies of the Soviet state and men who had committed major "errors" in economic thinking—including Bukharin, Rubin, Bessonov, and others. Yet, in 15 pages of small print, Pashkov did not give the name of a single Soviet economist who had made a "positive" contribution to the science of economics. The implication was clear: the role of economists was to defend the purity of the official dogma and to protect it against revisionism. Original ideas were neither expected nor to be tolerated.

This approach has been typical of economic literature until very recently. Seldom have the names of economists or discussion of specific contributions appeared in reference sources, general and specialized encyclopedias, or full-scale studies on the history of Soviet economic thought and development.[2]

AGAINST THIS background, the recent appearance of the first volume of the Soviet Union's projected new four-volume Economic Encyclopedia is highly significant. While many entries in it are similar to those in the preceding edition of the Encyclopedia, published in 1962-65, it focuses on the economic profession, economic theory, and methodology, whereas the earlier work had concentrated on technical matters. It thus accords these subjects the mantle of legitimacy.

The new Encyclopedia represents the initial effort in Soviet experience to provide a "Who's Who" of the economic profession, with some 130 names given in Volume 1 for the letters "A" through "I" alone. The entries are short but fairly comprehensive and include the positions occupied by the persons listed as well as their publications and areas of special interest.

Unhappily, there are palpable omissions from the list—most notably among economists who, however prominent in recent years, work in fields of theoretical and applied economics that are still considered controversial in the USSR. Thus, despite a very robust development of mathematical economics, econometrics and related optimization techniques since the early 1960's, this school is clearly underrepresented in the volume. Considering the scores of lesser-known economists listed, one is surprised by the absence—for example—of V. D. Belkin, one of the pioneers in the introduction of computers into economics; of leading Soviet specialists in input-output analysis and econometric model-building such as E. F. Baranov, A. E. Berg, V. S. Dadaian, and L. M. Dudkin; of economists who made important contributions to the theory of optimal planning and pricing, including R. A. Belousov, A. G. Granberg, K. K. Valtukh, and V. A. Volkonskii; and of specialists responsible for the modernization of the science of economic statistics, notably N. K. Druzhinin. All these economists have important teaching and/or research positions at leading Soviet institutions and have written numerous significant papers and monographs. Such omissions raise serious questions about the criteria used for the selection of those to be included in the Encyclopedia.

In the latter regard, one of the interesting features of the volume is the care with which the editors have tried to maintain some unstated, but obviously existent, nationality quota among the selections. In addition to prominent Ukrainian, Georgian, and Armenian economists who would have every right to be included in the Encyclopedia, the reader finds completely unknown representatives of ethnic minorities. The attention paid to the issue of nationality is also evidenced in special entries on contributions to economic thought in Belorussia and Azerbaidzhan (presumably similar entries for other republics will be listed in subsequent volumes).

In another surprising departure from its predecessor, the Encyclopedia includes the names of several "nonpersons" of the past —economists who were purged in the 1930's and have virtually dis-

[1] *Voprosy ekonomiki (Moscow)*, No. 10, 1967, pp. 9-24. Five years later, in another summary of the development of Soviet economic science, the editors of the same journal published an almost identical, unsigned survey: "50 let SSR i sovetskaia ekonomicheskaia nauka" (Fifty Years of the USSR and Soviet Economic Science), *ibid.*, No. 12, 1972, pp. 3-19.

[2] There has been some evidence of the changing status of the Soviet economic profession in recent publications. See, *e.g.*, F. Ia. Polianskii, Ed., *Istoriia ekonomicheskoi mysli* (History of Economic Thought), Vol. 3, Moscow, 1970, which offers a discussion of the individual contributions of Soviet economists, an unusual topic for Soviet literature in this field (pp. 383-438).

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appeared from Soviet professional literature. For instance, there are entries for V. G. Groman, a pioneer in early Soviet planning and a member of the Gosplan Presidium, who was arrested and convicted at the 1931 Menshevik trial; for Groman's closest collaborator and onetime editor of *Planned Economy*, V. A. Bazarov, who disappeared in the early 1930's; for A. M. Gintsburg, one of the main authors of the first draft of the first five-year plan, who was tried with Groman; and for G. F. Grinko, the People's Commissar of Finance until his arrest and execution in 1938. There is also a reference to the "long-wave business-cycle" theory of N. D. Kondratev, a brilliant theoretician and statistician who was caught in the purges. As might be expected, however, nothing is said about the fate of these victims of the 1930's.[3] Moreover, the list of resurrected "nonpersons" is conspicuously incomplete, with no entries for a score of other equally noted economists and statisticians who were purged. The most glaring omission is Bukharin, who was possibly the most professionally competent among the Soviet economists of the 1920's.

On the plus side, another innovation in the Encyclopedia is the inclusion of the names of several Russian émigré economists, such as L. D. Bilimovich of Stanford University; S. N. Bulgakov, a "legal Marxist" and the author of several economic volumes, who later in life became a priest and a professor of theology in Paris; and P. B. Akselrod, one of the most prominent leaders of the Mensheviks.

There are a number of entries, too, for Western non-Marxian economists, living and dead. The treatment of their contributions and main work is fairly balanced and complete, although the descriptions almost invariably end on a note of criticism. Thus, William Baumol of Princeton University, a noted specialist in the field of corporate and mathematical economics, is accused of "idealization of capitalism and disregard of class factors"; the work of Evsey Domar of MIT, one the major contributors to the modern theory of economic growth, is described as "suffering from an idealistic approach to economics"; John K. Galbraith is identified as a "committed anti-Communist"; and the work of Arthur F. Burns, presently chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board and a veteran specialist in monetary and fiscal theory, is said to be "far from true science."

The Encyclopedia also offers brief summaries of the economic thought of several countries, but on a selective basis. Thus, Bolivia, Hungary, and Venezuela are listed by name, while Australia and Albania are not; and Austria is covered under the entry, "Austrian School of Economic Thought." "Economic thought" is defined, as it has been in Soviet literature for some time now, much more broadly than is the case in the West. In discussions of the development of the economic thought of individual countries, one reads not only about economists and schools of economics but also about programmatic statements of labor unions, government policies, and political party platforms.

THE EDITORS of the Encyclopedia apparently wanted to make certain that the novel features of this work would not escape the attention of readers. Their prefatory statement notes that "as in all sciences within the Marxist-Leninist tradition, in economics there exist different views, and the Encyclopedia gives not only the commonly-held view but also others." Weak as this recognition of the possibility of diverse theories is, it is quite significant in the Soviet context, where economics has so long been characterized by uniformity of views and acceptance of only one "true" body of theory.

The editors also stress the fact that the entries for bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and revisionist economists include not only "recommended readings"—*i.e.*, Soviet literature criticizing those whose views differ from the official Marxist-Leninist position — but also the titles of these economists' original works. As in the case of other features of the new Encyclopedia, this departure from past practice must be regarded as encouraging. Even in the most recent state-approved programs for university courses in the history of economic thought, references to non-Marxist economists append titles of "recommended readings" by Soviet critics but almost never name the original works of those deemed "alien." [4]

[3] Both Groman and Gintsburg were sentenced to 10 years in prison but were believed to have died in camps soon after the trial. In telling testimony to the state of historical records in the USSR, particularly with respect to the purges, Groman's date of death is reported in the Encyclopedia as 1932, followed by a question mark, and Gintsburg's name is followed by a note, "date of death unknown."

[4] The program for a two-semester university course on the history of economic doctrines approved by the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR lists Robert Owen's works as the last original non-Marxian Western source. Beyond Owen, students are expected to learn about Western economic thought on the basis of "recommended literature" only. Ministerstvo Vysshevo Obrazovaniia SSR, *Programma kursa istorii ekonomicheskikh uchenii* (Program for the Course on the History of Economic Studies) Moscow, Mysl, 1970, 47 pp.

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In addition to the various listings mentioned, the Economic Encyclopedia contains a broad selection of standard entries explaining economic terms, concepts, theories and institutions. While in this respect the volume adds little to what has been previously published in reference sources, the information is useful.

To sum up, the positive innovations in the first volume of the new Economic Encyclopedia, as set forth above, can justifiably be seen as hopeful signs of a trend toward greater objectivity and a loosening of the restraints of ideology in the field of economics, although it is obvious also that these restraints are still far from being removed altogether. It will be highly interesting to see whether the remaining volumes of the Encyclopedia will confirm this initial judgment.

The Political Economy of Comecon

By Andrzej Korbonski

RYAN C. AMACHER: *Yugoslavia's Foreign Trade—A Study of State Trade Discrimination.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
ANDREA BOLTHO: *Foreign Trade Criteria in Socialist Economies.* Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1971.
HENRY WILCOX SCHAEFER: *Comecon and the Politics of Integration. New York,* Praeger, 1972.
IMRE VAJDA and MIHALY SIMAI, Eds.:*Foreign Trade in a Planned Economy.* Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1971.

AT A TIME when interest in East-West economic relations seems to be growing by leaps and bounds as a by-product of the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington, the appearance of four books dealing variously with the foreign trade and economic integration of Eastern Europe can only be applauded. While neither of these important topics in Communist international economics has been entirely neglected in Western literature, the earlier works have left much to be desired—in terms of quality as well as of quantity.

It would have been pleasant to report that each of these four new volumes has helped in some measure to remedy this deficiency. Alas, this is only partly so. At least two of the monographs cover ground made familiar by others some time ago and add little to our knowledge of East European trade and integration. Moreover, the volumes engage in descriptive, nonanalytical writing devoid—with one possible exception—of any striking scholarly sophistication or insight. These works highlight the crying need for more adequate concepts and more comprehensive research strategies in the study of the international economics of Eastern Europe, in particular, of the economic integration of the region.

In his book (based on a doctoral dissertation), Mr. Amacher resurrects the tired controversy over discrimination in state-to-state trade among Communist nations. This debate originated, of course, over the question of whether or not the USSR has exploited the smaller countries of Eastern Europe in trade transactions. The author makes a novel attempt to assess trade relations between Yugoslavia and countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) in the same analytical framework, and he argues that Yugoslavia derived a rather substantial discriminatory "monopoly profit" in such commerce in the years 1966–68.

While this argument is of some interest, the treatment is regrettably shallow. One would have expected at least some effort to look at original Yugoslav sources and talk with Yugoslav foreign trade officials as a basis for determining how Yugoslavia was able to extract extra gain from its East European trading partners, if indeed it did. There is no evidence that Mr. Amacher has

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done either; nor has he engaged in that admirable sort of detective work on discrimination in the trade relations of Comecon states that was performed earlier by Frederic L. Pryor or P. J. D. Wiles.[1]

It would have been useful (and relatively easy) for the author to select at random two or three Comecon members and to estimate the results of their trade with Yugoslavia during the period in question. It is the reviewer's feeling that such an inquiry might very well show that Yugoslavia actually came out on the short end in these dealings. If, however, the reverse is true—as Mr. Amacher claims on the basis of Comecon data—then he ought to have addressed himself to the question of what factors were responsible for the disparity in Yugoslavia's favor. This he fails to do. (One could ask, moreover, whether the question of who exploited whom in Comecon trade with Yugoslavia is really of any importance. Since trade took place, it can be assumed that both sides found it profitable or advantageous, even though one might have derived a relatively greater gain than the other.)

In lieu of an organized discussion of the forces bearing on trade relations between Yugoslavia and Comecon, Mr. Amacher offers only the briefest comment on the importance of political factors. He states that his analysis "lends support to the contention that economic forces are important in determining the terms of trade in Comecon trade. It does not suggest that political forces are unimportant" (p. 117). Admittedly speaking from the perspective of a political scientist, the reviewer would prefer to reverse the order of priority of these two sets of factors.

Little light is shed on these matters by Miss Boltho's study, which apparently was completed as a doctoral dissertation at Oxford in 1965 and seems to have been only hastily updated. Why it was found worthy of publication in 1971 remains obscure, especially since most of the volume consists of either ancient history or a mere rehash of existing literature on the subject of "Socialist" foreign trade. (The author confesses that she retained the term "Socialist" rather than "Communist" in the title despite growing disenchantment with the countries that wear the "Socialist" label.) Forced to muddle once again through a discussion of the "law of value" and the "Lange-Lerner model" as well as descriptions of foreign trade enterprises, autarky, material balances, and the like, the reader asks: *cui bono?* Surely this has all been discussed in greater depth and with a higher degree of sophistication by others, whose works were published prior to the Boltho volume.[2]

BY CONTRAST, the Schaefer volume on integration turns out—despite the author's numerous disclaimers (*e.g.*, ". . . no attempt is made to define integration *a priori*" or "no attempt is made to weigh Comecon's achievements against its failures")—to be a very useful book. While not pretending to make a theoretical analysis of bloc economic integration, the study capably accomplishes the important task of providing factual data on Comecon activities from 1968 through the initiation of a "complex integration program" in 1971. Mr. Schaefer's research is painstaking and comprehensive. Probably every single official and semi-official pronouncement regarding Comecon has been summarized and put in proper perspective, with the result that one gets a clear picture of each country's attitude with respect to the various plans put forward for the purpose of streamlining the working of Comecon. While some of these attitudes (*e.g.*, those of Romania) are well known, others have not been so widely publicized. Mr. Schaefer's study provides clear-cut evidence of the lack of consensus among Comecon members on a number of important issues. Such detailed information is unquestionably of indispensable service to anyone attempting an in-depth analysis of the process of economic integration in Eastern Europe.

The most impressive of the four volumes considered here comes, interestingly enough, from Hungary. The authors of this collection of essays represent a veritable who's who in Hungarian economics: Maria Augustinovics, Sandor Ausch, Ivan Berend, Jozsef Bognar, Bela Csikos-Nagy, Mihaly Simai and the late Imre Vajda. Reading the volume, one sees why the Hungarian scholars have taken the lead among East European economists from the Poles, who for one reason or another have so far proved unable to fill the void left by the death of Oskar Lange and Michal Kalecki. The eleven essays focus on a variety of topics ranging from past and present

[1] Frederic L. Pryor, *The Communist Foreign Trade System*, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1963; and P. J. D. Wiles, *Communist International Economics*, New York, Praeger, 1969.

[2] See, for example, J. Wilczynski, *The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade*, London, Macmillan, 1969, and Alan A. Brown and Egon Neuberger, Eds., *International Trade and Central Planning*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1968.

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East European integration efforts to specific trade and payments problems experienced by Hungarians. All are clearly based on thorough research, exhibit a high degree of scholarly sophistication, and are largely free of the ideological trappings that still encumber much of the economic literature emanating from Eastern Europe.

The preface by the late Imre Vajda, criticizes past neglect of the role of foreign trade in centrally-planned economies and urges a thorough reappraisal of that function, especially in Hungary in connection with the establishment of the "New Economic Mechanism" in 1968. This disregard for foreign trade was in part a reflection of a longstanding East European obsession with economic autarky, an attitude which—as Berend points out in a historical survey of past integration efforts—surfaced after World War I, persisted during the interwar period, and was strengthened by the advent of central planning in the late 1940's. The attachment to autarky continued to bedevil Comecon at least until 1957, when the first multilateral agreement was concluded among that organization's members.

Movement away from bilateralism toward multilateralism is, of course, an essential prerequisite for future progress in Comecon integration. In his contribution to the Mihaly-Vajda collection, Sandor Ausch, a well-known critic of past Comecon policies, appeals for a major effort at this time to introduce multilateral settlements within Comecon. He sees this as essential to maintain momentum toward integration, although he recognizes the difficulties of achieving multilateral clearing without liberalization of trade and rationalization of prices.

IT IS A STRIKING commentary on the quality of Western scholarship that none of the previous three books discussed stand up to the Hungarian volume in terms of perceptive discussion of integration in Eastern Europe. This gap is particularly surprising in light of the quality of Western research into political, economic and military integration elsewhere on the globe—in Western Europe, Africa and Latin America. (One need only mention here the works of E. B. Haas, L. N. Lindberg, J. S. Nye, D. J. Puchala, and P. C. Schmitter.[3])

The reasons for this lacuna in Western scholarship are not difficult to discover. In large measure it is a result of the continued polarization of scholars in the field of Communist studies into "traditionalists" and "behaviorists." The former, who still tend to dominate the field, either have no interest in or simply have no knowledge of modern social science methodology and theory, and they consequently continue to produce largely descriptive, historical, nonanalytic studies of Communist systems. On the other hand, the latter —often openly critical or even contemptous of the "historians"— are so enamored with the application of increasingly more abstract and complex models to the East European environment that they tend to lose sight of the realities of national and international politics in the Communist world.

When applied to the field of East European integration, the "traditionalist" approach produces lengthy studies analyzing in minute detail the Comecon nations' foreign trade data, which are freely available in the statistical yearbooks of these countries. Such studies criticize *ad nauseam* the errors committed by East European central planners in the 1950's and 1960's and pay little or no heed to the national and international political universe in which the planners had to operate. They also take delight in listing the various legal and institutional obstacles to closer Comecon integration and at the same time criticize Comecon for failing to progress "as far" on the road to integration as the European Economic Community.

(In this regard, one should note a certain inconsistency in the attitude of Western observers toward Comecon. On the one hand, Western commentators criticize the apparent lack of progress toward East European integration, which they attribute to the absence of supranational authority and the continued emphasis on national sovereignty. On the other hand, the slightest sign of autonomous foreign or domestic policy is welcomed as a symbol of independence from Soviet domination. This inconsistency has not escaped the attention of East Europeans, who have been heard wondering aloud what the West really wants—closer Comecon integration or national sovereignty.)

The "behaviorists," in turn, display little interest at all in analyzing the problems of integration. They prefer to apply, often uncritically, models developed for the study of Western political systems or less developed countries to Eastern Europe with little or no knowledge of the individual countries studied. The resulting

[3] A relatively recent bibliography of research on regional integration throughout the world lists the following number of items: Western Europe—85; Eastern Europe—15; Africa—39; Latin America—45. See L. N. Lindberg and S. A. Scheingold, Eds., *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 403-15.

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research tends to be quite far removed from political reality. Moreover, the focus of such studies tends to be either too narrow or too broad, some dealing with microcosms such as the politburo, the central committee, or party membership, while others address themselves to such macrocosmic topics as "change in the political system."

However, the process of international integration is a highly complex one, and its study requires a combined effort of scholars representing diverse disciplines and persuasions. As long as integration in Eastern Europe is studied by economists or political scientists, "traditionalists" or "behaviorists," working in isolation, the results are not likely to be very fruitful. What seems to be called for is a synthesis, a cooperative effort approaching the subject from a variety of angles. That this is possible has been amply demonstrated by research on the EEC and on integration processes elsewhere. In the very few cases where a comparable effort was made in the study of Eastern Europe, the intellectual payoff was most impressive. J. M. Montias,[4] in particular, has shown that one could meaningfully analyze the process of East European integration without resorting to lengthy statistical tables, conventional wisdom about "extensive" growth, or abstract models. There is no reason why his pioneering work—regrettably never fully developed—cannot be built upon in the future.

Several research priorities and strategies suggest themselves. In the first place, there is a distinct need to define the concept of "integration" as applicable to Eastern Europe. Some admirable work in the conceptualization of integration processes has been done by J. S. Nye.[5] His paradigm could be easily applied to and tested on Comecon. If, as may well be the case, the paradigm proves inapplicable in part or *in toto*, the exercise should provide an incentive to broaden or revise the concept so as to make it possible to compare Comecon's experience with integration efforts in other political and economic systems. Once agreement is reached on definitional and conceptual matters, it should be possible to determine how much progress Comecon has actually made toward integration. This would hopefully put an end to persistent contrasting of Comecon stagnation and Common Market dynamism based upon the false assumption of close comparability between the two systems.

When it comes to analyzing the process of integration in Eastern Europe, we probably already have sufficient information regarding the purely economic aspects (although we clearly need to know more about the progress of economic reforms and other efforts to improve economic performance throughout the area). On the other hand, much more remains to be learned about the political arena. Study of this arena is particularly important since it is there that the principal bottlenecks on the road to integration would appear to lie. As to the most profitable research approach, the reviewer has already suggested elsewhere that:

What is needed is a switch in emphasis from the macro- to the micro-type of analysis. We still know relatively little about the behavior of some key individuals and groups such as party and government bureaucrats, managers and planners. We have even less knowledge about the processing of "inputs" and the process of decision-making in Comecon countries. The same applies to such problems as negotiating techniques and style, ways and means of solving disputes, formal and informal arrangements for consultations among strategic actors, and so on.[6]

By abandoning rigid and parochial disciplinary concerns and by synthesizing efforts, we should be able to arrive at a more balanced perspective and to dispel the primarily negative view of Comecon's integrative efforts. The results should be highy rewarding and intellectually stimulating.

[4] J. M. Montias, "Problems of Integration," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), July 1966, and "Obstacles to the Economic Integration of Eastern Europe," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, Calif.), July-October 1969.

[5] J. S. Nye, *Peace in Parts*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971.

[6] A. Korbonski, "Theory and Practice of Regional Integration: The Case of Comecon," in Lindberg and Scheingold, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

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Notes & Views
Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

THE SOVIET MILITARY

TO THE EDITORS: William E. Odom's recent article, "The Soviet Military: The Party Connection" *(Problems of Communism,* September-October 1973), contains several valuable observations about the nature of the Soviet military establishment and its relationship with leaders of the Communist Party. His criticisms of Roman Kolkowicz's model of inherent conflict between the professional values of the military and the antithetical ideological beliefs allegedly held by the party are valid and well taken. Mr. Odom's proposal to examine the activities of the Ministry of Defense by using an alternative conceptualization, which he identifies as a bureaucratic-political approach, also has considerable merit.

Odom's analytical perspective, however, has serious shortcomings. His article characterizes the Ministry of Defense as a passive "executant" of policies apparently developed by the party without significant military participation. He identifies this compliant policy-implementation role as essentially "bureaucratic." His approach underestimates badly the parochial lobbying potential and activities of the Soviet military establishment and misunderstands the fundamentally political nature of public bureaucracies.

I believe that the application of a different model of bureaucratic behavior can lead to a greater understanding of the political role of the Ministry of Defense. In recent years, Morton Halperin and Graham Allison have formulated an approach which focuses upon the dynamic roles played by government bureaucracies in the development and implementation of US foreign and national security policy. Their "bureaucratic politics" model emphasizes the differing perspectives held by members of self-interested public bureaucracies. It also focuses upon the maneuvers that bureaucrats employ in order to shape the development, selection and implementation of policies in directions that benefit their constituencies.

The Soviet military can be usefully studied from this perspective. There are several broad policy orientations that appear to be generally shared throughout the Soviet military establishment. Some of these views—intense patriotism, support for a centralized command economy, literary conservatism—were noted in Odom's brief review of the Soviet military viewpoint. Military spokesmen have frequently voiced these and other institutional views in the public media and can be expected to lobby in support of policies which reflect their parochial preferences within government and party councils as well.

The Ministry of Defense is by no means monolithic. Members of the five military services, for example, appear to hold differing views regarding the assignment of roles and missions among the services and the levels of budgetary support that each should receive. Service parochialism was most evident during the early 1960's when the military found itself in a period of doctrinal ferment and faced strong political pressures to limit defense spending. Interservice conflict appears to have decreased in the period of general force expansion under the more accommodating Kosygin-Brezhnev leadership. Nevertheless, the recent publication of Admiral S. G. Gorshkov's series, "Navies in War and Peace," in *Morskoi Sbornik* (Moscow, Nos. 2-12, 1972, and No. 2, 1973) indicates that service chiefs continue to engage in vigorous promotion of their vested interests.

Spokesmen for the Ministry of Defense and the individual services almost certainly lobby actively on behalf of their organizational interests within the Soviet policy-making arena. While clearly subordinated to the ultimate decisions of the civilian-dominated party Politburo, the Soviet military has apparently enjoyed regular and direct access to that body and other defense policy-making organs. The military demonstrated its policy strength during the early 1960's when it successfully overcame Khrushchev's determined budgetary and doctrinal challenges. In recent years, as Mr. Odom noted, the military and political leaderships have so often expressed similar viewpoints that it is difficult to determine who has been influencing whom. The cardinal exception to this policy consensus has appeared with regard to arms control, where military opposition to the Brezhnev policy line has periodically surfaced. Although compelled to accede to the arms limitations contained in the SALT I agreements, the military has

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apparently been compensated for its acquiescence. This compensation has taken the form of continued Politburo support for the substantial strategic force modernization program which was evidently undertaken in the late 1960's and has become increasingly evident over the past six months.

The ability of the Soviet military to exert influence upon defense-related issues is enhanced by the near-monopoly position they occupy in the framing of military policy questions. In its General Staff, the Soviet military establishment possesses an organization which plays a dominant role in both the elaboration and implementation of these policies. Its wide-ranging responsibilities include the formulation of military strategy, military-economic planning, foreign military assistance, the collection and evaluation of military intelligence, operational planning, and the supervision of actual military operations.

The influence potential of the Ministry of Defense is further augmented by its symbiotic relationship with the several industrial ministries engaged in defense production. This industrial complex, presided over by CPSU Secretary D. F. Ustinov and Deputy Premier L. V. Smirnov, shares with the military a direct interest in the growth and continual modernization of the equipment inventory held by the Soviet armed forces. The political importance of this military-industrial coalition is likely to be particularly significant in a period of collective leadership.

In sum, I believe that Mr. Odom is correct to state that a policy consensus currently prevails between the Politburo and the Soviet military leadership. This consensus, however, owes much to the degree to which the members of the Politburo have come to support traditional military viewpoints. Should Brezhnev and his colleagues become less solicitous regarding military desires, Soviet military elements are likely to become more visibly assertive in the promotion of their shared and separate institutional interests.

EDWARD L. WARNER, III
Reston, Virginia

MR. ODOM REPLIES: I would like to express delight that Mr. Warner finds at least some of my analysis persuasive—but where he is convinced, it seems to be for the wrong reasons, and where he disagrees, it appears due to misunderstanding.

First, my laconic remarks on the nature of bureaucratic politics make no pretense at being complete. In such a few words the most I could do was to offer a few examples of the kinds of insights and reasoning that are possible by applying limited, or "middle-range," generalizations from Western literature to the study of Soviet bureaucratic hierarchies. There is nothing incompatible between my remarks and the analytical models used so adeptly by Professor Allison. I find his approach extremely congenial and applaud efforts to move it to the study of Soviet politics. Unless great care is taken, however, in finding empirical referents in the Soviet milieu for terms like "lobbying," and others with special American connotations, I fear that serious category mistakes will result. Professor Allison would undoubtedly endorse this caveat, and he would probably feel more confident about inferences drawn from Admiral Gorshkov's published views (and those of other military figures) if he were told a lot about the organizational structure of "Glavlit," the infamous Soviet censorship bureaucracy, and the games played by its faceless members in confrontations with military authors. It is not totally inconceivable that unique features of the Soviet system actually structure Admiral Gorshkov's incentives in a way that discourages him from trying to influence the Politburo by writing Aesopian prose for the readership of the military press. And if he persists in spite of disincentives, it would be nice to know who those readers are and how they exert pressure on the Politburo, once the Aesopian message has become clear and cogent to them. These research tasks are not easy, but until they are adequately dealt with, all talk about parochial interests, assertiveness and lobbying by the military lacks a firm empirical basis.

Second, my assumptions about the nature of party-military relations do not necessarily restrict the Ministry of Defense to a "passive" and "compliant" role. I said that marshals and generals are not in a position to frame the issues of defense policy (which inherently cut across science, industry, education and manpower allocations) but rather can only "react" to them. They may react aggressively or passively, and they may execute policy compliantly or reluctantly. The executants' reactions over time undoubtedly create a feedback effect on the further framing of issues in the Politburo, although military leaders are probably unable to anticipate that effect more than part of the time. In any event, an astute student of bureaucratic politics will not underestimate the potential power of passive gambits by subordinates vis-à-vis their hierachical superiors.

Third, concerning the "monolithic" character of the Ministry of Defense, my remarks on the nature of bureaucracy carry the implicit assumption that power is always diffuse in organizations. The patterns of diffusion, however, can vary. And varying patterns inevitably generate varying styles of bureaucratic politics.

Finally, Mr. Warner confuses me about where he stands on the central question of my essay: Is the party-military boundary a potential cleavage in the Soviet polity? In other words, do officers see the party-military dichotomy as relevant for deciding how to stand on the major policy issues? He starts by agreeing with my rejection of Roman Kolkowicz's answer to this question. Later he accepts my observation that if there is conflict on the party-military front, there is very little evidence of it. But then he ends by emphasizing the importance of the potential cleavage, which he believes is being held in abeyance only by the Politburo's concessions to the Ministry of Defense. If this is truly his view, I fail to understand his quarrel with Kolkowicz.

(Mr. Odom is currently abroad. After June 1974 his address will be the Department of Social Science, US Military Academy, West Point, New York.)

FOR THE RECORD

TO THE EDITORS: In the writing, condensing and editing of my article "Finnish Communism and Electoral Politics" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1974), there cropped up several imprecisions which should be corrected.

With reference to the statement on page 40 concerning the degree of fluctuation in

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the Communist vote from election to election, reference to the table on page 36 reveals, of course, that the variation was generally *less* than the average of 1.7 per cent, not more as suggested in the edited article.

As for the electoral successes of parties of the working class, it should be noted that in addition to capturing 103 of the 200 parliamentary seats in 1916 and 1966 (see p. 45), these parties also captured 101 seats in 1958.

Finally, it should be noted that, although there were no supporters of the SKP and SKDL in the caretaker cabinet formed after the March 1970 election (see p. 43), representatives of these parties did enter the government formed by Ahti Karjalainen in mid-1970, only to tender their resignations shortly thereafter, in early spring 1971.

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NOTE: The Editors of *Problems of Communism* apologize to Prof. Hodgson and to all our readers for the errors which were inadvertently introduced into the text of his article, "Finnish Communism and Electoral Politics." We thank him for setting the record straight.

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